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1DEDICATION
Dedicated to N’na – she who toiled in the fields of motherhood
But never within the dictates of the divine will
Wiped off the sweat from her brow – the labour of eve
But the multitudes of men have, shall and will always
By proxy, harvest the blooming fields.
And dedicated also
To this age-race of men who confuse complacency with development
Ah yes - the multitudes who march in a delusion empowered by drumless songs to the
grave
That grave
Of ignorance
Of hunger
Of thirst, and
Of poverty of the mind
And yonder, beyond the hills of strange-familiarities
The tidings of the cup is brought to all
To drink
To be sober
To be enlightened, and
To reverse the tide of complacency
But they fail to ask:
Where is the torch and spirit to transform dreams?
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8PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The international community has invested a significant amount of resources to
limit corruption in developing countries and institute sound public finance
management systems.1 This strategic approach has resulted in the emergence of anti-
corruption commissions in Africa and elsewhere as a means to institute good
governance, limit unconscionable spending and promote economic growth.2 However,
a proactive participation of Parliaments and other key stakeholders, including the
Auditor-General and civil society, in achieving this goal, has been very limited. As a
result, systemic corruption and mismanagement of financial resources continue to
pervade emerging economies in the midst of an unsettled political climate and limited
reforms.3
Notwithstanding this trend, the quest for achieving transparency and
participation in the budget process has become part of the general rubric of national
developments.4 By design and purpose, international policy makers and leaderships of
emerging economies are pursuing new public financial management strategies to
increase the role of oversight institutions such as Parliaments, to enhance economic
performance and curb corruption in the public sector.5 At the heart of the new
strategies lie the improvement of budget transparency and participation.
1 International Monetary Fund (IMF) , Manual on Fiscal Transparency, (2000), p9; Communiqué of
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, Commonwealth Secretariat,
2003. p4
2 Ibid.,p4
3 D. Leonard and S. Strauss, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes and
Cures, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003 p5
4 Ibid., p8
5 Ibid.,p8
91.2 BUDGET TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION
Put simply, budget transparency and participation constitute the attainment of
acceptable levels of fiscal disclosure in the budgetary process that matches the
appropriate standards of oversight coming from within and without.6 Transparency
must come from the executive (within) in the management of the budget through the
observance of fiscal accountability rules as well as upholding the principles of good
governance.7 Participation on the other hand, is the enhanced level of scrutiny that
comes from constituted authorities (without) such as the Parliament and the auditor-
general, and from non constituted authorities such as the civil society.8 As the Africa
Budget Project puts it:
There is an emerging consensus on the importance of transparency, as a
fundamental principle in public finance theory, in achieving sound financial
and budget practices. Not only is transparency [a] prerequisite for effective
participation around budget issues by both the legislature and the civil society,
but it is also conducive to better decision-making in government and provides a
check on the behaviour of decision-makers. More broadly citizens, as
contributors to the public purse, have a direct interest in transparency as they
are entitled to know how their government is using and managing public
funds.9
1.2.1 Significance of budget transparency and participation
The significance of budget transparency and participation rests on the fact that
national development largely depends on the effective management of public finance.
Therefore, not only is allocative efficiency and value for money critical to national
development, but the involvement of key oversight institutions in turn provides the
6Commonwealth Secretariat, Public Financial Management Reform: Case study of South Africa,
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007 p10
7 M. Claassens and A. Van Zyl, Budget Transparency and Participation: Nine African Case Studies,
Cape Town, IDASA, 2005 p 10
8 Ibid.,p10
9 Ibid, p11-13
10
basis for assurances that tax moneys are well spent on service delivery.10 In addition,
developing countries have mostly continued to face mounting fiscal pressures to make
further improvements as aid flows have failed (although not in all cases) to keep pace
with inflation; also, domestic resource mobilization mechanisms are in dire need of
review and reinvention.11 As current expenditures (particularly wages and salaries)
have grown steadily, revenue growth has generally been slower to catch up with
trends. As a result development expenditures have been squeezed, compromising
future growth prospects.12 At the same time there are growing pressures to improve the
quality and coverage of public services as well as developing the human resource.13
The attainment of fiscal transparency and effective participation of key stakeholders
holds out the prospect of addressing these issues by improving the effectiveness of
public expenditure to achieve national development.14
Approaches to budget transparency and participation
Approaches to the improvement of budget transparency and accountability
across developing countries fall into two categories: the international and the regional
or country levels.
1.2.2 The International Level
International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and
international development agencies, including the United Kingdom Department for
International Development (DfID), have provided lots of technical, advisory and
financial support to institute transparency and accountability in the budgetary process
10 Ibid.,p13
11 W. Tan, “Improving Public Financial Management in the Caribbean”, Commonwealth Public
Expenditure Management Seminar Report, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006, p3
12 Ibid.,p4
13Ibid.,p4
14 Ibid.,p4
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of developing countries.15 These development partners have also established
performance base indicators for the assessment of financial management, including
triggers and benchmarks that would determine the flow of direct budgetary support to
developing nations. Key among these compliance tools are the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Best Practices for Budget
Transparency, and its corresponding instruments: Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs),
Country Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAAs) and Country Procurement
Assessment Reports (CPARS) of the World Bank. These tools primarily provide
transparency guidelines for recipient nations.16 Other transparency and accountability
guidelines include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Reports on the Observance
of Standards and Codes of Fiscal transparency (Fiscal ROSCs), the IMF-World Bank
Public Expenditure Tracking Assessments and Action Plans for Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC AAPs).17 These instruments aim to strengthen expenditure
monitoring and fiscal responsibility, among others.
Recent initiatives have however witnessed some coordination among donor
agencies. The IFIs and corresponding development agencies, for example, DfID have
made efforts to harmonise their individual assessment and performance instruments for
developing countries so as to record better impact. The rationale behind the
harmonisation is primarily to coordinate their activities in a better way. In the past, a
developing country would host more than four similar assessment missions from four
international development agencies in a period of two months to measure performance,
15 PFM Performance Management Framework, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
Secretariat, www.pefa.org June 2005
16C. Santiso and A. G., Belgrano, Waiting for Godot? Legislative Budget Oversight and Public Finance
Accountability in Peru, xvi Regional Seminar Paper, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/1905258.pd,
January 2004, p 2
17 Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund , Manual on Fiscal Transparency,
Washington, 2003 p16
12
transparency and accountability in the financial management system.18 These lapses in
development assessments led to the establishment of the Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability (PEFA) Secretariat to coordinate the harmonisation exercise.
The PEFA Secretariat is housed in the World Bank, Washington.19
Added to the above collaborative activities of IFIs and development agencies, a
host of multilateral organisations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat are equally
pursuing budgetary reform measures as part of a comprehensive public sector reform
package for member countries. At a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)
workshop held in Nairobi (10th – 14th December, 2001), for example, participants -
mostly drawn from Parliaments - recognised the need for effective scrutiny and
resolved that “the future of Parliamentary oversight must [ensure] that the provisions
governing Appropriation Bills are properly enforced and that preventive policies are
put in place to mitigate against fraud, waste and abuse of public funds”.20 Similarly, at
a Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) held in Abuja, Nigeria
in 2003, leaders committed themselves to institute transparency and accountability in
the public finance management system of developing member countries.21 The
Commonwealth Secretariat has to this effect developed Guidelines for Public
Financial Management Reform to guide reforms in member countries. The publication
received the endorsement of finance ministers, as well as being adopted by the Heads
of Governments at Malta CHOGM in November 2006.22
1.2.3 Regional and country levels
18 Ibid., p16
19 PFM Performance Management Framework, www.pefa.org June 2005
20 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Workshop Report, held in Nairobi, Kenya, 10th – 14th
December 2001, http://www.cpahq.org March 2006
21 Commonwealth Secretariat, Abuja Communiqué of Commonwealth Heads of Government, 2003
22 K. Marah, Commonwealth Secretariat, Guidelines for Public Financial Management Reform:
Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in the Public Sector, 2006 p 2
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Across all the regions of the world: Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific,
young and old democracies are all on the march towards achieving strong oversight
measures to curb corruption and waste in the public sector.23 The African Union (AU)
as part of its initiative, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), for
example, has launched the “peer review mechanism”, which enables the AU to
appraise upfront member countries’ performance on a broad range of governance
issues and judicial matters. 24 The review instrument is quintessential to well-meaning
reforms geared towards achieving accountability and transparency in the public sector
of member countries. In India, for example, the use of the “report card system” by
service users in local communities has helped to assess the quality of services
delivered by agencies, and has recorded recognition and success beyond the borders of
that country.25 Developing economies in Latin America have also embarked on public
expenditure management reforms to improve transparency and accountability in
decision making mechanisms, including strengthening legislatures to scrutinise the
executive budget.26
Waves of ongoing reforms in public financial management and budgeting in
some countries have partly given rise to the emergence of corruption-curbing agencies
or anti-corruption commissions, such as in Kenya.27 In addition, the role of the media
and civil society organisations in the promotion of fiscal transparency and
accountability has received recognition and is being strengthened in almost all
developing countries. The trends in financial management reform have led to the
promulgation of public financial management laws; the refinement of procurement
23 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Manual on Fiscal Transparency, Washington, 2003 p18
24 Editorial Comments, Africa Budget Watch, IDASA, November 2002 p 4
25 M. Robertson, Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of Non-governmental Public Action,
Working Paper 279, Institute of development Studies, (2006) p 26
26 C. Santiso and A. G. Belgrano, op.cit., http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/1905258.pd,
2004 p 4
27 M. Robertson, op.cit., p27
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practice, strengthening supreme audit institutions by transforming them into effective
independent oversight bodies, and enhancing the oversight role of Parliaments on all
finance and taxation matters.28
1.3 THE SIERRA LEONE SCENARIO
Like some of its developing counterparts, Sierra Leone has had a history of
systemic corruption that derailed the relatively stable economy it inherited at
independence in 1961.29 At the dawn of independence, Sierra Leone was
“characterised as a model, if not the model, of British Parliamentary democracy in
West Africa….and there were reasons to believe that it could become a constitutional
model for most West African nations”30. It is further argued that “In the 1960s, Sierra
Leone had one of the best public sector structures in Africa. Its workers were
professionally trained, and a regular apparatus was in place to deal with challenges
confronting the new nation,” but that “decay and inefficiency set in the 1970s” because
of “political interference.” 31 This was largely brought about by the reign of the All
People’s Congress (APC) Party 1968 – 1992, which was marked by widespread
corruption and a systematic decay of democratic values, the erosion of participatory
governance, the infringement of human rights, the lack of answerability of
Government to the electorate, and the perpetuation of a non-transparent public
accounts system. 32
In recent years, however, the country has experienced a wave of reforms in
almost all spheres of governance under the leadership of President Ahmed Tejan
28 Ibid., p 27
29 J. A.D. Alie, A New History of Sierra Leone, Oxford, 1990 p230 (according to the Hansard on “Sierra
Leone Independence Debate” 22 March 1961) Sierra Leone was not particularly a rich country)
30 P. Marc-Georges, Review of the Constitutional History of Sierra Leone (1961-1995),
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/1pbr/subpages/reviews/thomps98.htm retrieved 24 March 2005
31 A. J. Ndumbe, “Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone” Mediterranean
Quarterly 12:90-105, no. 4 Fall , (2001), P1
32 Ibid.,p1
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Kabbah (1996 - 2005). The Government among other initiatives instituted an anti-
corruption commission to combat fraud in the public sector and adopted programmes
to enhance human and institutional resources through its interactions with bilateral and
multilateral institutions such as the United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DfID).33 The Administration has promulgated a new financial
management law – the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA) in
2005, and has established a Budget Bureau in the Ministry of Finance (MOF), with the
primary responsibility of budget development and public expenditure monitoring.34
Other initiatives include pre-budget discussions coordinated by the Budget Bureau in
which Parliament and civil society representatives participate. The current Parliament
has also facilitated the creation of District Budget Oversight Committees (DBOCs) to
monitor the budgetary process at grassroots and national levels.35
1.4 THE STUDY OBJECTIVES
This research is a follow-up to an earlier thesis (MA) by the author:
Development Constraints of Sierra Leone: The Role of the National Leadership and
International Financial Institutions (1961-2003)36, which delved into the development
challenges that have haunted that country since it attained independence in 1961. The
previous work argues that Sierra Leone’s stalled development was in large part due to
weak national leadership, systemic corruption, the mismanagement of public funds and
the inappropriate policies advised, but sometimes dictated by international financial
institutions – primarily the World Bank and the IMF.
33 Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance, Working Paper 120, (2002)
34 Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Briefing Paper, 2004
35 Sierra Leone Government Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005
36 K. Marah (Unpublished MA Thesis): Development Constraints of Sierra Leone: The Role of
National Leadership and International Financial Institutions 1961-2003, (SUNY, New York) (May
2003)
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The primary objective of this study is to unpack the measures that have so far
been put in place by the country leadership (1996 - 2005) to reverse the dismal state of
economic governance through the introduction of a sound public finance management
system – budget transparency and accountability, including strong external oversight
from the Parliament, the Auditor-General and civil society. To this end, the study aims
to present an overview of the nation’s financial management system of the All Peoples
Congress (APC) Party administration (1968 – 1992) and that of the military regime -
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996. Most
importantly, the study focuses on the public finance reforms that were introduced by
the 1996 democratically elected Government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (1996
- 2005).
Another key objective of the study is to explore leadership failure as an
underpinning contributor to the undesired development pursuits of the country since
independence. In particular, it aims to put into perspective how the leadership –
regardless of which political party is in power - has persistently continued to shape and
influence the politics and development policies in a downhill trend. For example, the
study investigates how political parties have never functioned on the basis of ideology,
values and commitment, and how political membership is fluid such that politicians
move between political parties with little regard to values. It also aims to unveil the
unsavoury and endured political strategy of dependency, such that the leaders adopt
policies supplied by the development partners with no distinct effort to carve home-
grown polities in response to the development challenge.
A third objective is to explore whether reforms of the Kabbah administration
meets internationally recognised standards on public expenditure management, in
particular, that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) Best Practices for Budget Transparency. By so doing, the study will explore
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the role of key institutions in the process, primarily the oversight functions of
Parliament, the Auditor-General and the civil society.
Another key objective of the research centres on the quest to contribute to the
search for reasons rather than for answers to the weak performance of the political
economy of Sierra Leone since independence and the performance of oversight
functions by accredited institutions. In the narrow sense, also, the research contributes
to the continuing debate on the model strategies, policies or approaches required to
propel developing countries into economic growth. The work promises a thorough
analysis of the interface of effective financial management and enhanced oversight in
the public sector.
In concluding, it is worth mentioning that this work may be the first to
investigate the financial management system of the country and one that seeks to offer
practical recommendations to achieve a strengthened approach to national
development through strengthening external oversight and improved procedures. The
relevance of the study also rests on the key objective to signal a wake up to decision
makers at the highest tier of the Sierra Leone society.
1.5 RESEARCH STATEMENT
Against the backdrop of the study objectives discussed above, the focus of the
study rests on the public finance management reforms that have taken place from 1996
to 2005 under the Kabbah administration. The research is thus centred on the question
of whether or not the Government has made a steady and impressive progress on
transparent budgeting with a strong Parliamentary oversight during the stated period. It
must be understood from the standpoint that the Government has in recent years
embarked on a number of transparent budgeting projects, such as the medium-term
expenditure framework (MTEF), to improve public finance so as to achieve good
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governance. In this regard, the research investigates the steps so far taken and it
analyses the delivered impact on the overall system. In order to achieve this approach
and to address the above objectives, the study sets out to address the following
research statement: Sierra Leone’s on-going reforms in public financial
management from 1996 to 2005 have moved the country towards improving budget
transparency and participation.
The basis of the research statement also hinges on a previous work of the
author in which the opinion was held: “Strengthening democratic and oversight
institutions such as Parliament, national audit service, civil society and the anti-
corruption commission, would improve transparency and participation in the budgetary
process”. 37 The unpublished thesis argued that a transparent and participatory
budgeting system is among the lead strategies that could be adopted to reduce
corruption, enhance good governance and propel national economies in the right
direction. It is relevant and equally important to note that this view was not only
reflected in the policies of the Government, but it became part of its overall reform
package to attain good financial governance. In his State Opening Speech to
Parliament, for example, the President, Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabbah noted:
We attach a high degree of importance to probity, transparency, accountability
and efficiency in the management of public resources. In this regard, we have
been reviewing our expenditure profile with the aim of minimizing any leakage
of public funds. In addition to our three-year budgetary planning formula
through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework we have established
Community Budget Oversight Committees, in all the Districts as part of our
decentralization programme. These Committees will participate in the annual
budget discussions and will monitor budget implementation in their respective
areas… In our efforts to ensure accountability in the use of public funds, the
second Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) was conducted in August
2002 for public expenditure for the second half of the 2001 Financial Year.
This survey, as with the first, has revealed that government policies need to be
37 K. Marah (Unpublished MA Thesis), op.cit
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fully implemented at the grassroots levels in order to reach target
beneficiaries.38
The above scenario therefore, provides the ideal opportunity to investigate the
progress so far made in accordance with the research statement. In this regard, the
methodology introduces the tools that will be used.
1.6 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
There has not been any well known publication on the budgetary process of
Sierra Leone, except reports on the activities of IFIs on various strands of reforms
taking place in the country. These are mostly focused on the financial management
assessment missions, poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) and the achievements
and challenges so far recorded. Although there is a handful of works on the Sierra
Leone Parliament, the Office of the Auditor-General (the audit service) and on civil
society activities such as those by Joe A. D. Alie and Marcus Jones, for example, there
has not been any significant piece of research dedicated to roles in public finance
oversight. Most publications, in particular Marcus Jones’s Legal Development And
Constitutional Change in Sierra Leone (1787-1971), touched on the general
development of Parliament as an institution rather than the critical issue of being the
lead national oversight body, and how those functions are being carried out or
influenced by the executive branch of government.
In view of the above reasons, the study mainly relies on primary resources and
promises to be among the first set of works to conduct in depth analysis and to
investigate the oversight role of Parliament and other oversight institutions such as the
Audit Service, and civil society in Sierra Leone. In this regard, the study draws on
38 Address by His Excellency the President, Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, on the Occasion of the
State Opening of the Second Session of the Second Parliament of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 20 June
2003
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generic publications on the role of Parliament and other key oversight bodies. The
research makes good use of primary sources and internationally accepted principles
and practices on transparent and participatory budgeting processes, in particular that of
the OECD, drawn up as a benchmark for good practice. Put simply, the on-going
Sierra Leone reforms will be measured against six established benchmarks of the
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency39.
i. Comprehensiveness of budgets and involvement of stakeholders at the
formulation stage
ii. Parliament be given sufficient time (three months) to study, debate and pass the
budget submitted by the ministry of finance
iii. Effective internal control measures and internal audit to ensure the integrity of
information provided in reports
iv. The year-end timely submission of reports to the supreme audit institution
(auditor-general’s department) in accordance with generally accepted principles
v. Parliamentary scrutiny – Parliament be adequately resourced and empowered to
carry out effective scrutiny of the report
vi. The public and media must be proactively involved in the budgetary process
and this to be made possible by the ministry of finance.
In addition to the OECD benchmarks, in depth analysis of primary sources
drawn from the ministry of finance, newspaper articles, magazines, among others, will
form the main research methodology. The study relies on these sources as the main
materials from which analysis will be conducted to validate the research statement. For
example, in identifying the culture-based reasons for the endured over-reliance on
donor and multilateral budgetary support by succeeding leaderships of Sierra Leone,
evidence would be drawn from diverse primary sources to pinpoint reasons, pattern of
behaviour and trends of donor assistance. It also helps to showcase the challenges
facing leadership to tap into opportunities present over the years.
39 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Code of Good
Practices on Fiscal Transparency OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm#code retrieved January 2005
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Semi-structured interviews of former and current policy makers, technocrats
and civil society activists is also employed with added analysis to complement
evidence drawn from documentary analysis. Opinions of lead oversight officials -
Parliamentarians, Office of the Auditor-General, and the national anti-corruption
agency - for example, provide insight into the evolving levels of public accountability
during the study period, and demonstrate whether oversight and accountability
requirements are incremental or static. The interviews will also capture the discourse
of leadership, policy direction and the quality of implementation under the various
regimes examined in the study. In this regard, a deliberate and careful selection of
interviewees from among the relevant stakeholders in the budgetary process prevails.
In complement of semi structured interviews and documentary analysis of
primary sources, elite public perception survey is also integrated in the study. This
approach regardless of its limitation in social science research is meant to assist in
validating the research statement. The views of senior public sector officials as well as
those of civil society activists are included in the perception survey.
1.6.1 Study Period
The period chosen for this study is 1996 – 2005; a two-term democratically
elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, and of two elected
Parliaments. It must be mentioned that Kabbah’s first term was interrupted by a nine-
month military interregnum - May 1997 to March 1998. For effective measurement of
progress so far achieved in transforming financial management, the study examines
post-independence public finance management and the role of Parliament and other
stakeholders in the exercise of budget oversight. In this regard, both the All peoples
Congress (APC) Party administration from 1968 – 1992 and the NPRC military regime
from 1992 – 1996, are examined to create an informed background of what prevailed
prior to the study period.
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1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH
The study is divided into three parts. Part one presents the research framework,
country background, the development of the Sierra Leone Parliament since 1787, and
pre 1996 financial management systems as they prevailed under numerous political
administrations. Part two examines on-going reforms – 1996 to 2005, including the
role of oversight institutions: The Parliament, Audit Service, and civil society. And
part three tests our hypothesis, provides study findings and conclusions, and submits
recommendations for the way forward.
Part One: Chapter one presents the analytical framework within which the
research is conducted. The framework comprises the OECD Best Practices for Budget
Transparency. The chapter attempts to define budgeting and the core elements of a
transparent and accountable budgeting system. As there is no renowned literature on
the budgetary process of Sierra Leone, our literature review will be drawn from the
works of academics and professional experts in the field of budget transparency and
legislative studies. The works of scholars such as Lord Byrce, Marrett Claassence,
Warren Krafchik, Mezey, Professor the Lord Norton of Louth, and Joachim Wehner,
among other authors will be reviewed.
Chapter two sets the country research stage. It presents the history and
background of the political economy of Sierra Leone. The third chapter unravels the
history and development of Sierra Leone with emphasis on the political structures,
system of government and political system. Attention is paid to the lack of values and
ideologies as mechanisms that should shape the party system, rather personality cult
personal influence party leaders, including ethnic considerations and regional
affiliations are the forces that shape party membership, political support and electoral
gains. The chapter explores further that while political parties are permanently driven
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by affiliation, there exists a fluid membership pattern and such that there is no
permanent political allegiance demonstrated by politicians as membership vacillates
between one party and another with disregard to sincerity. Chapter four explores the
evolution of the Sierra Leone Parliament dating from 1787 when “The Province of
Freedom” was founded by British Philanthropists: Granville Sharpe, William
Wilberforce (a member of the British Parliament) and others, to create a settlement for
the British “Black Poor” and the liberated slaves who fought on the side of Britain in
the American War of Independence (1775 - 1783), to the 1991 Multi-Party
Constitution. The chapter explores more than two centuries of Parliamentary
development with emphasis on legislative – executive relations on the conduct of
public finance and oversight.
Chapter five throws light on the management of public resources by previous
administrations. The first section of the chapter explores financial management under
the single party rule of the APC 1968 - 1992; and the second section looks at the
handling of financial resources under the four-year military regime of the NPRC 1992-
1996.
Part Two of the study investigates mainly the reforms that have been carried
out in recent times under President Tejan Kabbah from 1996 to 2005. This part opens
with the sixth chapter, which presents a field survey report on the perception of elites
and civil society activists on the key elements relating to budget transparency and
accountability and how they impact on reforms in Sierra Leone. The objective of the
survey is meant to integrate opinions in complement to primary resources as well as
opinions of interviewees drawn from senior policy makers and implementers.
Respondents are therefore selected from civil society activists and public sector
officials in Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) to able to achieve a wider
sampling of opinions. In addition, the survey which mainly depends on simple
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averages and percentages underpins the rationale of seeking the opinions of those
closer to reform platforms in developing countries.
Chapter seven captures the reforms introduced between 1996 and 2005 under
the democratically elected government of President Tejan Kabbah. Particular attention
is paid to the promulgation of new laws and regulations, the institutional reconstruction
of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and other innovations adopted by the government to
achieve transparent budgeting and national economic growth. Chapter six delves into
the establishment of a national procurement authority to regulate Government
procurement as a means to curb corruption and usher in fair and transparent supply of
public goods and services. Chapter seven is dedicated to external oversight. To this end
the chapter is organised into sections: the first section deals with a unicameral
Parliamentary oversight in accordance with the OECD best practice guidelines. The
section examines the legal mandate of the Parliament as the people’s representative
assembly, which authorises and scrutinises the executive budget; it explores the
committee system and the institutional resource capacity of Parliament to carry out
effective oversight. The second section explores the oversight function of the supreme
audit institution – the Audit Service of Sierra Leone; the third section looks at the role
of the anti-corruption commission; and the final section delves into the critical inputs
of the civil society in exercising their constitutional rights.
Part Three of the research tests the research statement, presents a conclusion
and generates some recommendations based on key findings as a means to contribute
to the development debate on Sierra Leone. The concluding chapter delves into the key
variable of development – leadership – with comments on the identified inherent
weaknesses ingrained in the leadership dynamics of the country, in particular,
dependency on external support, lack of commitment and systemic corruption as the
forces that cripples the country’s development prospects.
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1.7.1 Limitation of scope
The scope of the study is limited to the budgetary process only and will not
cover other financial institutions that are affected by the reform. These are the Bank of
Sierra Leone, the National Revenue Authority and other such institutions. Secondly,
ongoing reforms and national recovery programmes such as the country’s Vision 2025,
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative (HIPC), the role of development partners, and many others, will not be
examined but may be mentioned in passing.
Furthermore, the analytic framework is limited to only six OECD best practice
guidelines on budget transparency. The rationale centres on better management of the
research and the level of the country’s development pace: other best practice criteria
are far beyond the country’s present capacity to be used in this research but may be
used in future studies of this nature as the reforms unfold.
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CHAPTER TWO
CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the analytical framework within which the research is
conducted. It guides the research process by creating the basis of approach, the
arguments and key analysis. By so doing, a cursory definition of a budget, and a
detailed explanation of the budgetary process is presented. However, taking into
account that budgetary processes vary from country to country, the chapter delves into
the general principles of budgeting processes with emphasis on specific weaknesses
that have been identified in developing countries. This approach is a deliberate strategy
to be able to narrow the subject matter and test our hypothesis.
The second part of the chapter sets out the OECD’s Best Practices for Budget
Transparency, against which the reform experience of Sierra Leone will be measured.
Attention is paid to selected principles of the OECD Best Practices that are considered
crucial to the standard of Sierra Leone as a developing economy. For even among
OECD member countries, it is recognised that “different countries will have different
reporting regimes and may have different areas of emphasis for transparency. The Best
Practices are based on different member countries’ experiences in each area. It should
be stressed that the Best Practices are not meant to constitute a formal “standard” for
budget transparency”.40 On this premise, a range of selected prerequisites of the Best
Practices – also a sine qua non to transparent democratic governance - are used in the
analysis.
40 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Code of Good
Practices on Fiscal Transparency OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm#code retrieved January 2005
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2.2 DEFINITION OF BUDGET
A budget is the most important government policy instrument through which
national policies such as on education and economic development can be translated
into concrete results.41 A government budget therefore, records financial allocations
and revenue generation plans, and provides a guide to support the implementation of
plans set out in the estimates. A budget also establishes the legal means (authorisation)
to incur expenditure from the consolidated fund, as well as provides for a system of
accountability, and the standard against which results can be measured. Budgeting has
also been defined as the distribution of scarce resources amidst competing national
interests42; and the attainment of aggregate fiscal discipline as its main objective has
been underscored43. Budgets are constrained by the tax base and the ability of
government to generate sufficient revenue to meet its spending needs. As a result,
governments are faced with the task of broadening the tax base without the prospect of
damaging electoral gains in the next election. 44
Prioritisation, which is an integral component of allocative efficiency,
underpins government’s interpretation of the will of the people, and in developing
countries it could be poverty reduction programmes.45 Budgeting is therefore a highly
political process rather than a professional exercise alone.46 For an orderly process,
budgeting for effective service delivery must be governed by rules, procedure and
processes involving the inputs of stakeholders, principally the civil society and
international financial institutions, such as the World Bank (where a country relies on
41 H. Garnett and W. Plowden, “Cabinets, Budgets, and Poverty: Political Commitment to Poverty
Reduction”, in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons, edited by B.
Levy and S. Kpundeh, The World Bank, Washington , 2004 p149
42 Ibid.,p149
43 R. Allen, S. Schiavo-Campo and T. C. Garrity, Assessing and Reforming Public Financial
Management, A New Approach , World Bank, Washington 2004 p2
44 Ibid., p2
45 United Kingdom Policy Paper, Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: rethinking conditionality,
(2005), p9 https://www.comminit.com/en/node retrieved November 2005
46H. Garnett and W. Plowden, op.cit., p150
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external budgetary support).47 In a situation where a developing or middle income
economy supports its own budgetary needs without external financial inputs, taking
stock of the international financial environment and market trends, must guide policy
and decision-making as a means to support investments.48 Oversight institutions,
primarily Parliament and principal audit institutions such as the office of the Auditor-
General must be seen to be playing their roles without undue influence of the
executive.49
Put simply, a budget is a spending plan of government in which forecasted
revenue are allocated to specific expenditure areas for a period- mostly in the medium
term. In this kind of arrangement, care must be taken so that enthusiastic expenditure
plans of government do not outweigh forecasted revenue, or a deficit will ensue –
creating an unbalanced budget. A balanced budget is one in which aggregate spending
match aggregate revenue: spend as you earn scenario. 50
2.3 MEDIUM TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK (MTEF)
The single-year budgeting system, the model through which countries
developed a budget for a one year period has now been replaced by the medium-term
expenditure framework (MTEF) across economies in the world.51 MTEF is a three-
year rolling budget plan and has been lauded for its suitability in planning national
finance resource management. It allows for better prioritisation, planning and
adjustments. Budget predictability is easier as it makes possible long-term thinking,
preparation and internal reviews. A functioning three-year budgetary system is
47 Ibid., p151
48 Ibid., p52
49 Ibid.,p52
50 K. Marah, Overview of Public Financial Management Commonwealth Public Expenditure
Management Seminar Paper, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, October 2005
51 Manual on Fiscal Transparency, op.cit., p4
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therefore vital to sustainable development, most especially in emerging economies
where pro-poor issues are at the forefront of development. 52
2.4 PHASES OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
In this subsection, the principles and processes involved in the budgetary
process are explained and serve as a guide to further analysis in the study. Four major
generic and interrelated strands of the budgetary process have been identified, although
there are behavioural variations in the matter in which they are handled at individual
country levels.53 In this research, emphasis is placed on how developing countries
conduct financial management and oversight functions within the framework of the
four elements of the budgetary process, namely:
 Budget Drafting
 Budget Legislation
 Budget implementation; and
 Budget monitoring and evaluation (audit and reporting)
2.4.1 Budget Drafting
The first stage of the budgetary process is drafting the budget document, which
involves the development of information contained in the budget and the preparation
of the final estimates of revenue and expenditures of various agencies that will be
submitted to Parliament for approval. Budget drafting varies across systems, which
underscores the notion that budget making reflects the political arrangement, history
and culture of democracies.54 In the Westminster Parliamentary democracy, for
example, the executive budget is rarely modified or rejected by the legislature; this is
because the lives of both government and Parliament are inextricably linked – a
rejection of the budget by Parliament is tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the
52Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance, Medium Term Expenditure Framework Guidelines, 2003, p12
53Editorial Comments, Africa Budget Watch, op.cit., p1
54 Ibid.,p1
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government, which will lead to dissolution of Parliament and early elections.55 Unlike
the Westminster system, Parliaments such as the United States Congress can not only
challenge the executive budget, but can also produce its own budget if the need arises
and thus reject the president’s budget.56
In the Westminster democracies, a powerful finance minister is responsible for
the formulation as well as overseeing the implementation process.57 In the United
Kingdom, for example, where the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer
live next door to each other, a close working relationship is a must for the government
to continue in power.58 In single-party governments (non-coalition scenario), the
minister of finance prepares a fiscal policy paper or a “budget call circular” 59 outlining
general guidelines of the government’s multiyear priorities, including its fiscal policy
and the macroeconomic framework for the set period. In economies where
governments are formed on the basis of a coalition, as it is in the Netherlands,
“strategic discussion [becomes] an essential part of the contractual approach, in which
several partners in government agree, up front, on their budgetary targets and other
strategies for the ensuing period”.60 In Germany, technocrats play a leading role in the
allocation of revenue to regions.61 This exercise however requires a high mathematical
modelling. In India, a constitutionally mandated, impartial body called the Fiscal and
Financial Commission (FCC) is responsible for financial allocation.62
55 Morunga Werunga, Commonwealth Parliamentary Systems, Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association Seminar for West African Parliaments , Banjul, The Gambia, August, 2005, p3
56 Ibid., p 6
57 W. Krafchik and J. Wehner, The Role of Parliament in the Budgetary Process,
http://www.idasa.org.za August 2005
58 J. Wehner , Principles and Patterns of Financial Scrutiny: Public Accounts Committees in the
Commonwealth, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, (November, 2003) p
59 Ibid., p187
60 Ibid., p175
61K. Marah, Commonwealth Secretariat, Public Financial Management Reform, A Case Study of South
Africa, op.cit., p 20
62 Ibid.,p20
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The South Africa model is a combination of matrixes meant to achieve fiscal
transparency. First, the Budget Forum is responsible for local government fiscal
arrangements and allocations.63 Above this level is the Budget Council, which is a
consultative body of political representatives from national and provincial
governments that makes recommendations to the cabinet on financial allocation. The
final and inner core of the Budget Council is the Finance MinMEC – which means, the
Minister and Members of the Executive Council that comprises of the Minister of
Finance, the Deputy Minister, and the nine provincial MECs for finance, advisors, and
the Director General of Finance. This core group shapes the draft budget that is
submitted to Parliament.64
2.4.2 Challenges
Regardless of the differences in the approach to budget formulation, it can be
said that developed democracies have had adequate resource and capacity both in
terms of human, legal, and institutions to deliver successful budgetary outcomes. For
example, the number of research assistants and technical experts in the United States
Congressional Budget Office is more than the number of all Commonwealth West
Africa Parliamentary staff put together.65 Developing countries are faced with the
challenge of poor institutional capacity and inadequate infrastructure to develop as
well as effectively implement public expenditure. For example, there is a persistent
problem associated with revenue forecasting – revenue shortfall is not a new
phenomenon but there is also the lack of political will to expand the revenue base and
to make critical changes in the public sector.66
63 Ibid., p59
64 Ibid.,p59
65 J. Wehner, op.cit., 189
66 K. Marah, Commonwealth Public Expenditure Regional Programme Brief for Belize, (July, 2006)
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The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency recommends that “the
budget documentation should specify fiscal policy objectives, the macroeconomic
framework, the policy basis for the budget, and identifiable major fiscal risks”.67 Thus
a fundamental requirement of budget drafting is the availability of professional
expertise and the capacity of departments and agencies to be able to come up with
realistic estimates.68 This is considered vital because a sound budget is characterised
by “comprehensiveness, predictability of resources and policies, and the
flexibility”69of the system to be able to make relevant adjustments to the budget
document, as and when required. This critical requirement is lacking in emerging
economies. For example, a five African country performance reports on the budgetary
process published by the Africa Budget Project, raised concerns that with the exception
of South Africa, the countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia lack the relevant
professional expertise to draft comprehensive budget documents.70
Another serious and regularly cited defect in the budgetary process is that
budget drafting takes place in secrecy in some developing countries. Commenting on
this trend, the Africa Budget Project observed that budget formulations shrouded in
secrecy for whatever reasons, violate the principles of transparency and participation.71
“What ought to be done”, Marritt Claassens of the Africa Budget Project reiterates is
“to operate a transparent system that provides room for inclusion at every level of
budget engagements”.72 Lawrence Matemba, also of Africa Budget Project, takes the
point further that, unlike mature democracies, emerging economies have failed to
achieve sustainable growth partly because of the “closed-door-budget process” they
67 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/1905258.pd op.cit.
68 M. Claassens, Analysing Budget Policies, presentation at a Budget Workshop for Civil Society in
Sierra Leone, Freetown, 15 – 18 September, 2003
69 L. Matemba, Analysing Budget Policies, presentation at a Budget Workshop for Civil Society in
Sierra Leone, Freetown 15 – 18 September, 2003
70 Africa Budget Watch, Transparency in the Drafting Phase, IDASA, November, 2002 p 2
71 Ibid., p 2
72 L. Matemba, Analysing Budget Policies, op.cit.,
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have consistently pursued. Matemba underscores his argument: closed and secret
budget systems exclude Parliaments and civil society in constructive engagements,
which in turn leads to weak accountability and reporting systems.73
Current trends in developing countries however, demonstrate a change in
attitude. The creation of an enabling environment to nurture civil society participation
in drafting and implementation stages of the budget is laudable.74 In addition, the high
level involvement of Parliament and other stakeholders in the budgetary process is also
a remarkable progress made. 75
2.4.3 Legislation
Budget legislation is the second stage of the budgetary process. It is the legal
authorisation of Parliament that enables the executive arm of government to start
generating revenue as well as expending resources from the consolidated funds.76The
process starts with the budget being formally tabled before Parliament by the executive
- in a number of cases, this is done by the minister of finance.77 It must be mentioned
that the method through which Parliaments authorise budgets varies from country to
country, however the processes are often similar.78 When the budget speech is
delivered by the finance minister, considered to be the first reading, the appropriate
committees or sub-committees that deal with the budget may then study the content in
detail at committee stage. In some democracies, the committees have the leverage to
make changes to the original document such as in the United States.79
73 Ibid.,
74 Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, London, 2005 p9
75 T. Saronjini, “Gender Budgeting”, Seminar Paper by the Social Transformation Division of the
Commonwealth Secretariat, Barbados, September 2005
76 L. Matemba, op.cit.,
77 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, op.cit., p10 -11
78 Ibid.,p12
79 P. Norton, The Legislative Powers of Parliament, In: The evolving role of Parliamentarians in Europe,
p18 -19; J. Wehner, op.cit., p 9
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Committee remits differ across countries, as do debates on the budgets: some
are well organised with sufficient allotted time to review the estimates such as in India;
others have less time and are not clearly focused, or decisions are not influenced by the
opposition (Nigeria).80 In some countries, Parliamentary finance committees conduct
public hearings through which the inputs of citizens and other stakeholders are
incorporated into the committee’s recommendations for the consideration of the whole
House.81 However, this activity is largely practiced in the United States and it is almost
nonexistent within the Commonwealth of Nations. “The greater effective power of the
legislature” argues Andy Norton and Diane Elson, is to create a platform for civil
society involvement “as the scope for public debate of the budget is at its highest
during the approval phase”82. It is also relevant that further incentives are created for
special interests, and “elite lobbying” to get involved in the process. The significance
of expanding the budget debate to include stakeholders has been felt and developing
economies heavily reliant on external budgetary support have heeded the call of the
donor community to incorporate stakeholders in the process. 83
The prevailing scenario across democracies is that budgets are authorised
through the passing of an Appropriation Bill by Parliament. In some countries, a
separate Finance Bill which would authorise government to start mobilising revenue
whilst the Parliament is still considering the budget, accompanies the budget document
for an earlier consideration.84
It is increasingly recognised by academics and development practitioners that
the role of Parliament in the budget process is on the downward spiral, especially in
80 R. Allen, S. Schiavo-Campo and T. C. Garrity, op.cit., p12
81 Ibid., p12
82 A. Norton and D. Elson, “What’s behind the budget? Politics, rights and accountability in the
budgetary process”, Working paper, Overseas Development Institute, 2000 p 12
83 Ibid.,
84Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance, “Improving the Budget Stream” , 2005 p13
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developed economies.85 The growing dimensions of governance and its complexities,
such as entitlement spending, are among the reasons responsible for this trend. Lord
Bryce put it as “the constant additions to functions of governments”86 To the contrary,
a wave of reform is taking place across Africa, Asia and Latin America strengthening
Parliamentary oversight in the budgetary process. This trend has been daubed by
academics and practitioners as on-going legislative activism across the developing
world. 87 For example, the passing of the Public Finance Act by the South African
Parliament which sanctions prison sentences for ministers or permanent secretaries
who overspend, demonstrates the changing role of Parliament.88
The oversight role of Parliaments takes various forms. Studies reveal that some
Parliaments play ex-ante role, that is, they take part in the pre-budget consultation
process with the executive, before a budget is tabled before Parliament for approval.89
With the exception of the United States Congress, which can write its own budget if it
finds it necessary, most Parliaments in developing countries can only approve or
rubberstamp budgets without the power of creating new expenditure heads, or making
an increase under existing heads without the prior approval of the president.90 If
anything, Parliaments in emerging democracies are limited to the authorisation role
rather than that of formulation.
2.4.4 Constraints of Parliaments
Although the wave of democratisation in emerging economies has had positive
impacts on the budgetary process, Parliaments continue to be constrained by factors
85A broad range of literature including Lord Bryce in his The decline of legislatures argues that the age
of powerful legislatures has dwindled over the years. However, a notable reason advanced is the
expansion of public services and service providing agencies.
86 L. Bryce, The decline of legislatures. In: Legislatures, Norton Philip, pp 47 -56. (1990) ,p53
87C. Santiso and A. G. Belgrano, op.cit., p4 W. Krafchik and J. Wehner op.cit., p 2
88 K. Marah Commonwealth Secretariat, Public Financial Management Reform, The Case Study of
South Africa, op.cit., p45
89 J Wehner, op.cit., p 24
90 C. Santiso and A.G. Belgrano, op.cit., p 3,
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that are internal as well as external to the institutions.91 First, memberships of
committees are subject to frequent changes between elections which subsequently
erode committee efficiency and institutional memory.92 In addition, committees lack
the basic and adequate resource base such as research assistants and budget experts to
inform decision-making process and to provide professional support to the work of the
committees.93 Parliaments are also constrained by a limited window of time to study
and pass the budget. In some countries such as Maldives in the Indian Ocean, time is
irrelevant; the Parliament passes the budget without any dissenting voice both from
within and from without the walls of Parliament.94 In some, if not most countries
within the Commonwealth, the critical exercise could take less than a month.95 The
Internationally accepted standard, however, stipulates three to four months to allow the
legislature sufficient time to study, debate and pass the budget. 96
Furthermore, committees such as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) - a
traditional standing committee in Commonwealth Parliaments that is charged with the
constitutional mandate of establishing value for money following the audit reports on
public accounts - lack the requisite power to summon every kind of witness to testify.
In the United Kingdom, for example, some ministers may refuse to appear before
committees to give evidence (this is explained by the fact that ministers are not
accounting officials).97 In addition, unlike PACs that are normally chaired by a
member of the opposition party (a Commonwealth tradition), finance committees
91 J. Wehner, op.cit., p5
92 Ibid., p6
93 W. Krafchik and J. Wehner, op.cit., p 8
94 A. Arif, Public Financial Management in Maldives, Commonwealth Public Expenditure Seminar
Paper, May, 2005
95Parliamentary Oversight Within the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Seminar Paper, London, June
2005, p2
96 Ibid.,p2
97 M. Stanford and L. Maer, Select Committees Under Scrutiny, University of London Research Series ,
2004, p14
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would normally be chaired by members from the majority ruling party.98 While this
arrangement assists the government in dominating the conduct of committee business,
including the pace and content of committee agenda, it invariably kills bipartisan spirit
at committee levels.99
Since a huge portion of some national budgets are donor funded, such
arrangements would normally be entered into with little or no reference to the
Parliament.100 Parliaments are thus constrained by a number of internal impediments
as well as hurdles that are externally imposed. Parliamentary oversight has therefore
been a very challenging exercise.
Philip Norton and David Olson succinctly captured another key constraint of
Parliaments in developing democracies, in particular post-Soviet Parliaments where
electorates freely move from one party to another, as well as politicians after the fall of
the Soviet hegemony.101 It would appear that similar situation prevailed in post-
independent territories, such as Sierra Leone where electorates and politicians move
freely between parties; but also where personality plays a huge role. The interesting
corollary is captured by Norton and Olson: “…the membership of Parliamentary
parties is sometimes fluid. Some parties are formed after the Parliament has met. Some
members move from one to another, engaging in what has been termed ‘political
tourism’”102
In exploring Sierra Leone’s political development the shifting patterns of
politicians across parties will be discussed, and the role personalities play in shaping
political parties will also be dealt with.
98 J. Wehner, op.cit., p 28
99 Ibid.,p29
100 W. Tan, Parliamentary Oversight within the Commonwealth, op.cit., p4
101 P. Norton and D. M Olson, Parliaments in Adolescence, In: The New Parliaments of Central and
Eastern Europe, edited by D.M. Olson and P. Norton, Routledge, 1996 p235
102 Ibid.,p235
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2.4.5 Budget Implementation
Budget implementation is the actual management of allocated resources to
deliver projected plans, for example, road construction or the provision of health
services in remote villages. After the budget has been approved by Parliament, the
onus of implementation rests with the executive arm of the government.
Implementation is thus carried out by vote controllers or permanent secretaries, chief
executive officers of agencies, who are assisted by a professional team made up of
departmental principal accountants, controllers and middle level managers.103
However, budget implementation goes beyond the mere spending of moneys from the
consolidated fund, and comes with the recognition and adoption of efficiency and
accountability tools; namely: internal control and internal audit, and regular reporting
systems – monthly, quarterly, half yearly and annually.104
Expenditure control measures relate to the limitation of Virements – a
justifiable shift of votes from one head to another, achieved through obtaining the
express permission of a supervising body such as the controller and Accountant-
General’s office.105 It has been observed, however, that ministries, departments and
agencies (MDAs) do not usually adhere to rules as it is expected of them. Santiso and
Belgrano observed that it is not uncommon that votes are moved from one head to
another without proper recording and approval of Parliament being sought. The point
is further reinforced that ad hoc instruments (creating spending areas at the execution
stage without the approval of Parliament) may feed uncertainties in the
macroeconomic framework of the country and undermines good governance.106
Similarly, supplementary spending plans which must be brought before Parliament for
103 Ibid.,p4
104 Ibid.,p5
105 Ibid.,p5
106 C. Santiso and G. Belgrano, op.cit., p8
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independent scrutiny, as well as to guide non-allocated spending in the original budget,
is ignored and replaced with extra-budgetary spending – an improper, unaccountable
method of expending public monies, common in countries such as Nigeria.107
Recent public finance reform structures have witnessed the emergence of
internal audit commissions or divisions to enforce the observation of financial
regulations, rules and accounting principles and practices in ministries, departments
and government supported agencies (MDAs). Internal Audit bodies can be an
independent commission (Ghana)108 that operates almost independent of the ministry
of finance or exists as an arm of the Ministry of Finance (Sierra Leone).109
A critical component of expenditure control and financial accountability is the
frequency and timely submission of reports and the reliability of the generated data
contained in the reports. The accepted principle on the frequency requires MDA
expenditure reports to be submitted on monthly, quarterly, half yearly and on annual
basis to the budget division or bureaus as the case may be, and to the office of the
controller and Accountant-General.110 The chain of reports creates the basis for the
Accountant-General’s regular and annual reports on the public accounts that are
submitted to the supreme audit institution. The supreme audit body will in turn audit
the account statements and forward it to the PACs for necessary scrutiny and action.
The role of Parliament in the budgetary process is not totally limited to
preparation, authorisation and scrutiny. There is also an increasing trend of
Parliament’s involvement in the implementation phase of the budget to enhance
participation. The German Bundestag, for example, plays an active role in the
107 Transparency in the implementation Phase”, Africa Budget Watch, November 2002, p 3
108 P. Nomo , “Internal Audit Case Study, the Ghana Internal Audit Commission”, In: Internal Controls
and Internal Audit Case Studies: Ghana Seychelles and Singapore, Edited by K. Marah, Commonwealth
Secretariat, 2006 p 13
109 Interview with Olayinka Phillips, Deputy Director, Internal Audit Department, Ministry Finance,
Freetown, June 2006
110 K. Marah, Guidelines for Public Financial Management Reform, op.cit., p34
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implementation (concurrent) of the budget by overseeing departmental spending.111 A
similar scenario now exists across developing countries with some limitations,
however, their role has been expanded from a mere ex post (post mortem activity, or
after the fact) review function to taking on the role of establishing value for money.112
2.4.6 The debate on the role of Parliaments
The role of Parliament in the budgetary process has received mixed reactions
from academics and practitioners. Some analysts are of the view that Parliaments,
especially those in developing countries where democracy is yet to establish firm feet,
face the odds of battling a strong entrenched executive, which may strangulate
oversight functions.113 On the other hand however, fears have been raised that juggling
between the executive and legislature over the budgets may generate indiscipline and
over expenditure in the public sector.114 This argument may not be totally valid if the
“contractual approach” operating in some OECD member countries is considered. In
the Netherlands, for example, members of the coalition may enter into an arrangement
that captures the interests of all parties concerned, which goes beyond the control of
the cabinet.115 This approach brings into focus Lord Philip Norton’s valid point that the
strength of a Parliament partly resides in its institutional capacity to influence the
policy stream; in this case, the national budgets that are prepared by the executive and
tabled before the legislature for authorisation. He puts is simply: “The legislature itself
is not responsible for creating the stream, but rather for determining whether and to
what extent it is allowed to continue”.116 The strength to influence changes in the
111 J. Wehner, op.cit., p 24-25
112 C. Santiso and G. Belgrano op.cit., p 2
113 J. Wehner, op.cit., p 7
114C. Santiso and G. Belgrano, op.cit., p 3
115 Ibid.,
116 P. Norton, “The legislative Powers of Parliaments”, In: The evolving role of Parliamentarians in
Europe, 1994 ,p21
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budget document or rubber stamp it, as presented, marks a point of departure in the
classification of Parliaments.
Warren and Wehner on the other hand, argue that the current executive-
legislative imbalance over the budget process could be addressed through Institutional
engineering – improving the capacity of Parliaments so as to create a balance in the
executive-legislative budgetary relationship. They propose that Parliament could adopt
measures such as fixing budget ceilings and creating new budgetary guidelines, such as
a balanced budget criterion to which the executive must comply. They posit further
that the capacity of Parliament could be improved by establishing research institutions
or strengthening existing ones, as well as building the technical capacity of
Parliamentary committees.117
The lack of enforcement mechanism in Parliament to regulate the behaviour of
the executive greatly undermines the implementation phase of the budgetary process.
2.4.7 Other challenges
As submitted above, the best practice criteria for budget implementation hinge
on strengthening the expenditure environment with controls and reporting systems to
foster transparency.118 However, a series of challenges hinder effective implementation
in developing democracies due in large part to inadequate institutional capacity and
weak governance. There is no doubt, for example, that the lack of capacity to record
spending is widespread across developing nations.119 And although internal audit
institutions have been created in some developing countries to enhance control and
accountability, there is a significant lack of political will to adequately empower actors
or take appropriate actions on audit recommendations.120 At a pan-Commonwealth
117 P. Norton, op.cit. W. Krafchik and J. Wehner, op.cit. p 8
118 UK Policy Paper Partnerships for Poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality, op.cit., p16
119 Editorial Comments, Africa Budget Watch, op.cit., p 4
120 Ibid., p4
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seminar held in London for senior internal audit officials from 9 – 13 October 2006, it
came out strongly from participants that internal audit and expenditure control
measures require urgent and appropriate actions from political leaderships.121
2.4.8 Reporting and Audit (Establishing Value for Money)
The final stages of the budget process are monitoring and evaluation of public
expenditure, and audit and reporting. The latter includes:
 preparing and publishing reports on the annual public accounts by the
Accountant-General;
 submission of the report to the Auditor-General;
 accounts report audited by the audit general or an independent agency selected
by the Auditor-General; and
 submission of the published audit report to the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) of Parliament to scrutinise and to establish value for money. 122
Public accounts are published by the Accountant-General followed by an audit
conducted by the principal audit body or an independent institution appointed by the
former. The audit report, in principle, must be prepared and submitted within twelve
months of the end of the financial year.123 The code of Best Practices recommends that
“The budget documentation, final accounts, and other fiscal reports for the public
should cover all budgetary and extra budgetary activities of the central government,
and the consolidated fiscal position of the central government should be published”.124
These criteria have unfortunately not been met as is the case in some developing
countries where institutional capacity is weak and processes and procedures largely
compromised or disregarded at the highest level.125
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The Auditor-General would normally audit the published report of the
Accountant-General and forward the audit report to Parliament for scrutiny and to
establish value for money. In the ideal transparent environment, the audit report would
normally be published to keep the tax payers abreast with the outcomes of government
fiscal performance over a budget period.126 The essence of submitting an audit report
to the Parliament is not limited to demonstrating value for money, it also is to uncover
what went wrong and what was done right so that future budgetary activities could
draw on the mistakes, inadequacies or good examples from the previous budget.127
Regrettably, legislatures in developing economies lack the required logistics,
skills, resource and time to study such reports. According to Santiso and Belgrano,
budget cycles overlap so that while Parliament is busy approving a recent budget, it
might also be monitoring an approved budget as well as studying a previous one. There
is therefore little or no corollary between audit reports to achieve a feedback impact on
the process. Thus, no one budget informs budget makers about issues they would have
learned from the previous budget. 128 In the next section, the role of public accounts
committees of Parliament is reviewed.
2.4.9 Financial Scrutiny and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is the creation of the Gladstonian
reforms of 1863 in the Westminster Parliament of the United Kingdom.129 The
committee was established to carry out financial scrutiny of the public accounts. The
popularity of the PAC has over the years gained a wider adoption and it has become a
traditional Parliamentary standing committee for scrutiny within the
126 J. Wehner, op.cit., p24
127 Ibid., p 32
128 C. Santiso and G. Belgrano, op.cit., p11-12
129 J. Wehner, op.cit., p31
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Commonwealth.130 The reasons PACs are charged with the scrutiny function is
underscored by the three major achievable objectives in recent public expenditure
management reforms: affordability, prioritisation and value for money (the last being a
new focus area).131 While the functions of Parliament in part is to set expenditure
ceilings on the grounds of affordability and in accordance with the priorities of the
government, it is the prime business of the PAC to establish whether value for money
was attained at the end of the budget implementation. The scrutiny function of the
PAC therefore completes the cycle of the Parliament’s authority for financial control
and oversight.
2.4.10 Challenges facing Effective Scrutiny
The structure and direction of policy and implementation within the
Commonwealth have placed increasing constraints on the work of PACs. The
definition of roles and responsibilities in governments has always given the ministers
control over providing policy direction for the ministries, while the heads of
administration (mostly permanent secretaries) are put in charge of administration and
financial control as vote controllers. Regardless of the role separation, the parameter
within which ministers and senior officials operate is blurred, as actions of ministers
can sometimes bear direct influence on the manner in which departmental finances are
administered. 132 This challenge has led to the call for the demonstration of political
will for the institutionalisation of good governance and economic growth.
The traditional practice of summoning witnesses to answer queries before
PACs is limited usually to administrative and accounting officers (See Table 1 below).
There are only a few cases where ministers appear before committees. In a
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) survey carried out in 2001, it
130 Ibid., p 1
131 Ibid., p2
132 Ibid., p5
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emerged that 97 percent of departmental officials are summoned as compared to only
31 percent of ministers. Table 1 below demonstrates the trends and variations.
Table 1: Who is normally summoned as witness? (%)
Yes No
Ministers 31 69
Departmental officials 97 3
Auditor-General 79 21
Civil society and interest
groups
29 71
Source: Adapted from Wehner
As mentioned earlier, weak institutions and bad governance have had a failing
impact on committees. First, the quality and frequency of reports may affect the work
of committees. In the “Westminster tradition” a PAC is designed to scrutinise reports
of the Auditor-General as well as take appropriate actions. However, the lack of
capacity which comes in the form of human and institutional preparedness inhibits the
frequency and robust quality of audit reports sent to PACs in developing
democracies.133 Audit institutions in advanced economies are on the other hand,
adequately resourced. For example, the National Audit Office (NAO) of the United
Kingdom has more than 800 highly skilled audit officials, compared to Zambia, where
in 1997, it had 416 qualified accountants but only four worked for the government.134
These institutional failings have largely been blamed on poor remuneration, wages and
salaries paid in developing countries.
In addition, and as Lord Norton puts it, the skills set of committee members to
effectively scrutinise audit reports as well as carryout similar technical functions
largely depends on among others: “exclusive jurisdiction, informed memberships, and
133 Ibid.,p5
134 J. Wehner, op.cit., p7 8
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enjoy extensive power of evidence-taking, and amendment”. 135 These requirements do
not necessarily prevail in Parliaments of developing economies, and it is made
worsened by the changing nature of audit functions and the introduction of new
accounting principles and audit systems. For example, the introduction and adoption of
an accrual accounting system side by side with cash accounting, poses significant
challenge to both the audit institution and the PACs in terms of meeting the skills
requirement to “parallel existing bureaucratic agencies” or the ministry of finance, to
be able to conduct effective audit and scrutiny respectively.136
Furthermore, the proliferation of government supported agencies in the public
sector created to provide emerging and expanding new services comes with its own
problems. As a result, not only has the remit of the supreme audit institution been
overstretched, but the quality and frequency of reports has been adversely affected in
developing countries.137 In some economies, including Sierra Leone, for example, the
Audit Service makes a selection of institutions for audit on risk basis. This is mainly
due to inadequate manpower, resource and lack of technical expertise to be able to
cover the institutions critical to the accountability process.138
It is underscored that the purpose of PAC scrutiny is not only to provide
feedback by way of a report, but to be able to get the government to initiate action on
the recommendations.139 Value for money can best be achieved through this feedback
loop. The Government response is normally embodied in a Treasury Minute or
Executive Minute. Nonetheless, it is the core business of the committee to follow up its
recommendations. In a survey conducted by the CPA in some Commonwealth
countries, 80 percent of respondents say that the executive is required to respond to
135P. Norton, The legislative Powers of Parliament, op.cit., p23
136 W. Tan, The Public Overseer, Commonwealth Public Expenditure Management Seminar Paper,
Singapore, November-December 2006
137 Ibid.
138 Interview with Leslie Johnson , Deputy Auditor-General of Sierra Leone, June 2006
139 J. Wehner, op.cit., p 9
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committee recommendations (See Table 2 below). The table also demonstrates that 85
percent of PACs depend on the Auditor-General’s report, while 87 percent say that
committee reports are freely available to the public.140
Table 2: Selected results from a survey of
Public Accounts Committees in the Commonwealth (%)
Yes No
Is the chairperson a member
of the opposition?
67 33
Is it required that the
committee be unanimous in
its decisions?
33 67
Are committee reports freely
available to the general
public?
87 13
Are hearings open to the press
and the general public?
55 45
Does the committee depend
primarily on the Auditor-
General’s report?
85 15
Is the committee report
debated in the legislature?
57 43
Is the executive required to
respond to committee
recommendations?
80 20
Source: Adapted from Wehner,
To conclude, the role of PACs in the budgetary process has proven to be
resourceful and strategic to public sector accountability and participation. Later on in
this research, the case study of Sierra Leone will highlight the issues as they play out in
that country.
2.5 DEFINING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The previous section defined a budget and dealt with structural and
administrative issues relating to implementation, and in part, what it takes to achieve
transparency and accountability in the public sector. The section also touched on the
role of the lead oversight institution – Parliament - and the challenges it faces. This
140 Ibid.,p9
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section defines the research framework – the OECD code of best practice for budget
transparency - and provides an outline of the core elements against which the Sierra
Leone budget transparency initiatives will be assessed.
2.6 OECD BEST PRACTICE FOR BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
The OECD codes of Best Practice for budget transparency are internationally
recognised and are used by OECD member countries as well as non-member countries
to assess the effectiveness of financial management systems. However, for the purpose
of this study, only six out of the long list of best practice codes have been selected.
This is because the systems and institutions of the OECD countries are of high
standards compared to those of Sierra Leone. And as such, the latter cannot be
assessed by using all the tools applicable to developed OECD economies. Secondly,
the six best practices have been deliberately selected because they are the entry point
of budget transparency and accountability and could be applied to any system of
similar standing. The following codes have been selected for this study:
I. Comprehensiveness of budgets and involvement of stakeholders at the
formulation stage;
II. Parliament be given sufficient time (three months) to study, debate and
pass the budget submitted by the ministry of finance;
III. Effective internal control measures and internal audit up and running to
ensure the integrity of information provided in reports;
IV. The year-end timely submission of reports to the supreme audit institution
(auditor-general’s department) in accordance with generally accepted
principles;
V. Parliamentary scrutiny – Parliament be adequately resourced and
empowered to carry out effective scrutiny of reports; and
VI. The public and media must be proactively involved in the budgetary
process and this to be made possible by the ministry of finance.
From the above outlined codes of best practice it is implied that Parliaments should:
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I. Be given sufficient time –no less than three months to study a budget
document before legal authorisation takes place;
II. Be adequately resourced to be able to examine all forms of reports it deemed
fit. The fiscal reports could be monthly, quarterly, half-yearly or annual reports
of the Accountant-General; and
III. Scrutinise the Auditor-General’s report to ascertain value for money.
In addition, it also implied that annual public accounts must be audited by the
Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) or the Auditor-General’s department in accordance
with accepted auditing principles; thirdly, that internal control mechanisms and
internal audit at MDA levels must be institutionalised to strengthen fiscal discipline
and financial rectitude; and finally, that civil society awareness and participation
should be facilitated by the ministry of finance.
2.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided an overview of government budget and the budgetary
process; it has explored what it takes to attain transparent and participatory budgeting,
including an examination of the institutions involved and the inherent challenges they
face; and it has provided a framework for our analysis.
Implicitly, the chapter sets out that in instituting effective financial governance,
robust leadership is required to not only put in place such institutions as relevant as an
independent audit office, a strong and capable Parliament, but also to adequately
resource these bodies by building institutional and human capacity, providing adequate
logistical support, and financial resources so as to instil and nurture accountability and
transparency in the budgetary process. It also calls for the leadership to adopt a
forward looking mentality in terms of providing the legal framework to guide the
reforms, and to be able to incorporate all stakeholders as civil society and the media in
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the change and delivery process. The process, for example, involves shifting from
single year budgeting to medium and long term budgeting – taking a long term view of
development; and to incorporate also, strategic planning and effective implementation
of budgets, with the culture of disclosure and financial reporting being mainstreamed
in the process.
It is against these set of requirement that in the next chapter an attempt is made
to explore the human and development background of Sierra Leone, which are
essential components of transparent and participatory budgeting. By so doing, attention
will be paid to the socio-economic livelihood and infrastructure, leadership and
political arrangements, as well as other development indicators that are integral to
attaining successful financial governance.
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CHAPTER THREE
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SIERRA LEONE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Sierra Leone is situated on the southwest coast of West Africa bordered by
Guinea and Liberia, with an area of about 73,326 square kilometers. The country is
endowed with rich natural vegetation ranging from coastal swamps to a green
peninsular belt towering over the capital city, Freetown. There are twelve
administrative districts subdivided into three provinces with capitals, Bo, Kenema and
Makeni. The population is about 6 million.141 A Sierra Leone historian, Magbaily
Fyle142 reported that by the late fourteenth century, a Portuguese sailor named the
coastal region “Serra Lyoa”, meaning’ Lion Mountains - because the peninsula
surrounding the capital city looked like a lion. The corrupt form of “Serra Lyoa” is
today Sierra Leone, with sixteen ethnic groups.
Contemporary Sierra Leone is the product of the initiative of some eighteenth
century Christian philanthropists in Britain, among them Granville Sharpe and William
Wilberforce.143 In 1787 the group established a settlement in West Africa called the
“Province of Freedom” for the British “black poor” that were mostly freed slaves,
including British Crown ex-servicemen who fought on the side of Britain in the
American War of Independence (1775 -1782). The settlement which later came to be
known as Freetown (the capital of Sierra Leone), became a Crown colony in 1808 and
the territory also became a base for the British anti-slavery campaign.144 British control
was limited to the settlement until 1896 when the colonial power extended its sway
141 Sierra Leone Web, http://www.sierra-leone.org/cso.html May 2004
142 M. Fyle, The State and the Provision of Social Services in Sierra Leone Since Independence, 1961-
91, London 1993, p1
143 Ibid, p3
144 Ibid., p 3
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over the hinterland (the rest of present day Sierra Leone). Britain continued to exercise
political and economic control over the territory for nearly two centuries (1787 –
1961). Sierra Leone attained independence in 1961, and became a Republic within the
Commonwealth in 1971.
3.2 POLITICS
Sierra Leone mostly enjoyed stability throughout the period of colonial
administration until independence. However, between 1967 and 1997, the country
experienced more than 10 political upheavals: aborted or successful military coups.145
The first attempted coup was uncovered three weeks before the 1967 general elections,
as a result the Deputy Commander of the Military, Colonel John Bangura and seven
others, were arrested.146 However, a successful military coup took place on the 22
March 1967 in the wake of the general elections, in which dispute arose about the clear
winner between the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the opposition All
Peoples Congress Party (APC). The coup happened when Siaka Stevens the leader of
the opposition APC, who had been sworn as Prime Minister was about to appoint his
cabinet. A counter coup staged by another set of army officers on the following day,
23 March 1967, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Juxon-Smith, brought the National
Redemption Council (NRC) to power. One year on - 17 April 1968, another coup led
by “a Sergeant’s Revolt” returned Siaka Stevens to power, as Prime Minister. 147
Siaka Stevens, who was ardently opposed to the SLPP proposals for the
attainment of a republican status and the introduction of a single-party constitution,
became the ironical champion of both policies. The APC successfully introduced a
republican constitution in 1971 as well as a single-party constitution in 1978. 148
145 Ibid., p.4
146 J.A.D. Alie, A New History of Sierra Leone, 1990, p 232
147 Ibid., p239
148 It was reported by Mr Marquand MP, at the Sierra Leone Independence debate in the House of
Commons that Mr Stevens had written several letters calling for post independence efforts to
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Following the inception of the single party constitution, Stevens banned all political
parties, student union activities and pro-democracy campaigns.149 In 1985, he resigned
the seat of president, and manipulated his succession by appointing Major General
Joseph Saidu Momoh, then head of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, as president.
Under President Momoh, economic conditions further deteriorated and corruption
spiralled out of control. In the face of prevalent economic malaise, Foday Sankoh, a
former corporal in the Sierra Leone military, led a rebel incursion into Sierra Leone
from across the Liberian border on March 23, 1991.150
The Momoh administration was faced with the daunting task of putting down a
rebel invasion amidst a faltering economy and an ill-equipped fighting army. As a
result, the President became unpopular among the army rank and file, and was
subsequently overthrown in a popular military coup led by a twenty-six year old
officer, Captain Valentine Strasser, on 29 April 1992. Strasser formed the National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), and took over the reins of government, until he
was ousted in a 1996 palace coup led by his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio151.
Clamour for democratic changes intensified in 1990 and 1991 from every
sector, and was led by three key institutions: the Sierra Labour Union, the National
Union of Sierra Leone Students, and the Sierra Leone Bar Association. The Student
Union, for example, organised peaceful demonstrations calling for political pluralism,
which were brutally dispersed by the Special Security Division (a special security unit
of the ruling party). The national outcry led to the promulgation of the 1991 multi-
party constitution by the APC, and the first democratic elections in decades were held
in 1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected President under the SLPP that lost the 1967
consolidated democracy in Sierra Leone,, See Sierra Leone Independence Bill – order of the second
reading, 22 March 1961)
149 Ibid. p. 241
150 A. Ndumbe, “Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone” Mediterranean Quarterly
12:90-105, no. 4 Fall (2001), p. 94
151 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, (2001), p. 12
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general elections to the APC. Kabbah was also re-elected in the May 2002 presidential
elections, but his government faced a setback in May 1997, when it was toppled by a
rebel-military coalition led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma of the Sierra Leone Armed
Forces (SLAF). Major Koroma formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC). But the coalition was short-lived as it was taken out in a blood battle in the
city of Freetown by the Nigerian-led Economic Community Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) - the military wing of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). President Kabbah was reinstated by ECOMOG in March 1998.152 In July
1999, a United Nations (UN) sponsored peace accord was struck between the
government and the rebels in the spirit of the Lome Peace Accord, which ultimately
led to a final conclusion of the nation’s civil conflict in January, 2002.153
3.2.1 Political Parties
Political parties in Sierra Leone as in most developing countries are nascent,
less than organised and ill disciplined.154 They are neither created on platform of
political, social or economic ideology, nor are they sufficiently cohesive to have an
impact on the lives of the electorates.155 Political parties are largely organised around
personality cults and along tribal and regional lines. As a result, the activities of
government and Parliament are centred on the influence and desire of the head of state,
party stalwarts and senior ministers in government. Commenting on the features of
Sierra Leone’s party systems, an assessment team of the United States National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) underscored:
Political organizations have lacked the opportunities to develop into
representative bodies. The parties are urban based and largely personality
driven. They are not identified with issues and ideologies, have little or no
152 Ibid., p14
153 The Lome Peace Accord provided for a power sharing arrangement between the government and the
rebels RUF. The leader of the RUF was given a strategic control over mineral resources.
154 Political Parties and Processes: an NDI Assessment Mission Report, March 6-10 2000”,
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/101_sl_processes.htm#politicalparties 22 February 2005
155 Ibid
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relationship to constituents, and derive electoral support along ethnic and
regional lines. As described by one party head, "politics in Sierra Leone is not
based on issues, it's based on leaders”.156
During colonial rule when political parties actively clamoured for
independence, the dominant party was the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) under
the leadership of Sir Milton Margai, who led the country into independence. The SLPP
dominated the political scene until the death of Sir Milton in 1964. Siaka Stevens, the
leader of the All People’s Congress Party (APC) - arch rival of the SLPP leadership -
came to power after the 1967 general elections despite a military coup that was
allegedly supported by the ruling SLPP to stop the opposition from taking the reins of
government. The APC ruled the country for a period of twenty-four years (1968 to
1992) until it was toppled in a popular military coup in 1992.
Political parties in Sierra Leone do not coalesce around policies or ideologies
as it is in western democracies. The situation is underscored by a number of factors,
including personality, regional and ethnic influence.157 The number of political parties
elected to Parliament in the 1996 general elections doubled the current three parties
represented in Parliament. In the 1996 elections, six parties were elected on the basis
of proportional representation. The SLPP traditionally draws its support from the south
and east of the country, mostly from among the majority Mende ethnic group. The
APC on the other hand, draws its support from mainly the northern ethnic groups,
including the Temne and Limba. The United National People’s Party (UNPP) which
was led by John Kerifa Smart (formerly, a member of the SLPP) was the main
opposition in Parliament after winning 17 seats. The UNPP then drew its support from
the north, east and western regions, and from among the Temne ethnic group. The
156 “Political Parties and Processes: an NDI Assessment Mission Report, March 6-10 2000”,
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/101_sl_processes.htm#politicalparties 22 February 2005
157 Ibid.,
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People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won 12 seats with a majority of its support coming
from the north. Its leader, Taimu Bangura was formerly a member of the APC.
The Democratic Centre Party (DCP) which received its support from the
diamond-rich Kono District was led by an ethnic Kono, Abu Koroma, who was also a
former member of the APC. The National Unity Party (NUP) which relied on votes in
the capital, Freetown and from the military NPRC supporters has almost gone into
extinction. The then presidential candidate of the NUP, Dr John Karimu is now a
member of the SLPP and holds the strategic position of Commissioner General of the
newly created National Revue Authority (NRA). In the present Parliament only 3 out
of the 17 registered political parties are represented. Table 3 below demonstrates the
shifting pattern of political party membership over the years.
57
Table 3: Shifting pattern in political party membership
Name Current
Party
Former
Party
Last
Parl
Current
Parliament
Current
Status of
Party or
personality
Dr. John
Kerifa Smart
UNPP SLPP
(1960s)
27 seats none Almost
submerged
Taimu
Bangura
(deceased)
PDP APC none Almost
submerged
after demise
of leader
Abu Koroma
(deceased)
SLPP APC &
DCP
3 none Merged with
SLPP
Fillie Faboe SLPP APC,
Secretary
General
before the
1992 NPRC
Coup
Ruling Party,
currently, a
regional
minister of the
SLPP
J.B. Dauda SLPP APC Special
adviser to the
current
president
Charles
Margai, son of
former Prime
Minister,
Albert Margai
PMDC SLPP
&
NUP
New Party
Will
contest
next
elections
Lost SLPP
Party
Leadership in
2005-found
the new party
John Karimu NUP
1996
Presidential
Candidate
SLPP Currently, the
Commissioner
General of the
NRA
Source: developed in the research process
With the exception of the long standing parties - the SLPP and the APC - none
of the four political parties in the previous Parliament won a seat in the 2002 general
elections. The question therefore may be asked: how could the UNPP, which was the
main opposition party with 17 seats in the last Parliament, came to lose that strategic
position to the APC, and worse still, ended up with no seat in the current Parliament?
The answer rests with the fact that apart from ethnic and personality influence, political
support and leadership are in a constant state of flux, in part determined by unfolding
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circumstances. For example, the APC came out very strong in the north by squeeze out
the UNPP in the region. With the benefit of hindsight, the APC struggled in the 1996
general and presidential elections because of the stigma of corruption for which it was
thrown out of power in the 1992 NPRC coup. The stigma was still fresh in the heart
and mind of the electorates. Ten years on (2002) however, the memory had faded and
the party was again able to appeal to its natural constituents in the north. It must be
also mentioned that during the whole period, the UNPP leadership was caught up in a
court battle over leadership status, which weakened the party’s morale and support
base.
Another instance of fluidity lies in the fact that the DCP, which won seats in
the previous election in 1992, merged with the SLPP in the 1996 general elections, and
the leader was given ministerial appointment. When Abu Koroma, who was the leader
and founder of the DCP crossed over to the SLPP, the party ceased to exist. Also, the
PDP and the NUP won no seats in the 2002 general elections. The PDP did not win
any seats because its charismatic leader, Taimu Bangura, died before the elections –
the leader died with his party. In addition and as mentioned above, the NUP
presidential candidate of the 1996 elections, Dr. John Karimu, did not take part in the
2002 elections. He crossed over to the SLPP and he is now the Commissioner General
of the newly created National Revenue Authority (NRA).
Another interesting twist took place. The deposed military leader of the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), Johnny Paul Koroma, established a new party,
the Peoples’ Liberation Party (PLP) on the eve of the 2002 election (after the rebel
conflict). His party drew support from his ethnic group, the Limba and sympathisers of
his regime; as a result, the PLP won 2 seats in Parliament with little efforts put into the
campaign. Johnny Paul Koroma is currently at large on account of an alleged coup plot
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against Tejan Kabbah in which he was implicated. His disappearance took away the
party with him - it is almost a dead one.
Another case in point centres on Charles Margai, a popular lawyer and son of
Sir Albert Margai, the second Prime Minister (1964-1967) under the SLPP. Charles
was a member of the SLPP but he resigned from the party in 1996 to join the NUP
when he lost the party’s leadership contest to Tejan Kabbah. Charles was recalled later
by the SLPP party leadership and appointed a minister in the Kabbah Government.
Charles resigned from the party in 2005, when he lost another leadership contest to the
current Vice President, Solomon Berewa ahead of the July 28, 2007 general and
presidential elections. Charles has formed a new party, the Peoples Movement for
Democratic Change (PMDC) and will be contesting the presidency in the 2007
elections. Charles Margai draws support from the younger generation and largely from
his ethnic Mende.
In conclusion, the aforementioned shifts in political allegiance and leaderships,
clearly demonstrates how personality and ethnic belonging have shaped the party
system of that country and the entire political landscape since independence. The
scenario is clearly captured by Norton and Olson as it was with post-soviet politics:
“The fluid nature of parties within Parliaments…too many parties, and too little
organisation, will tend to fragment the legislature, depriving it of any internal ability to
organise itself. Certainly, party within the Parliament tends to be fragmented and
members variously willing to move from one party or party group to another”.158
158 P. Norton and D. Olson, Parliament in Adolescence, In: The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern
Europe, op.cit., p237
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3.2.2 Government
The government of Sierra Leone is headed by an executive president, assisted
by an appointed cabinet. At present (2007), the country has a 124 member unicameral
legislature with three political parties represented: SLPP 83, APC 27, and the Peoples’
Liberation Party (PLP) 2. Each of the 12 administrative districts is also represented by
an elected Paramount Chief (traditional ruler) to fill the remaining 12 seats. The
country is governed by a democratic constitution passed in 1991.
Before the 1991 Constitution came into being, the system of government since
colonial period was fashioned along the model of Westminster Parliamentary
democracy, in which the head of government and ministers are members of
Parliament. However, with the introduction of the 1991 Constitution, Sierra Leone
adopted the American style presidential system of government in which the president
is elected independent of Parliament. In addition, the President would normally appoint
his ministers from outside of Parliament. No reason was given for the change, but it
may be deduced that the then President Joseph Saidu Momoh opted to become a very
powerful executive president, such that his political fortunes would be independent of
the Parliament’s and would have leeway to appoint persons from outside Parliament.
3.3 THE ECONOMY
3.3.1 Agriculture and Mining
Sierra Leone is one of Africa’s poorest nations. Its economy can be roughly
divided into two main sectors: agriculture and mining. Agriculture is the mainstay of
the country’s economy, employing 80-90 percent of the rural population. But farming
is done on a subsistence scale, and is carried out on smallholdings averaging 1.6
61
hectares.159 This sector provides foreign exchange earnings from cash crops such as
coffee, cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel and ginger. However, agricultural output is
severely hampered by falling producer prices, poor transport facilities160 and the
devastating effect of the civil conflict.
Mining is the chief source of the country’s revenue. Until 1970, mining
provided the dynamism for the economy. But the declining yields of diamonds coupled
with the fall in international market prices of iron ore adversely affected national
revenue in the 1970s.161 In 1977, for example, the iron ore mines closed down on
account of falling prices and cost overruns.162 On the eve of the rebel conflict in 1991,
diamonds, bauxite, rutile (titanium dioxide) and gold accounted for 80 percent of
official exports.163 Unfortunately, the bauxite and rutile mines closed down when they
came under rebel assault in 1995.
The end of the conflict in January 2002 brought former rebel strongholds under
government control and diamonds are again the leading contributor to the country’s
export and foreign exchange earnings. The Bank of Sierra Leone put official diamond
exports between July 2000 and July 2001 at $US15.32 million.164 Increase in diamond
export in part was due to a UN Security Council resolution,165 which prohibits
businesses from buying diamonds without an accompanying Certificate of Origin from
the exporting nation. The resolution came about as a result of rising concerns that
“blood diamonds” (illegal trade of diamonds in a war torn country) fuel conflicts in
Sierra Leone and elsewhere166.
Sierra Leone is the largest producer of rutile (titanium dioxide) in the world,
with an estimated annual output of 150,000 tons.167 Modalities have been worked out
recently and have led to the resumption of the mining of the mineral but on a very
159 J. Weeks, Development Strategy and the Economy of Sierra Leone, London 1992, p. 13
160 Ibid., p 14
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small scale. The Koidu Kimberlite diamond mines has also resumed operations under
the Koidu Holdings Company.168
The Government of Sierra Leone in 2001, announced the discovery of offshore
gas and oil in fairly large quantities, and plans are currently underway to conduct
further explorations and award contracts to commence extraction.169 The country is
also endowed with marine resources, but lacks the technology to fully explore its 485
kilometre coastline rich in lobsters, shrimp, shark fins, and other marine stocks.170
By mid 2003 Sierra Leone’s external debt stood at about US$1.52 billion from
US$1.48 billion in 2002. 171 The country is indebted to sixteen bilateral creditors
including eleven Paris Club member nations – Austria, Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, United States of America, United Kingdom, Japan and
Switzerland. Non-Paris Club creditors include China, Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia.172
3.3.2 Manufacturing
Sierra Leone’s manufacturing sector contributes only 5 percent to the country’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Most manufacturers produce consumer goods such as
plastic footwear, small items of furniture, clothing, beer, soft drinks, candles and
matches. Some of the major manufacturing companies include the Sierra Leone
161 Ibid., p13
162 Ibid., p 13
163 Ibid., p 16
164Economic Intelligence Unit, Report on The Sierra Leone Economy, 2001, http://www.eiu.com 24
May 2006
165 UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), 6, 11
166 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1306 (2000) (New York: UN Security Council, 2000), 23, 193
167Economic Intelligence Unit, op.cit.
168 All Africa Website, Resumption of Koidu Kimberlite Project, 23 September 2002
www.Allafrica.com
169 Economic Intelligence Unit, op.cit.,
170 Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce Report, November 2002, p. 11
171 Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance, Economic Bulletin, The Economic Policy and Research Unit
(EPRU) Vol 9, No. 3,( October 2003), p 43
172 Ibid., p43
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Brewery, Chanrai Chemicals, Aureol Tobacco Company, and the Sierra Leone Paint
Factory.173
3.3.3 Infrastructure and the Environment
Sierra Leone’s infrastructure is among the poorest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most
of the rural areas are inaccessible and the roads linking the capital to other major towns
are largely unpaved. There is also a severe shortage of power supply both in the capital
and in all towns and cities with the exception of Bo and Kenema – the only two cities
that enjoy regular power supply. The lack of power supply is a clear disincentive for
investment. Management of the environment is almost non existent as a result of the
government’s failure to enforce laid down regulations. While the war has taken a toll
on the environment, the persistent cutting of trees by the logging industry and
individuals for business and domestic use, continue to damage the environment.174
3.4 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENTS
According to the Economic Intelligent Unit, Sierra Leone’s income distribution
is among the lowest in the world. In 1990, 82 per cent of its population lived below the
poverty line. Between 1990 and 2000, per capita income plunged 35 percent and it was
only $1.34 per day in 2000.175 According to a World Bank assessment, “even taking
into account projected growth rates and expected improvements in its terms of trade,
Sierra Leone is expected to remain an International Development Association (IDA)-
only and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)-eligible country for the
foreseeable future"176
173 Ibid., p13
174 J. Weeks, op.cit., p 8
175 Economic Intelligent Unit, op.cit.,
176 World Bank Report, Sierra Leone Country Background, World Bank, Washington, 2002, p23
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Other development indicators tell a sad story: child and maternal mortality are
among the highest in the world. In fact, for the past several years, Sierra Leone has
been ranked at the very bottom among 162 nations in terms of Gross National Product
(GNP) per head, life expectancy at birth, and adult literacy.177 In 2001, the UN
Children’s Fund estimated that 5,000 children die in Freetown before reaching their
first birthday.178 Life expectancy in 2002 is 38 years; the average life expectancy in
Sub-Saharan Africa is 49 years.179
There is a high incidence of sexually transmitted diseases also perpetuated by
the rebel conflict. Malaria, a readily preventable disease, still remains the single largest
health problem in the country. In addition, the country faces poverty and hygiene
related illnesses as well as preventable epidemics, such as typhoid, cholera, periodic
outbreaks of Lassa fever and many others. There are no reliable data on the level of
HIV/AIDS among the population. However, the Economic Intelligent Unit speculated
that it will soon hit epidemic proportions if urgent action is not taken. For example, in
1999, the military carried out tests on 1,099 potential male conscripts and recorded a
21.3 percent infection rate compared to 7.8 percent in 1994.180
3.5 CONCLUSION
The political, social and economic history of Sierra Leone unravels multi-layer
challenges that the currency of the state must grapple with as well as reverse for the
good of the nation. The history of violence, punctuated by a spate of military coups
and aborted coups are a worrying scenario for a nation still struggling to stand on its
own feet. To this end, the country requires proactive and multidimensional economic
177 UNDP Human Development Report, 2001, p 156
178Economic Intelligence Unit, Health and Education Sierra Leone 2001 http://www.eiu.com January
2006
179 Country Profile: Sierra Leone, April 4, 2003, www.devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile
180 Economic Intelligent Unit, op.cit.
65
strategies and long term commitment to the principles of good governance for the
attainment of economic growth and sound democratic institutions. This is underscored
by a demonstrated presence of undisciplined political arrangement such that the party
system is neither defined by values and ideologies, nor is it guided by a strong culture
of allegiance – one that is structured on discipline and political beliefs. Amidst the
lame-development environment came a long drawn ill defined civil conflict that
terrorised the human potential, devastated an already limited infrastructure and
reversed the development potential of the small nation-state. The endured
encumbrances are heightened by the country being an ailing and a highly indebted
poor economy for the foreseeable future, which presents in a sense, the opportunity for
a committed leadership to reverse the trend with support from the international
community and development partners.
There is a lingering hope that the Kabbah administration will take forward
some of the key challenges to institute change, however, The state of the human, socio-
economic and political development potential as presented in this chapter begs at least,
three questions to grapple with: first, how has the leadership been managing the
challenges prior to the 1996 Kabbah reforms, or have they been part of the problem
dynamics; second, there arises the need to further investigate the interplay between
leadership and the management of public resources that resulted into the grim state of
affairs as presented in the chapter; and finally, there is a need to explore the state of
affairs before independence in 1961, for example, to understand whether the political
and economic dimensions of governance were a good foundation for the leadership to
build upon, or whether there was absolutely no political or economic infrastructure put
in place by the colonial masters in helping the new leaders take the country forward.
The next chapter addresses the last question – investigating the political and
economic landscape of Sierra Leone prior to independence. This will be done by
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examining the parliamentary development of the country since 1787, as representative
democracy was the first and ultimate institution that the first settlers of present day
Sierra Leone saw as the platform through which development aspirations should be
channelled. The subsequent chapters will explore the first two issues with the objective
of identifying how the leadership failed in providing multiplier effects through not
strengthening oversight institutions, or enhancing human capacity, as well as failing to
adopt inclusive policies for the engagement of the civil society and the media in
national resource management.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHAPTER FOUR: PALIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT OF SIERRA LEONE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Modern Parliaments are imbued with the “power of the purse”181 to authorise
executive budgets and to exercise financial oversight to ensure transparency and
accountability in the process of delivering public services within the spirit of planned
estimates and expenditures.182 It can be said, also, that the political history and social
dynamics of a country are to a very large extent reflective of the manner in which
politics and policy implementation are shaped. In the attempt to analyse the role of the
Sierra Leone Parliament in exercising law-making as well as budgetary oversight
functions, it is useful to take a look at the historical development of the institution to
understand how it has evolved from the colonial era to the present. In depth study of
the background of Parliament will also help the research process to unpack the
dynamics behind its present relationship with the executive on major issues such as the
national budget and implementation.
4.2 ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE 1787-1791
The first legislative institution established in Sierra Leone - the then “Province
of Freedom” was in 1787, when the free blacks were returned to the West African
coast from Britain under the humanitarian venture of Granville Sharpe and other
Englishmen. These men were vehemently opposed to the Slave Trade and agitated for
an end to the inhuman act. Upon the creation of the settlement, the returned free slaves
181 Seminar discussions led by Professor the Lord Norton of Louth, University of Hull, October 2004
182 R. Kibria, Budgeting and Oversight in the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Public Expenditure
Management Regional Seminar, (July 2006), Belmopan, Belize
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were given the opportunity to elect a council that would be responsible for the day to
administration of the settlement. In the words of Marcus Jones:
The founding of the settlement was unique and peculiar …. Instead of a
colonial legislature, the settlement had a Common Council formed from among
the Hundredors and Tythingmen who were elected. In their Common Council
the settlers exercised legislative powers with absolute freedom, unfettered by
any interference or direction from anywhere else. The council was one of
limited powers. 183
The first legislative council of the settlement unfortunately was short-lived. It
lasted for only four years - 1787 to 1791 when the Sierra Leone Company was set up
by the philanthropists in England, to take control of the administration of the territory.
As a result the settlers lost their independence to company rule. It is worth noting that
the four years of self rule was the only period before Sierra Leone attained
independence in 1961, where an indigenous independent Parliament was in absolute
control of the affairs of state.184
4.3 COMPANY RULE 1791- 1808
Since 1791 when the Sierra Leone Company took over the administration of
the territory from the indigenous independent Parliament, it continued to be in charge
of affairs of the settlement until 1808 when the British Crown took over from the
business institution.185 Under company rule, an independent elected Parliament was
replaced by a Governing Council headed by a Superintendent appointed by the Court
of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, residing in England. The Superintendent
was not responsible to the settlers but to the Company Directors. The Superintendent
wielded absolute powers over the territory.186
183 M. Jones, Legal Development and Constitutional Change in Sierra Leone (1787 – 1971), p 32
184 Ibid.;p32
185 Ibid.; p 40
186 Ibid.; p41
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While the company ruled, it was also busy conducting trade with the settlers
and neighbouring indigenous tribes.187 To maintain law and order, the Superintendent
involved the settlers in the general administration of the settlement. In that regard,
Hundredors and Tythingmen were appointed from among former indigenous settlers
responsible for the running of the settlement. However, these appointed officials
operated on the fringes of government, they were not allowed to play any strategic role
in governance regardless of their experience in leading the settlement prior to company
rule. For example, on 1 March 1793, the council appointed a handful of Hundredors as
Town Marshals. The Hundredors and Tythingmen mainly performed municipal duties
where they debated and passed resolutions.188
By 1793 the settlers started claiming the right to propose enactments through
the Superintendent and Council; the proposals were accepted by the company leaders
and were passed into law. However, by virtue of a Charter passed by the Company in
1800, the Hundredors and Tythingmen were removed from all decision making
schemes and the powers of the Governor consolidated (The Charter changed the title
Superintendent to Governor) to make decisions without recourse to the settlers.
According to Marcus Jones, the 1800 Charter marked the beginning of executive style
leadership in Sierra Leone:
The governor’s position was strong. He had a veto, and contrary to what had
been in force earlier on, his powers were not limited or made conditional upon
his obtaining the concurrence of the council. However, neither he, nor his
council, could pass any law which was repugnant to or inconsistent with the
laws of England. 189
By strengthening the Governor to act independent of the council, it can be said
that the 1800 Charter not only laid down the foundation for ultra-executive style
187 Ibid p78-79
188 M. Jones, op.cit., p79
189 Ibid., p69
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leadership, but also prepared the ground for colonial rule, in which the governors
wielded absolute executive powers in the colony.
A provision in the Charter worthy of mention is the incorporation of Freetown,
making it the first municipality on the African continent. It was established “Body
Politic and Corporate” under the leadership of “The Mayor and Aldermen of
Freetown”. The settlers played a significant role in the administration of the city.190
But as highlighted above their role was limited to municipal duties only, with no
significant involvement with the proper administrative framework.
4.4 COLONIAL RULE 1808 - 1960
Following numerous attacks on the settlement by neighbouring tribes and the
rising resentment against company rule, the British Crown took over the administration
of the settlement in 1808, thus marking the real beginning of British colonial rule in
Sierra Leone.191 In the early years of colonial rule, the Crown retained all
administrative structures put in place by the Company and did not make any major
changes to the rules laid down by the Sierra Leone Company. The only exception was
to deny the settlers the right to take part in any form of decision making in the
territory. The new policy not only deepened deprivation from playing some form of
role in the administration of their settlement, but the settlers were neither consulted nor
did their opinions count any longer.192
4.4.1 Changes to Legislative Arrangements
After more than a decade of crown rule, the British Government introduced
some legislative changes in its West Africa territories. In 1821 the West Africa Act
190 Ibid., p71
191 Ibid., p83
192 M. Jones, p 85
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was passed in the British Parliament which led to the expansion of the membership of
the Legislative Council by nine additional councillors.193 The Act also brought into
being a significant change to British administration in West Africa, by making
Freetown the seat of colonial administration for the rest of its West African colonies:
“all the possessions and territories of Great Britain in West Africa, between latitudes
20 degrees north and 20 degrees south should be annexed to and or made
Dependencies of the colony of Sierra Leone”.194 As a result The Gold Coast (now
Ghana), The Gambia and Lagos became dependencies of Sierra Leone, and were
subject to the laws of Sierra Leone. Freetown then became the administrative capital
for the rest of West Africa. 195 Although the Act was repealed in 1827, it underscored
the premium placed on the Sierra Leone colony above the rest of the British territories
in West Africa.
4.5 THE 1863 CONSTITUTION
The next significant change took the form of a new constitution introduced in 1863,
which was regarded as the first constitution to be specifically promulgated for the
administration of Sierra Leone.196 Previous instruments of administration were
Charters or Orders made in Council. The 1863 Constitution made the following
changes to the Legislative Council:197
 The Governor and Commander-in-Chief (had a casting vote)
 The Chief Justice
 The Colonial Secretary
 The Queen’s Advocate
 The Officer Commanding the Troops
193 Ibid., p98
194 J. Marcus, op.cit., p96
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 “And such other person or persons nominated and appointed to serve on the
council” (the number varied between 2 to 7). The nominations were to be made
by the Governor confirmed by the Secretary of State.
The provision made for nominated members turned out to the advantage of the
settlers when one of their members, John Ezzidio, became the first African to be
nominated to the Legislative Council. Ezzidio’s nomination once again opened the
door for the indigenous Sierra Leoneans to play an active role in the political
dispensation of the colony. The trend continued until Sierra Leoneans gained total
control over the Legislative Council and government a century later. The Constitution
provided for an Executive Council, which comprised of all official members of the
Legislative Council with the exception of the unofficial nominated members. It is
important to note, also, that emphasis was placed on the official establishment of an
Executive Council in the 1863 Constitution.198
It is submitted that the 1863 Constitution is the “archetype colonial measure” in
which the Governor wields unlimited residual powers incompatible with contemporary
executive leaderships.199 Under the Constitution, for example, the Governor could
appoint members to the Legislative Council and dismiss them – the members served at
his pleasure; he exercised absolute control over the treasury and financial
administration beyond that of the Legislative Council; and also exercised judicial
functions. Moreover, the Governor was not made to be accountable to any political
unit in the colony except the Crown in England.200 It could be said perhaps that the
absence of political accountability in the colonies might have contributed to the
general outcry in the British Parliament in 1865 against the submitted estimates for the
administration of the colonies. Members in the House then described the colonial
198 Ibid., p112
199 Ibid., p112
200 Ibid., p109
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leadership as irresponsible; that they neither promoted trade nor fought to end slavery
in the West African territories.201
The year 1896 was another turning point in the political and Parliamentary
development of Sierra Leone: the Crown established its sway over the hinterland
(contemporary Sierra Leone) and declared it a Protectorate.202 The declaration came
about as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1885 (the partition of Africa among the
colonial powers), which extended Britain’s colonial grip over the rest of present day
Sierra Leone. It should be mentioned, also, that the settlement of Freetown was the
only jurisdiction under colonial control since the introduction of company rule in 1791,
the rest of the country was under tribal rule of numerous Kings and Warriors. The
declaration of the protectorate also brought to an end absolute tribal authority and
changed the overall administrative structure of the country in favour of colonial rule.203
4.6 THE 1924 CONSTITUTION
The introduction of the 1924 Constitution was the first major change to have
taken place in the political and Parliamentary setup of the colony since the 1863
Constitution. The new instrument brought about changes, although not radical enough
to transform the Legislative Council. Under the provisions of the new constitution, the
membership of the legislative council was expanded to eleven (11) official members
and ten (10) unofficial members nominated by the Governor. The membership was as
follows:204
Official Members
 Officer Commanding the Troops
 Colonial Secretary
201 Ibid., p109
202 Ibid., p119-123
203 Note: Freetown area which was established in 1787 was for administrative convenience referred to as
the Colony, while the annexed hinterland of 1896 was known as the Protectorate.
204 M. Jones, op.cit., p137
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 Attorney General
 Colonial Treasurer
 Principal Medical Officer
 3 Provincial Commissioners (following the annexation of the hinterland)
 Comptroller of Customs
 Director of Public Works
 Commissioner of Lands and Forests
Unofficial Members
 3 Elected members from the colony
 2 Colony Africans nominated by the Governor
 2 Europeans nominated by the Governor
 3 Paramount Chiefs from the protectorate one each from the three
administrative regions nominated by the Governor205
The Executive Council comprised of the five senior members of the Legislative
Council:
 Officer Commanding the Troops
 Colonial Secretary
 Attorney General
 Colonial Treasurer
 Director of Medical Services
The promulgation of a new constitution conferred immense powers on the
Governor beyond the provisions of the 1863 Constitution. The Governor, for example,
could make laws for peace and good government (the colony and protectorate
together); he could summon, adjourn, prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Council
without advice. The Governor could, moreover, exercise all prerogative powers of the
Crown with the exception of the powers of legislation. He could among others:
i. Nominate members to the Council
ii. Exercise the right of veto
iii. Appoint judges and justices of the peace
205 Note: The Paramount Chiefs were the Kings or ethnic leaders in charge of the administration of
numerous tribal jurisdictions. The title was changed to Paramount Chief by the British Crown and ruled
the protectorate through the Paramount Chiefs under the system of “indirect rule”. The chiefs were
addressed by the colonial administrators as “my good friend”. Regardless of several merger
arrangements over the years, there remain 146 Chiefdoms in present day Sierra Leone.
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iv. Grant pardons
v. Regulate fees collected as general revenue
vi. Dispense offices
vii. Reserve bills for Her Majesty’s pleasure, and refuse assent to them206
4.6.1 Implications of the 1924 Constitution on Public Finance
The 1924 Constitution brought along administrative features similar to those of
contemporary executive leadership, including that of Sierra Leone, where the executive
president is imbued with extensive rights to veto, powers to appoint judges and the
granting of presidential pardons.207 The Constitution reinforced the vast powers of a
future executive president already laid down by the previous Constitution of 1863.
Another significant feature of proper public finance administration was for the
first time since the British Crown took over the crown colony in 1808, followed by the
1896 declaration of the protectorate in 1896, brought to the fore. Firstly, a Colonial
Treasurer now sat on the Legislative Council as well as the Executive Council. This
development was significant in terms of mainstreaming financial regulations and
resource management in the colony. It meant also that budgetary issues including
resource allocations were discussed at both the Legislative and Executive Councils. In
addition, the presence of the Comptroller of Customs in the Legislative Council also
meant that revenue policies received the direct attention of members and occupied a
strategic place on the agenda of legislative proceedings.
Thus far, there seems a high correlation between revenue generation and
expenditure control during the third decade of the twentieth century in the colony of
Sierra Leone. It is worth noting at this juncture that the post of Comptroller of Customs
continued to be in charge of revenue generation at customs, until recently when all
206 M. Jones, op.cit., p138
207 The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone
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revenue generating agencies were harmonised in 2004 under a single body, the
National Revenue Authority (NRA).
Moreover, the fact that the Governor regulated fees collected as general
revenue reinforced the primacy of executive control over public funds during the first
quarter of the twentieth century (nearly four decades before independence). However,
there is no indicative evidence that emphasis was placed on the proper management of
finances in a transparent and accountable environment, which should have been
created by the colonial administration. On the contrary, evidence shows that
indigenous ministers in the colonial government were involved in financial
impropriety even before independence. This might partly be explained by the absence
of a transparency culture in the management of national resources.208
By virtue of this analysis, it could be said that the overwhelming powers of the
Governor over financial resources must have shaped current trends in which the
executive president exercises unrivalled control over the national budget. As
demonstrated in chapter eight of this study, in most developing countries within the
Commonwealth, all Money Bills with financial implications must be cleared with the
executive or receive prior approval before they can be introduced in Parliament.209 In
this regard, it can be said that the peripheral role of Parliaments in the budgetary
process owes its ancestry to colonial administration. Executive dominance over the
budget is a culture that has evolved over the years in most Commonwealth countries.
208 The 1958 Riot over the hoarding of rice as explained later in this chapter, is a case in point
209 This was discovered at recently organised training programmes under the Commonwealth
Secretariat’s Public Expenditure Management Programmes held at pan-Commonwealth and regional
levels.
77
4.6.2 Developments leading to further legislative changes
Post-1924 Sierra Leone was one in which the indigenes clamoured for more
changes to the political arrangement and called for their greater participation in
government. The nationalists took bold steps for self-determination which resulted into
some significant changes. The Sierra Leoneans started organising for political change
even before the 1924 Constitution was passed. For example, as early as 1907, the Civil
Servants Association was formed by indigenous workers in the public service to
protect the welfare of their membership and agitate for appointments to top civil
service positions.210 In addition, the first Ratepayers Association was formed in 1909,
among other reasons to contest seats in the municipal elections of Freetown. The group
later focused its attention on national politics seeking representation in the Legislative
Council. Furthermore, as a result of ongoing external forces within the region, in
particular after the First World War, the National Congress of British West Africa was
formed by J.E Caseley-Hayford of the Gold Coast (Ghana) with the prime objective of
seeking self-rule for all West African British colonies, namely Ghana, The Gambia,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone.211
In 1919 another group of political activists, the African Progressive Union was
formed in the colony of Freetown with a similar objective to influence constitutional
changes that would grant Sierra Leoneans greater role in the politics of the colony.212
Further developments took place in 1945 when a new political party, The Sierra Leone
National Council (SLNC) was formed under the leadership of highly educated elites to
play a central role in the administration of the country. The most dramatic change
however, took place in 1938 when the West African Youth League was formed by Isaac
Theophilus Akunna Wallace Johnson, a radical political activist who found and ran the
210 Ibid., p141-143
211 Ibid.,p142-143
212 Ibid., p142-143
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African Standard Newspaper in Freetown. Wallace Johnson was a radical with neo-
communist ideologies.213
The West African Youth League delivered its first dramatic impact by winning
several seats in the municipal council elections in Freetown. As a result and on account
of pressures from other groups, the colonial administration approved the provision for
an African unofficial majority in the Standing Committee of the legislative council –
the first time in the history of colonial Africa.214 Following this achievement, two
Sierra Leoneans were appointed to the executive council in 1943, granting them the
opportunity for the first time - after more than hundred years - to participate in the
executive decision making process in the country. It can be submitted that having an
unofficial African majority on the Standing Finance Committee was by itself a
significant gain in the struggle for self-rule. In addition, matters relating to control over
public finance also gained primacy.
On account of the increased pressure for political change, the Protectorate
Assembly was established in 1946 by the colonial administration to provide the
protectorate local leaders with the opportunity to play a role in national administration.
The Protectorate Assembly advised the Crown on native and tribal issues. During the
same period that the Protectorate Assembly was created, the Sierra Leone
Organisation Society was formed by a handful of protectorate elites to serve as a
mouth piece for provincial interests.215
213 Ibid., p142-143
214 Ibid., p144
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4.7 THE 1951 CONSTITUTION
On 19 November 1951, the British Government issued an Order in Council,
published as The Sierra Leone Legislative Council Order in Council Public Notice No.
106 of 1951, to introduce a new constitution. The new instrument provided for an
Executive Council and an unofficial African majority in the Legislative Council. It also
attempted to introduce representative government but the latter was not operational in
the protectorate where the elective principle was absent.216 Membership of the
Legislative Council in the protectorate was through a padded nominated system rather
a direct electoral system. In other words, representatives were drawn from the
protectorate assembly. The legislative assembly comprised the following:217
Official Members
 The Governor (as President)
 The Chief Commissioner of the Protectorate
 The Attorney General
 The Financial Secretary
 The Director of Medical Studies
 The Director of Agriculture
 The Director of Education
Unofficial Members
 Seven elected members from the colony
 Fourteen elected members from the protectorate, of whom one was to be
nominated by the Governor and one nominated by the protectorate assembly
 Two nominated members to represent trade and commerce.
The Executive Council comprised of following:
 Four ex-officio members, these were:
 The Colonial Secretary
 The Chief Commissioner of the Protectorate
216 Ibid., p180
217 Ibid., p180-181
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 The Financial Secretary
 The Attorney General
 Six Unofficial Members
In spite of the introduction of an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council, the
Governor was still a very powerful influence as he presided over the Executive
Council as well as exercised control over the colony. For example, he had the power of
veto, could introduce legislation and he also enjoyed absolute control over the
judiciary. 218
Regardless of criticisms levied against the constitution on account of the
sweeping powers of the Governor, it could be said, that the 1951 Constitution laid the
foundation for self-government and it created the building blocks for a clearly defined
budgetary system. For example, the appointment of the Financial Secretary to the
Executive Council was a pointer that financial controls were beginning to gain a
foothold in the system. In addition, the election of a Vice President, in this case, Beoku
Betts, from among the Africans, meant that the principle of self-determination was
gradually taking shape.219
4.7.1 Towards Ministerial Government
The 1951 Constitution was to facilitate a rapid shift of power from the colonial
administrators into the hands of the local African leaders. Following the 1951 elections
contested by the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the National Council, the
SLPP formed a government after taking the majority of seats.220 Further significant
developments took place in 1953 that expanded the scope of national responsibility of
local political leaders. Six ministers, including one without portfolio, were appointed
218 Ibid.,p181
219 Ibid., p184
220 Ibid., p184
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from among the local Legislative Council members. The title “leader of the
opposition” was formally conferred on Dr H.C. Bankole Bright of the National
Council by the Governor. 221
The political landscape during this period was marked by intense party rivalry
in which financial malpractice and public sector impropriety started to incubate among
the new African leaders in executive positions. It could be argued, however, that the
colonial leadership might have greatly influenced the behaviour of the new elected
officials in government. Professor Marcus Jones aptly quoted Professor Robinson in
his The Governors and the Governed that: “Knowledge by the people about their
government is indispensable if democracy is to succeed. The government cannot
operate successfully if its activities are veiled in ignorance, misunderstanding and
mystery. Public authorities must come into the market place and tell people simple and
clearly what they are trying to do and why. They should explain and justify the
methods. They should be frank about difficulties and shortcomings. Only by a
deliberate effort of this kind can prejudice and ignorance or malevolent criticism be
avoided and a discriminating body of public opinion built up”. 222
The prevailing situation in government, unfortunately dictated the reverse. In
his contribution to Parliamentary debate on 5 November 1956, for example, Wallace
Johnson, the radical politician and journalist, lashed out that “one minister since
entering the executive council had built houses worth £9000 and had £5000 cash in
various banks. Another had £6000 worth of buildings, a transport company and one
hundred acres of land; a third was suppose to be able to sign cheques of £30,000”.223
The spate of corruption, it can be argued, took its toll on the livelihood of the populace,
because in February 1955 serious riots took place in Freetown on account of alleged
221 Ibid.,184
222 Ibid., p188
223 Ibid., p189, J.A.D. Alie, op.cit., p211
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hoarding of rice by political leaders. Mr Stevens (who later led the country for nearly
two decades 1968-1985), Mr Margai and Mr Mustapha - all politicians, alleged their
houses were attacked by rioters.224 Similar disturbances took place in the protectorate,
which were followed by the setting up of the Cox Commission to look into the
situation. The Commission reported among others that “there was evidence of greed,
extortion and widespread corruption on the part of chiefs. They concluded that these
activities had a demoralising effect on the people.”225
4.7.2 Constitutional changes leading to independence
In addition to the high level mismanagement in government, the clamour for
self-rule continued unabated. One would have thought that the nationalist leaders
clamour for political independence was in tune with the spirit of national development,
rather than personal aggrandisement as demonstrated during this period. Between
1951 and 1960, several developments took place in preparation for the attainment of
independence in 1961. One of the occurrences was a dialogue that took place in
London between the local leaders and the Crown Representatives which led to the
removal of all Official Members from the Executive Council with the exception of the
Governor.226 Dr Margai, the then leader of the majority party (the Sierra Leone
Peoples Party) in Parliament was designated Chief Minister.
Furthermore, a statutory instrument was introduced in 1956 that ceded more
responsibilities to the local leaders in anticipation of independence. The instrument, for
example, changed the name of the Legislative Council to the House of Representatives
(HOR). The membership of the HOR was also increased to fifty-seven with a new
224 J. A.D. Alie, op.cit., p212-213 (explained further that five chiefs were deposed and five resigned their
positions following the Cox Commission Report)
225 Ibid., p190
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position of “Speaker of the House”. The House of Representatives comprised the
following:227
Ex-Officio
 The Chief Secretary (the new name for the Colonial Secretary)
 The Attorney-General
 The Chief Commissioner of the Protectorate
 The Financial Secretary
Elected
 14 from the colony
 25 from the protectorate
 12 chiefs from the protectorate
Nominated
 2 nominated members
The Governor withdrew from the Legislature and was replaced by the Speaker.
On 25 March 1960, Sir Milton Margai, the Chief Minister led a twenty-four
man team, called a United Front including 17 members of the HOR to London to
engage the Crown in further negotiations for self-rule. The mission achieved a number
of fruitful outcomes, for example, on the 23 June 1960, another Statutory Instrument
introduced a whole new African Executive Council – now called the Cabinet, and the
Premier (Chief Minister) became Prime Minister. The Instrument further established a
new Public Service Commission and a Judicial Service Commission. All of these
developments bore the hallmark of self-government that was translated into
independence the following year.228
4.8 THE 1961 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION
Prior to the attainment of independence, an “all party delegation” of local
political leaders led by Sir Milton Margai (Leader of the majority party, SLPP in the
227 Ibid.,p191
228 Ibid., p 193
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HOR), visited London again from 20 April to 4 May 1960, to request formally
independence from the Crown. As in the previous case, the mission was successful and
led to the selection of 27 April 1961 as the date for independence. Following this
understanding, the Sierra Leone Independence Bill was tabled and debated by the
British Houses of Parliament on the 22 March 1961. However, the manner in which
the bill was rushed through the house and concluded within two hours, raised serious
concerns for which Norman Pannell MP said: 229
I regret the delay in bringing this bill before the House…Even more do I regret
the haste with which the Bill is being passed through all its stages. A colony
with which we have had a connection for over 200 years is being, in a sense
disposed of in a few hours. Whereas yesterday, we discussed for the whole day
a matter of transitory and trivial importance – the salary of one man – today we
are disposing of the destiny of two million people in less than half that time.
4.8.1 Features of the 1961 Constitution
The Constitution brought with it some features of real democracy: it introduced
a Bill of Rights – guaranteed the rights of citizens, and Judicial Review - which meant
that laws passed by Parliament that contravenes the constitution could be subjected to a
review by the judiciary. The principle of executive governance was introduced as it
vested immense powers in the Governor-General which can be exercised directly or
indirectly through cabinet ministers. The Constitution put finishing touches to the
Westminster style government in which ministers are drawn from the unicameral
Parliament. The instrument also provides that following a general election, the
Governor General can appoint as Prime Minister the person who appears to command
a majority in the HOR. However, in spite of the presence of an elected Prime Minister
as head of government, the Governor General retained extensive powers such that he
can dissolve the HOR and may appoint persons to the judiciary if he chose.230
229 Ibid., p196 (The author incorrectly refers to the MP as Norman Powell)
230 Ibid., p200-202
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The Constitution established a Parliament for an independent state composed of
the Governor General, the Speaker and members elected from single-member
constituencies. Added to this number, each of the 12 Districts had one traditional ruler
– a Paramount Chief - as member. Parliament was instituted the supreme legislative
authority of the country with powers to alter and amend the constitution, although
some clauses were entrenched.231
4.8.2 Analysis of the independence status
It appeared that whilst Sierra Leone and its leaders celebrated independence,
the great question that loomed was the preparedness of its leaders to take forward the
leadership mantle of the young nation. It is of significance to note that the new leaders
had not had the political and administrative experience required to lead the country
into independence. Unlike the Creoles of Freetown (formerly the Province of
Freedom), who have had nearly two hundred years (1787 – 1961) experience in
political, legal and administrative leadership, their counterparts in the protectorate,
who were now in control of government had only had less than two decades
experience in political leadership. It was for this, among other reasons that some
creoles challenged the legality of the constitution. Marcus Jones shared their
sentiments:
When independence arrived in Sierra Leone, there were no fundamental unities
binding the peoples of the country. The colony and the protectorate were torn
apart and once again, litigation was commenced, this time in London, to
challenge the constitutionality of the independence of Sierra Leone. There was
no great mass movement for independence as had happened in Ghana, for
instance and so the legal framework for national unity was practically non-
existent. The civil service was beginning to be politicised, there was
considerable illiteracy and there was a deep tribal division. This was the kind of
country which was taken over by the politicians of the Sierra Leone People’s
Party who had had just under a decade of experience in the running of a
modern democracy. The provision of a Bill of Rights as an attachment to the
231 Ibid., p202
86
constitution of Sierra Leone seemed a very necessary and desirable
expedient.232
Until the establishment of the protectorate assembly in the 1940s, membership
to the Legislative Council for the protectorates was through nomination rather than by
election, and until the subsequent creation of the SLPP by the protectorate elites, the
new leaders have never had dealings with western public sector leadership. The
Creoles who have had that exposure in the colony were in the minority and could not
win as many seats as were required to lead the country. Similar views of political
immaturity were raised from several quarters including the Times newspaper:
A colonial regime is authoritarian in essence, even though it may be acting as a
school for democracy. The authoritarian sanctions are there in reserve and even
occasionally used. The African Government taking over from such a regime
has to govern a country where the electorate are immature, mostly illiterate and
ridden by fear and witchcraft. They are deeply divided tribally, violence is
endemic and the very boundaries of the country are recent and in some cases,
purely artificial. It is reasonable to suppose that any government will be able to
control such a situation unless it is prepared to govern it strongly?233
Political immaturity manifested itself soon after the death of the first Prime
Minister, Dr Margai in 1964. Mr Albert Margai, junior brother of the deceased Prime
Minister, who succeeded him, immediately attempted to introduce a single-party
constitution as well as a republican one. Both attempts met with stiff opposition from
the leading opposition party, the All Peoples Congress (APC). The APC mobilised
national resistance against the Margai proposals. In addition, following the 1967
elections which were marked by serious malpractices, a team of military officers took
power by force, but this was short-lived as it was put down by another rank of junior
officers, who formed the National Reformation Council (NRC) headed by Lieutenant
Colonel Juxon-Smith.234 One year later, another military coup toppled the NRC and
232 Ibid., p198
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installed Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister. Stevens was leader of the APC that
supposedly won the controversial 1967 general elections.235
4.9 THE 1971 REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION
When the APC came to power in 1968, the party ruled and dominated the
political scene of Sierra Leone for a period of twenty-four years, 1968 to 1992, when it
was ousted in a military coup in 1992. Stevens, who had earlier opposed the
introduction of both a republican constitution and a single party rule, became the great
advocate of republicanism and the single party system. On the 19 April 1971,
Parliament passed a Republican Constitution by a majority of 53 to 10.236 Section 16 of
the Constitution introduced an executive president as head of state and commander in
chief of the armed forces. He was to be elected by cabinet and to hold office at the
pleasure of the cabinet. Initially, a significant constitutional omission regarding the
qualification for the office of President was identified and was later addressed by an
amendment. Apart from the fact that he was supposed to take an oath of office, there
was no provision in respect of his role in the process of government.237
The constitution provided for a unicameral Parliament of elected members and
paramount chiefs. The Constitution did not take into account the role of an opposition
party in Parliament. The only significant role set out for the opposition was after the
passing of Act No. 7 in the same year, which required the whole Parliament including
the opposition members to appoint the President with the Chief Justice serving as the
returning officer. This role was previously carried out by the Cabinet. The amended act
also provided that to be eligible for the position of President, the person must be a
235 Ibid., p231
236 Ibid., p236
237 Ibid.,p236
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citizen and must have attained the age of forty-five years. The immunities and
privileges of the President were also provided for.
Under the new arrangements, the President could appoint members of the
electoral commission without the advice of the Prime Minister (now the Vice
President). Section 49 further consolidated the President’s grip on power, for example,
he would act in his deliberate judgement without the advice of the cabinet. He “shall
not be obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority”. The
office of the Vice President replaced that of the Prime Minister. Most notably, and in
contravention of tradition, the President had two Vice presidents instead of one.
The republican Constitution also introduced a president more powerful than
even the colonial Governors, who were answerable to a Colonial Secretary and the
Crown in England. The republican President was not answerable to any institution or
individuals – arguably marking the beginning of a dictatorship. The 1971 constitution
reinforced absolute executive dominance over the legislature in relation to all state
operations, including the oversight functions of the latter. Section 49 more or less
reduced the powers and influence of the Parliament over issues that required its
approval such as on the national budget as well as its oversight functions.
4.10 THE 1978 SINGLE-PARTY CONSTITUTION
The 1978 One-Party Constitution was the most repressive post independent
constitution passed in Sierra Leone under the APC regime of Siaka Stevens. The
constitution was passed on the premise that a single party system would facilitate
effective governance in a post independent era, given that human resource and ideas
would be harmonised under a single political club.238 Proponents of this political
arrangement were of the view that the polarisation of people and ideas was not in the
238 J.A.D. Alie, op.cit., p242-245
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best interest of young nations across Africa. Thus Stevens, the flag bearer, who had
opposed the introduction of a republican constitution and a single-party rule,
championed the passing of both constitutions. The APC manipulated a referendum
which led to the promulgation of the 1978 one-party constitution. 239
4.10.1 Features of the 1978 Constitution
4.10.2 The Parliament
The new Constitution fashioned Parliament along the Westminster model with
the President and cabinet being Members of Parliament. To be eligible for election to
Parliament, a person must be a citizen of Sierra Leone (naturalised citizens exempted),
must have attained twenty-one years and must be literate in English. The election of a
Speaker and a Deputy Speaker from among Members of Parliament (MPs) was also
provided for. The Parliament was made the supreme law making body and was imbued
with such powers that allowed it to regulate its own proceedings – for example, make,
amend, and revoke Standing Orders for the orderly conduct of Parliamentary business.
4.10.3 Executive Dominance
Executive dominance which prevailed during colonial administration was
perpetuated in the 1971 Republic Constitution and, again taken to excessive lengths in
the 1978 Constitution. This was ingrained, for example, in the election of President in
which Section 24 (2) (a) provided that complaints or protests relating to the election
shall be referred to and be determined by the Returning Officer, whose decision shall
be conclusive and shall not be inquired into by any court of law. In addition, Section
239 Ibid., p245
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90 provided for the Chief Justice to serve as the Returning Officer, who by deliberate
design is appointed by the President and holds office at his pleasure.
Section 21(1) provides for a “Supreme Head of State and Commander of the
Armed Forces, and Grand Commander of the Order of the Republic, who shall be
known as the President of Sierra Leone”. The Head of State is the embodiment of
national unity and ensures continuance of the Republic; he is guardian of the
constitution, guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of the territory, of
respect for treaties and international agreements. He is the fountain of justice and
honour, who shall hold office for a period of seven years.
The President is powerful such that he is exempted from personal taxation
(Section 27 (3)) and no criminal or civil proceedings can be instituted against him in
respect of anything done or omitted either in his official or personal capacity (Section
27 (4). Furthermore, Section 79 (1) vested further executive powers in the President:
the President shall always act in accordance with his own deliberate judgement in the
performance of state duties, among them the dissolution of Parliament and the
appointment of the first and second Vice Presidents. The President is also empowered
to appoint up to seven members to Parliament after each Parliamentary election and
those members were entitled to contribute to debates and could vote on any matter
before the House (Section 43). In a situation where the decision or action of the
President requires advice from some other quarters, such as from the Cabinet, the
question whether he sought or received such advice “shall not be inquired into by any
court” (Section 79 (3)).
The extensive powers of the President also overshadowed the legislature. For
instance, the President may at any point in time prorogue or dissolve the Parliament,
and he may recall the body after such a dissolution, pending a general election if he
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deemed it necessary owing to a state of public emergency (Section 75) (1) (5)). The
President may at any point in time summon a meeting of the Parliament.
4.10.4 The Power of the Purse
The 1978 Constitution provided for the Parliament to authorise (through an
appropriation Act) national budgets (estimates and expenditure) submitted by the
minister of finance (Section 127). While the Constitution provided for the traditional
Parliamentary power of the purse, it is clear that real power over public funds rested
with the executive – the President, the Cabinet and the minister of finance. For
example, although Parliament can confer the authority on a local government unit to
raise funds through local taxes, the President and Cabinet on the other hand, wield
absolute control over taxation: Section 54(1) limits the ability of Parliament to impose
any form of tax without the express approval of the President, except where reduction
is required.
Furthermore, where it appeared to the minister of finance that there will be
delays in passing the Appropriation Act to authorise expenditure, the minister may
through a Parliamentary resolution, cause moneys to be spent from the consolidated
fund for implementation purposes. Section 132 of the constitution also provided that
Parliament may establish a contingency fund which is controlled by the finance
minister and who in turn determines how and when the funds would be o be expended.
The constitution further provides that “there shall be paid to the holders of the
offices … such salaries and allowances as may be prescribed by or under any law or
determined by the President acting in consultation with the Cabinet”. This provision
resides considerable powers in the president to determine the salaries and allowances
of the following: the Vice- Presidents, Attorney General and Minister of Justice, the
Chief Justice, A Justice of the Supreme Court, A Justice of Appeal, A Judge of the
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High Court, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Chairman and Members of the
Electoral Commission, the Chairman and members of the Public Service Commission,
and the Auditor-General (Section 131 (1) and (4).
Drawing on the aforementioned, it is clear that the President’s firm grip over
state funds as provided for in the constitution, provided leeway to act ultra-vires on
financial matters. The constitution also provided the President undue leverage over the
judiciary and the financial oversight institution of the Auditor-General. The Auditor-
General is appointed by the President in consultation with the Pubic Service
Commission, if he pleases, and he also determines the salary and allowances of the
public oversight officer.
4.11 CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the history and background of Sierra Leone’s
parliamentary and constitutional developments as a prelude to the current institutional
behaviour and political structures. The chapter traced executive dominance as a
political legacy of colonialism that laid the foundation for current executive-legislative
relations in which the latter plays a peripheral role in the budgetary process of the
country. Regardless of this identified institutional challenge, it can be said that the
British colonial legacy was one that can be celebrated as it laid all the democratic
foundations, including institutions that the leadership could have built upon after
independence.
At independence there were not only present proactive bodies such as an audit
office, a free media (for example, Wallace Johnson’s African Standard newspaper and
many more), and avenues for civil society activities (such as the Rate Payers
Association established as far back as in 1909), there were also opportunities present in
the form human and institutional capacity (include a Public Service Commission and a
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Judicial Service Commission), as well as political awareness, which were huge capital
to be tapped into for the cultivation of economic and political development. In
summary, the colonial apparatus did deliver some of the key mechanisms on which a
strong nation could have been built, in particular for the political leadership to have
transformed the country from a small and relatively peaceful cohesive nation to one of
affluence and modern dynamism.
The next chapter is an attempt to examine in depth the management of national
resources including governance structures under a number of successive governments -
civil as well as military - prior to the Kabbah administration. It also highlights some of
the leadership failures and the attendant attributes of corruption, greed, and the lack of
foresight that have defined and permeated the development parameters of a once
peaceful and thriving economy, only to be transformed into oblivion and poverty in
less than half a century. The journey for Sierra Leone has been a painful experience
accompanied by some of the most intriguing elements of society as set out in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CHAPTER FIVE: BUDGET TRANSPERENCY AND PARTICIPATION 1968-1996
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter unpacks the administration of public finance by three governments
from 1968 to 1996, prior to the ongoing reforms of President Ahmed Tenja Kabbah.
First, it looks at the All Peoples Congress (APC) Party’s management of the budgetary
process under two succeeding regimes, with emphasis on government transparency and
stakeholder participation between 1968 and 1992. In this regard, the rule of Siaka
Stevens 1968 -1985, and that of Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh 1985 -1992
would be examined. Second, it explores the manner in which the military government
– the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) - handled the public finances from
1992 to 1996.
5.2 THE APC REGIME 1968 -1992
5.2.1 Siaka Stevens 1968 -1985
Siaka Stevens, the founding father of the All Peoples Congress (APC) party
introduced the Republican Constitution in 1971 and the Single-Party Constitution in
1978. The successful introduction of the 1978 Constitution guaranteed the government
the leeway to do whatever it chooses to do, when and in the manner in which it wanted
to be done without formidable opposition from any quarters within society.240 The
legal framework which guided the budgetary process, as highlighted in the previous
chapter was the 1971 Republican Constitution and the Finance Control and
Management Act No. 2 of 1961. The 1978 Constitution entrusted enormous powers in
the President and Cabinet over the management of the public purse. Section 132 of the
240 J. A. D. Alie, op.cit., p246
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Constitution for example, provided for the Parliament to create a contingency fund to
be managed by the minister of finance at his own discretion. Contrary to the OECD
best practice guidelines, the government largely managed the budgetary process bereft
of transparent discretions. As a result, unofficial spending was estimated at 60 percent
of the country’s operating budget by 1979 and was higher in the 1980s.241
Corruption was systemic and eventually affected the fabric of society such that
by the 1980s the corrupt activities of ministers and civil servants took the slang:
“Squandergate, Vouchergate, and Milliongate”. 242 Public servants indulged in corrupt
practices without fear of sanctions. In the 1985/86 fiscal year, domestic revenue stood
at 18 percent of the 1977/78 figures.243 The economy was so weak that the finance
minister announced in 1980 that businesses had paid only 1.7 million (Leones) out of
100 million in assessed taxes since 1971. By 1984 national development outlay stood
at only 3 per cent of the overall budget.244 These developments completely fell outside
best budgetary practice.
As mentioned earlier, the President is powerful such that he is exempted from
personal taxation and no criminal or civil proceedings can be instituted against him for
any wrong doing or omission either in his official or personal capacity. Furthermore,
Section 79 (1) vested extreme executive powers in the President: the executive
President shall always act in accordance with his own deliberate judgement in the
performance of state duties, among them the dissolution of the Parliament and the
appointment of first and second Vice Presidents.
241 Ibid., p246
242 S. Kpundeh, op.cit., p150
243 W. Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge University, 1995 p 64
244 Ibid., p 64
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A similar trend of poor financial management continued under the
administration of Major General Saidu Momoh, who was head of the Sierra Leone
Armed Forces (SLAF), but was handpicked by Stevens to succeed him as President in
1985. The economic downturn became more pronounced under the Momoh
administration which among several factors led to the successful 1992 military coup
that brought an end to the twenty-four year rule of the APC (1968 -1992).
5.2.2 Parliament under the APC regime
Parliament under the 1978 single-party constitution was a one-dimensional
house characterised by no dissenting voice. The submission of a single year budget
was only a political masquerade and was reduced to a mere ceremonial process.245
Debates on budgets were smooth, with no controversies or need to strike compromises
on any budget head as every MP was part of the government. In fact, Appropriation
bills were never a priority on the business list of the House.246 On the question of
taxation, Parliament could only make a reduction and could not introduce any new tax
without the express consent and approval of the executive President (Section 54 (1)).
In view of the above, Parliament under the APC did not operate within the prescribed
OECD benchmarks for robust Parliamentary scrutiny.
All Pre-1996 Parliaments were Westminster-style legislatures in which the
President and Cabinet were members of Parliament. The scenario made it very simple
for all APC Governments to introduce and pass all money bills. In addition, neither the
1971 Republican Constitution nor the 1978 Single-Party one provided for a
comprehensive committee system. There was no Public Accounts Committee (PAC),
for example, as would be provided for under both constitutions in conformity with the
245Interview with Sahr Randolph Fillie-Faboe, former MP and Secretary General of the APC Party,
currently a regional minister of the SLPP, June 2006
246 Ibid.,
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Westminster Parliamentary tradition. Little wonder that emphasis was never placed on
the publication of the Accountant-General’s annual report or submission of such
reports to the Auditor-General for audit.247
Although Parliament during the Momoh administration introduced the PAC
under the Standing Orders, the committee was never up to the job. In fact, the current
tradition of drawing the chairman of the PAC from the ruling party can be traced to the
single party Parliament under the APC.248 In sum, Parliament was allotted a lame duck
role in the budgetary process, a demonstration of a total disregard for the values and
principles of transparency and accountability.
5.2.3 Auditor-General and other stakeholders
The role of oversight institutions in the budgetary process, in particular the
Auditor-General was peripheral, inadequate, and less desirable. For example,
appointment, dismissal and salary of the Auditor-General were at the President’s
discretion (Section 131), and his decisions on the allowances to be received by the
Auditor-General could not be questioned in any court of law. In addition to this
provision, “probity and accountability was not a word in the dictionary of the APC”,
said Sahr Randolph Fillie-Faboe, a former APC MP and last Secretary-General before
the 1992 coup, and currently a Minister of State in the SLPP Government. “The party
did what it did for the sake of its interest … the interest of entrenching itself in power”.
While independent corroborating sources may be required to buttress Mr Fillie-
Faboe’s opinion, it could be deduced by inference what has been reported by William
Reno, other scholars and observers that the APC regime was grossly in breach good
governance values and acceptable practice of representative democracy.
247 Interview with Mr Fillie-Faboe
248 Ibid.,
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Civil society involvement in the budgetary process, which would have been
critical to achieving transparency and accountability, was not encouraged or facilitated
by the Government – a significant departure from the OECD best practice benchmarks.
The APC largely discouraged all forms of civil society activity that opposed its
policies. In reality there was no formidable or organized civil society group to have put
up challenge to government activities. Opposition to government policies came mainly
from university students, such as the 1977 student uprising that forced the APC among
other things to call early elections.249
The party mostly made use of the youth supporters and thugs to suppress
dissenting voices. The APC policy of blatant intimidation of the citizenry was also
reinforced by the establishment of the Internal Security Unit (ISU), a paramilitary unit
that parallels the military and police. The ISU not only intimidated citizens it also
provided security for the president and his ministers. The ISU was later renamed
Special Security Division (SSD), when it was popularly dubbed by the citizens to
mean: “I shoot you”. The SSD was better trained and professionally equipped than the
constitutional forces - the military and police. The SSD received professional
combatant training from Cuba that transformed it into a force of repression.250
5.3 STEVENS AND STATE FINANCE
The problem with the APC management of Sierra Leone budgets, it can be
argued, did not lie in the lack of resources, but in the absence of respect for democratic
and accountability values. Anyu Ndumbe observes: “In the 1960s, Sierra Leone had
one of the best public sector structures in Africa. Its workers were professionally
trained, and a regular apparatus was in place to deal with challenges confronting the
249J.A.D. Alie, op.cit., p243
250 W. Reno, op.cit., p108
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new nation,” but that it began to suffer “decay and inefficiency in the 1970s” because
of “political interference.” 251
William Reno on the other hand, argues that state corruption in Sierra Leone
was in the first place introduced and nurtured by the British colonialists who ruled the
former West African territories through indirect rule - a system by which colonial
governors administered the territories through the local chiefs with little or no regard to
the educated elites.252 The administrative setup was such that all development funds
were channelled through the chiefs and the colonial office deliberately refused to take
appropriate actions when the chiefs misappropriated the funds.253 Reno argues that
during the colonial period, factional politics developed along the line of acquiring state
resources rather than class politics or ideology.254 As a result, he posits further, that
when the elites assumed power at independence, they built partnerships with the
business class, particularly the Lebanese community, to the detriment of national
development. Whether the argument is valid or not the fact remains that the Lebanese
had dominated the Sierra Leone economy since independence by creating an informal
market in league with the political stakeholders. This gave rise to a patron-client
relationship between corrupt politicians and the Lebanese businessmen which in part
led to economic decline.255
Sahr Kpundeh,256 a prolific writer on Sierra Leone, observed that President
Stevens institutionalized corruption through the slang: Wusai den cow, nar dae e go
251 J.A , Ndumbe, Diamonds, Ethnicity, and Power: The Case of Sierra Leone” Mediterranean
Quarterly 12:90-105, no. 4 p 1
252 W. Reno, op.cit., p3
253 Ibid., p59 (a key example was the findings of the Commission that investigated the 1958 riots that the
chiefs were involved in hoarding of rice)
254 Ibid., p 60
255 Ibid., p.61
256 S. J. Kpundeh, “Limiting Administrative Corruption in Sierra Leone,” The Journal of Modern
African Studies, 32,1(1994), p 145
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eat, meaning that a cow grazes where it is tethered.257 Stevens wielded control over
every facet of the economy and personalized state power more than any leader of that
country. For a period of seventeen years (1968-1985), he was the lynch pin around
whom every state activity evolved. During his tenure, for example, Stevens adopted
the following major policies: created a shadow state and a powerful informal market in
partnership with Lebanese businessmen,258 he outwitted the World Bank and the IMF
on major economic reforms such as privatization by selling off state enterprises to his
cronies;259 he transformed the country into a single party state in 1978, and
manipulated his succession by handing power to the Major-General and head of the
Sierra Leone army, Joseph Saidu Momoh, who was also a member of Cabinet.260 It
could be said therefore, that the APC Government of President Stevens was far
removed from the principles of good financial governance, citizens’ participation in the
decision-making, and the values of fiscal controls as contained in the OECD best
practice benchmarks.
5.3.1 Stevens’s informal market
Stevens extended his grip over the rich diamond district of Kono under the
guise of a privatisation policy. Through this policy he forged a strong partnership with
Lebanese merchants such as Anthony Yazbeck and an Afro-Lebanese, Jamil Said
Mohamed.261 With Stevens and his team in partnership, they initiated the Corporate
Contract Mining Policy through which Stevens’s cronies were awarded lucrative
mining rights with no transparent mechanism to hold them accountable. Stevens also
established a mineral regulatory body called the Government Gold and Diamond
257 W.Reno, op.cit., p76; S.J Kpundeh, p 145
258 W. Reno, “Ironies of Post Cold-War Structural Adjustment in Sierra Leone,” Review of African
Political Economy No.6, (1996), p 10
259 Ibid., p10
260 S.J. Kpundeh, p 150
261 W. Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, p 68
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Office (GGDO) to regulate the diamond market and appointed Jamil and himself as
board members.262 The remits of the board, among others, was to value precious
minerals - gold and diamonds - on behalf of the Government for tax purposes.
However, the board undervalued diamonds for close associates of the President or
allowed them to export the precious minerals without going through the normal
channel. Such activities undermined the sector, which was one of the country’s major
sources of export earnings.263
The activities of the shadow state were so inimical to the country’s economy
such that by 1980, the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC), which was the
official mining company mandated to extract diamonds, produced only 29 percent of
diamonds. The rest went into the hands of the informal market participants.264 Thus,
by the early 1980s, an estimated $70 million was accumulated by the informal sector
annually. 265 Jamil, for example, had created a link with the Byblos Bank in Lebanon to
finance Stevens’s informal market. In 1984, Jamil established his own bank in the
capital, Freetown, known as the International Bank of Trade and Commerce. Through
this bank, Jamil directly financed illegal diamond operations in collaboration with the
Byblos Bank in Beirut.266 As a result private diamond sales to the Government fell by
90 percent in 1984.267
5.4 JOSEPH SAIDU MOMOH 1985 -1992
Joseph Saidu Momoh’s succession to the presidency in November 1985 was
greeted with a sigh of relief by the populace amidst hope for popular reforms. This was
initially manifested in Momoh’s launch of his New Order policy, with the primary aim
262 Ibid., p. 69
263 Ibid.,p69
264 Ibid., p70
265 Ibid., p114
266 Ibid., p130
267 Ibid., p 134
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of ridding the country of corruption.268 The new President started on a sounder footing
as a well-intentioned leader, but was caught up in a triangular web of redirecting the
course of a battered economy: meeting International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs)
conditionalities for fiscal responsibility; clamping down on a thriving informal market,
which he not only inherited but in which he was stakeholder and a key player in the
game.269
5.4.1 Improving the economy and fighting the informal market
In the quest of reversing the poor state of the economy, Momoh tried to assert
his authority over diamond trade so as to reduce the influence of the informal
market.270 To this end, the new President enlisted a foreign firm, LIAT Construction
and Finance Company, headed by an Israeli businessman, Shaptai Kalmanowitch, to
play a lead role in the diamond trade.271 The company imported substantial amount of
rice from diamond proceeds in order to “isolate Lebanese-politician enterprises” that
have dominated rice business - the staple food - under the previous administration”.
Further, the President “used LIAT’s intervention to reassert his own control over
diamond wealth.”272 This strategy paid off to the satisfaction of both creditors and the
president.273 As a result, official diamond exports in 1986/87 rose to 280 percent over
the previous years.274 One year into his presidency, the Bank of Sierra Leone’s foreign
reserve holdings rose from a mere $196,000 to $7.6 million. As a result, Freetown
268 J. A.D, Alie, op.cit., p245
269 W. Reno, op.cit., p114
270 Ibid., p158
271 Ibid., p.158
272 Ibid,p158
273 Ibid. p159
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resumed paying multilateral arrears that also led to the institution of Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAPs) in 1986 for SDR 63.7 million.275
Building on these gains, Momoh introduced the Public Economic Emergency
Regulations (PEER) to limit systemic corruption.276 However, resistance from the
informal sector came through a foiled coup plot in 1987. Momoh’s Vice President,
Francis Minah, was implicated in the act of treason including Jamil and two dozen of
the former President’s close associates.277 A further blow came from the arrest of the
LIATT leader, Kalamanowitch, in London for allegedly raising money in the United
States through illegal means to buy shares in the National Diamond Mining Company
in Sierra Leone. Momoh’s authority, as a result, was weakened and the informal sector
was in control again. In consequence, official diamond exports dropped and the
payment of arrears to multilateral creditors halted. The Bank and the IMF responded
by blocking loans to the government.278
5.4.2 Momoh - IFI relations
Unlike Siaka Stevens, who was capable of manipulating IFI policies such as
selling off public enterprises to his cohorts, Momoh on the other hand played into
hands of the Bank and the IMF by adopting all policy proposals - some of them
inimical to the economy.279 The IFIs did so with little regard to the impact the policies
would have on the economy including social life of the country, and the likely erosion
of the President’s authority. Part of the Structural Adjustments Programme (SAP)
imposed by the IMF, for example, forced a devaluation of the Leone (the national
currency) against the advice of the Bank of Sierra Leone, which resulted in “capital
275 Ibid., p 159
276 Ibid., 160
277 Ibid., p160
278 Ibid. p161
279 Ibid., p215
104
flight” and a further contraction of the economy.280 In the midst of this grim situation,
Momoh was for the second time advised by the IFIs to contract another international
firm as a means to squeeze out the influence of the informal sector. Another Israeli
company, N. R. SCIPA Group, was contracted to take over the export of diamonds
under the directorship of Nir Guaz. Like LIATT, SCIPA registered initial successes
but became involved with the informal market, which further undermined the economy
and the President’s authority. Momoh responded by arresting Guaz for economic
sabotage. With Guaz behind bars, the economy ground to a halt, and gas prices, in
particular the cost of a gallon of petrol rose as high as $10.00 per gallon on the black
market.281
Momoh’s battle with the informal market was shrouded in a big irony. Whilst
he focused on ridding the country of corruption, he was also asserting his authority
over the nation’s resources as well as practising blatant nepotism. For example, the
following strategic positions were held by his relatives from the same ethnic group:
Minister of Mines, Minister of Transport and Communications, Minister of State
Enterprises, Minister of Party Affairs, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Inspector General of Police, Deputy Force Commander, Managing Director of Sierra
Leone Commercial Bank Ltd., Chairman of Sierra Leone State Lottery, and Deputy
Managing Director of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, including several
influential State House aides.282
5.4.3 Towards democratic reform and transparent budgeting
The last days of the Momoh administration witnessed a nation-wide call for
democratic governance which includes the resuscitation of political pluralism through
280 Ibid., p162
281 Ibid., p167
282 Ibid.,
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constitutional reforms. At the forefront of the campaign were the Sierra Leone Bar
Association, the labour unions, and the National Union of Sierra Leone Students. The
students in particular, Fourah Bay College Students Union organised two successive
peaceful demonstrations demanding the return to multi-party democracy, which were
dispersed by the SSD and the police with tear gas canisters and rubber bullets. At the
academic front, the Fourah Bay College students organised round table discussions and
public lectures led by senior lecturers drawn from primarily the Department of
Political Science, and History. The renowned historian, Magbeley Fyle, for example,
delivered a public lecture at the student amphitheatre entitled “Search for the Beast”
that was attended by intellectuals, professionals and senior civil servants. His paper
focused on the one-party system as the beast that terrorises development, democratic
values and the prospects for political maturity of the country. 283
The rebel conflict which started in 1991 – also on the premise of political
reform - brought pressure to bear on the political leadership to institute reform. As a
result of the clamour for change, two major constitutional changes took place: the 1991
Constitution and the 1992 Public Budgeting and Accounting Act. In concluding, it
could be said that on the eve of the military take-over in April 1992, Sierra Leone was
moving towards democratic governance and transparent budgeting, albeit influenced
by the will of the people.
5.5 THE 1991 CONSTITUTION
The 1991 Constitution (Act No. 6 of 1991) is a democratic multi-party
constitution that revoked the 1978 single-party instrument. The constitution promised a
return to democratic rule after more than two decades of the APC administration and
economic decay. The country was bracing itself for Parliamentary and presidential
283 Witnessed by the author of this research
106
elections to take place within the framework of the new constitution that had been
approved in a referendum. However, the instrument did not come into being because of
a successful military coup in 1992 that brought the National Provisional Ruling
Council (NPRC) to power. The 1991 Constitution, nonetheless, took effect after the
1996 democratic elections won by the current President Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah of the SLPP.
5.5.1 Features of the 1991 Constitution
The 1991 Constitution is a significant departure from the 1978 single party
constitution. It guarantees and protects the fundamental human rights of the citizens
and freedoms of the individual. Provision was also made for the registration of
political parties, for the purpose of which a Political Parties Registration Commission
was created in Section 34 (1). The constitution also put in place good governance
structures including the Office of the Ombudsman to provide citizens with an avenue
for seeking public redress. For the purpose of this study the following key provisions
were made in the constitution: the office of the President and Parliament.
5.5.2 The President
Section 40 of the Constitution provides for a president who shall be Head of
State, the supreme executive authority of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces. However, Section 46 (1) provides for an incumbent to be in office
for no more than two five-year terms “whether or not the terms are consecutive”. This
section is an improvement on the 1978 Constitution which provided for an open ended
term of seven years each.
The 1991 Constitution provided for a unique mix of the traditional Westminster
Parliamentary democracy and that of the American-style presidential government such
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that while members of the Cabinet are drawn from outside of the Parliament (Section
56 (1)), the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) a traditional Westminster standing
committee is retained for the purpose of financial oversight. It must be said that while
the Constitution is heavily designed along the American presidential system, the
undeniable values of the British Parliamentary system persists. This brings Douglas
Verney’s comments to mind that “Nowadays when it is fashionable to speak of
political systems and theories as “not for export” it is worth bearing in mind the
success with which a system adapted piecemeal to suit British constitutional
developments has proved feasible in different situations abroad”. 284
5.5.3 The Parliament
Section 73 of the constitution provided for a Parliament that comprises of the
President, the Speaker and Members of Parliament. Parliament is the supreme law
making authority in the land (Section 93 (1)). Unlike the 1978 constitution, the 1991
makes the Parliament powerful such that all the committees may summon a minister to
appear before MPs to account for issues within his official remits or to explain a major
government plan or “policy” for the benefit of the business of the House and the
electorates. The constitution further established eight Standing Committees among
them, a Finance Committee and a Public Accounts Committee (PAC). For purposes of
effectiveness, the committees are imbued with such powers as those of the High Court,
including the following:
a. compelling the attendance of witnesses and examining them under oath,
affirmation or otherwise;
b. compelling the production of documents; and
c. issuing of a commission or request to examine witnesses abroad.
284 D. V. Verney, “Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government” In:Parliamentary Versus
Presidential Government, Edited by Arend Lijphart (1992)
108
It was the first time in the Parliamentary history of Sierra Leone that committees had
been given such outright powers.
5.5.4 Power of the purse
The constitution gives Parliament the power to impose tax: “no taxation shall
be imposed or altered otherwise than by or under the authority of an act of
Parliament”. Parliament is also empowered to authorise the budget submitted by the
minister of finance (Section 112), including supplementary estimates prepared by
spending agencies during the course of the financial year. It is also the responsibility of
Parliament to ratify all loan agreements entered into by government with any agency,
government of individuals (Section 118). The legislature must be also notified by any
minister concerned for the receipt of gifts, donations, grants and pledges on behalf of
the country.
5.5.5 Limitations
Regardless of the extensive powers imbued in Parliament in the exercise of its
functions, there are some limitations within which it must operate. For example, whilst
Parliament is the only body that can authorise taxation, the institution is limited by not
being able to make an increase in tax rates without the express approval of the
President. The executive arm of the government, to be precise, the minister of finance,
also has the advantage of setting up a contingency fund and determining the method of
expenditure. Although this can only take place on the approval of Parliament, its
oversight functions are limited in terms of not being able to know in the first place,
how and within which parameters the resources would be used.
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5.5.6 The Public Budgeting and Accounting Act, 1992
The Public Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1992 was passed by Parliament
on the 5 March 1992 - four weeks before the military took over the reins of power. The
Act repealed Act No. 2 of 1961 – The Finance (Control and Management) Act. The
introduction of this Act, it could be argued, marked a turning point in the management
of national financial resources. The country from this point was set on the path leading
to greater budget transparency and accountability as contained in the provisions of the
Act.
5.6 TOWARDS IMPROVING THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
After thirty one years of managing public resources under the Finance (Control
and Management) Act of 1961, the 1992 Act introduced several accountability
measures aimed at improving the budgetary process by clearly defining roles and
responsibilities, such as the establishment of a Budget Bureau (BB) in the ministry of
finance for the preparation and monitoring of annual budgets (Section 4). The BB is a
new instrument of change introduced to improve budgeting. The Act also provides that
a budget document be submitted to Parliament one month before the beginning of the
financial year. Although the period allocated to the Parliament is shorter considering
the huge task involved in scrutinising the budget, it is nonetheless an improvement on
what prevailed under the single-party rule of the APC. Parliament’s authority over the
national purse is further maintained so that the oversight institution approves all
supplementary budgets and the public accounts committee (PAC) reviews the auditor-
general’s report.
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5.6.1 Financial reporting emphasised
The Act introduced appropriate financial procedures: Sections 18 and 31 (2)
provided respectively, that the minister of finance submits “monthly reports to the
finance committee for the information of Parliament; and that within ten days at the
end of the financial year, all heads of departments prepare and submit reports to the
minister on annual commitments and unspent resources for onward transmission to
Parliament. The Accountant-General is required by Section 54 (1) “to draw up and
sign a monthly statement” of the public accounts and to publish such statements in the
Sierra Leone Gazette. Section 56 (1) (2) and Sub-section (2) provides further that the
Accountant-General not later three months after the end of the financial year, submits a
report on the public accounts to the minister of finance, and publish such a report for
the good of the general public, including submitting a copy of the report to the
Auditor-General for audit purposes.
5.6.2 Financial oversight
Apart from the scrutiny role of Parliament, financial oversight is provided by
the Auditor-General, who audits the public accounts and reports to the PAC for review.
The Auditor-General is also responsible for internal audit to be carried out across
government departments and agencies. Section 63 (3) provides that “The auditor-
general may in consultation with heads of the establishment make arrangements for the
carrying out of internal audit functions in all the offices audited by him”. While this
provision is laudable, it is practically impossible for the Auditor-General to be able to
exercise both internal and external audit across a government with a growing number
of service delivery agencies.
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5.6.3 Sanctions to strengthen accountability
The Public Accounting Act provided for sanctions such as surcharge. A robust
measure taken against fraud is imprisonment or a fine or both imposed in a summary
court of law. As stated in Section 87, whosoever commits an offence under this Act
“shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five times the amount
so offered or accepted or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to
both such fine and imprisonment”.
5.6.4 Summary
From the above examination of the twenty-four year APC rule, it could be said
that the activities of the party both under Siaka Stevens and Joseph Saidu Momoh did
not strengthen budget transparency and participation. Rather, the general economic
direction under both leaderships was dismal and one that led to the intervention of the
military in the business of government. It can be said however, that the party
introduced meaningful democratic changes in the early 1990s under the influence of a
public cry for democratic reforms. Unlike Stevens, it was worth mentioning that
although attrition set in under both administrations, Momoh could be singled out for
been good-spirited to have introduced reform measures for economic recovery, among
them, the New Order and the Public Economic Emergency. In addition, it could be said
he was relatively a tolerant leader to have allowed reforms to take place, while Stevens
clamped down on every form of dissent with an iron fist.
5.7 THE NPRC MILITARY REGIME 1992-1996
The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) came to power in a military
coup on 29 April 1992 that ousted Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh of the APC. It
must be mentioned that the coup took place one year into the rebel conflict, which
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started in 1991. The coup makers explained as key reasons for the revolt: the lack of
military logistics to fight the rebels, the poor state of the economy and the rampant
corruption as reasons behind their action. The NPRC was headed by a twenty-six year
old military Captain, Valentine Strasser who was later dethroned in a palace coup by
his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. Typical of military regimes, the NPRC banned
all political parties and political activities, suspended Parliament and ruled by
decree.285 These actions are in total breach of the good spirit of good governance and
accountability. The military formulated annual budgets in secrecy and expended public
funds in a poor accountability environment with no proper reporting systems.
At the early stages of the NPRC regime, the military worked very hard to
revive the economy (which was part of the reason they staged the coup) and did very
well. The regime was lauded for its initial brilliant performance which was achieved
through the launch of an anti-corruption campaign to improve fiscal and monetary
control and to enhance revenue generation. As a result, the Paris Club agreed to write
off “50 per cent of debt –service obligations due under non-concessional loans”. 286
The success story was however short-lived as the military leader fell into the
same trap of the informal market nurtured by his predecessors. Strasser manipulated
state apparatus to wield control over resources, and did so by enlisting the support of
individual businesses to finance his endeavours. The Captain established links with
creditors and “overseas commercial networks,”287 and in 1993, 435 carats of diamonds
were exported to Sweden under private arrangements.288 William Reno observed that
Strasser’s regime found it difficult to accept a free market activity and as a result, the
leaders of the regime established “a monopoly on the exercise of violence, and the
285 W. Reno op.cit., p173
286Economic Intelligent Unit, The Shaping of Political Forces in Sierra Leone, 2001 p49
287 W. Reno, op.cit., p176
288 Ibid., p176
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capacity to direct and control the exploitation of resources on behalf of new claimants
is the imperative of Strasser’s government.”289 The influence of foreign firms helped
Strasser freeze competition among rivals with himself at the top. With established
control over resources, the military captain entrenched his position as a powerbroker of
the country’s population.290
Coupled with a gloomy state of a slipping economy, the country was held in a
rebel conflict which took a toll on personal security and led to the proliferation of
private security companies to protect life and property.291 In order to restore security as
well as halt the advancing rebels, Strasser sought external assistance and contracted a
South African mercenary security firm, Executive Outcomes, in return for lucrative
diamond concessions.292 Strasser, like his predecessors, failed to put the economy on a
recovery track.
5.7.1 Budget transparency and accountability undermined
Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, who took over from Strasser in a palace coup went
further to amend the Public Budgeting Act of 1992 by issuing Decree No. 7 of 1996.
The amendment decree not only concentrated the exercise of power in the Secretary of
State for Finance, but also distorted the accountability and transparency environment
already created by the Public Budgeting Act. For example, an additional Section 10
gives the Secretary of State for finance powers over the Accountant-General such that
the latter is obliged to do as directed by the former: “the accountant-general shall in the
performance of his duties under this Act, act in accordance with the general or specific
directions issued by the minister”. “Specific directions” could mean any form of
289 Ibid., p178
290 Ibid., p180
291 Ibid., p 176
292 Economic Intelligent Unit, op.cit., p 51
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directives in financial management relating to fraud. Moreover, whilst the Public
Budgeting Act required the Accountant-General to publish statement of accounts three
months after the end of the financial year, the Decree amendment extended the
reporting period to six months, and provided further that such reports may not be sent
to the Auditor-General for audit purposes (Section 56 (3) (4)).
An assessment of corruption and its perpetrators in Sierra Leone has been
simply summarized by William Reno: “…top politicians and businessmen pursue
personal wealth and political power through informal markets…and state
officials…even share common interest in abetting informal markets as part of a
strategy to control political challenges or obtain essential services, especially when
austerity programmes reduce institutional state supplies of benefits.”293
5.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter has unravelled the Parliamentary history of Sierra Leone dating
from 1787 assembly of Hundredors and Tythingmen in a settlement of about a few
hundred to the present Parliament with a population of about 6 million. One can
deduce that the country has had a long history of British interaction both as a colonial
master and a development partner for more two centuries. This is evident by the
structure of the country’s institutions, including education and administration.
Regardless of its departure from the British Parliamentary democratic system, the
manner in which the Sierra Leone Parliament conducts its business has a typical
Britishness about it.
Part one of this study raised a number of underpinning questions on the
development of Sierra Leone, ranging from imbued opportunities to wasted ones; from
a cultural shift of a committed and collective mindset of a people in the early years of
293 W. Reno, op.cit., p 215
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statehood, to one of declining dimensions such as to have laid the foundation of poor
leadership and dependency; and to a scenario where donor conditionalities dictate the
pace of development rather than guided by internally generated policies.
In addition, it is observed that wasted opportunities do ring alarm bells for the
future of the country as there seem to be a dwindling influence on the energy that once
fired-up those Hundredors and Tythingmen who worked tirelessly in the early years of
the Sierra Leone settlement, for example, to have led to the nomination of John
Ezzidio to become the first African to the legislative council in 1863. By 1800,
Freetown did not only achieve the status of being the first municipality on the
continent of Africa, but that the West Africa Act of 1821, also helped to develop the
leadership and institutional potential of Sierra Leone such that the rest of British West
Africa territories (Gold Coast (now Ghana), The Gambia and Nigeria) were
administered from Freetown, until 1827, when a decentralised structure was adopted.
Moreover, with Fourah Bay College being the first institution of higher learning in the
sub region as far back as 1872, and with Sierra Leone being referred to as the “Athens
of West Africa” it becomes obvious that opportunities have been wasted over the years
(with a consistent disregard for good governance), which could have been put into
good use by the succeeding leadership to take the country to higher heights. Instead,
moral authority waned and the impetus of delivering development was transformed
into systemic corruption, mismanagement and a “shadow state” propped up by corrupt
leaders and dishonest politicians.
Thus a shrinking political commitment became glaring as demonstrated in the
Cox Commission Report follow up to the 1958 riots, in which it was highlighted that
greed and corruption among the political class were the main factors that led to the
national outbursts. Indeed, corruption has been groomed long ago with little or no
transparent and accountable structures nurtured to stem the steady drain of national
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resources. Instead, in the place of political leadership has emerged a shadow state that
controlled the realm of the economy, while the role of leaders has technically been
taken over by the international financial institutions – mainly the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and bilateral partners such as the DfID - who provide
policy initiatives, some of which turned out inimical to the state survival and interest.
The question that lingers so far is to be asked of all political leaders of Sierra
Leone: where did innovation, commitment and love for country get lost along the way
since independence.
Put simply, part one of the study unpack a story of poverty of leadership
coupled with political parties not structured on ideologies, but characterised by shifting
loyalties from one party to the other by the great and influential members of society –
“political tourism”. The type of politics through which ideologies and policies are
channelled and implemented, is being played out with blurring rules put in place by ill-
disciplined political parties with fluid memberships. With opportunities been wasted,
and with endured shrinking leadership, part two of the research focuses on the role the
Kabbah administration to reverse the dismal trends, but with external direction being
provided by donor partners.
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PART TWO
The previous chapters present an overview of Sierra Leone in terms of its
history, Parliamentary and constitutional developments, post independent political
scenarios and the management of financial resources by numerous governments dating
from the late 1960s to the eve of the 1996 democratic elections. The chapters
demonstrate the unsatisfactory role played by the succeeding governments in the
financial management of the country with few exceptions, such as the initiatives
introduced by President Momoh. In contrast, the post democratic government of
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah introduced a number of reforms with the aim of
reversing the trend. It is these adopted measures and initiatives that the following
chapters will investigate to measure the levels of achievements in budget transparency
and accountability from 1996 to 2005, using the OECD best practice indicators on
budget transparency.
In addition, attention is also paid to some of the most significant factors that
drive transparent and accountable budgeting, these are, leadership and political will,
enhanced human capital, inclusive governance and institutional renewal – delivering
change through learning. The chapters are laid out in the following:
 Public perception
 Public financial management reform under the Kabbah Administration 1996-
2005;
 Public procurement reform; and
 The role of external oversight institutions:
o Parliament;
o Auditor-General;
o Anti-Corruption Commission; and
o Civil society.
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CHAPTER SIX
CHAPTER SIX: PUBLIC PERCEPTION
6.1 OBJECTIVES
Public perception on the change introduced by the Kabbah administration is
captured in the opening of part two of this study. The chapter unveils in particular the
levels of transparency and accountability that has so far been achieved in the budgetary
process; and the evolving interactions among such stakeholders as the Parliament and
civil society groups to improve participation. It also unpacks the nature of existing
relations between government and the civil society groups, as well as those between
the development partners and the civil society activists. In addition, opinions are
sought on key oversight and implementation issues which are integral to transparent
budgeting, for example, functions of internal audit and controls, financial reporting and
general strategy.
The main objective of the field survey (See sample questionnaires in
Appendices G and H) is to investigate the levels of transparency and participation in
the budgetary process beyond what would normally be recorded during interviews
such as in this study.
An analysis of leadership as a driving force of reform, provided in the
concluding chapter of this study draws mainly on the survey results and provides
insights into the future directions of the reforms when support scales down and the
development depart the country. It also is an attempt to delineate some of the far
reaching positive changes that have so far taken place since the end of military rule
showcasing a new era of political-civil interactions in a number of that hinge on
national development. The chapters also addresses salient issues regarding committed
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leadership and the need for leaders to deliver on social contracts – good governance
and service delivery – comments which could not have been relevant in the pre-
democratic military context - prior to the reforms.
The survey incorporates the opinions of middle level practitioners in
Government, as well as civil society activists and the ordinary man on the street as a
means to achieve a holistic approach to investigating the research statement. However,
limitation of the this approach is taken into account as it does not meet the
requirements of quantitative or scientific analysis; it is a deliberate attempt meant to
gauge the perception of the public through the use of simple mathematical calculations
to determine averages, as well as to complement opinions raised by officials in
interviews conducted and analysis carried out on primary sources. Put simply it does
not propose to meet scientific corroborations rather it seeks to achieve an indicative
measure of the opinions of stakeholders of the reforms considered suitable to the
research purpose.
The specific objectives of the survey are as follows:
1. To examine budget participation and transparency;
2. To examine the available merits in budget mechanisms as a means to enhance
accountable budget management;
3. To explore the level of civil society interactions with Government and other
stakeholders and the effectiveness of such interactions; and
4. To make recommendation based on findings.
6.1.1 Study Area
Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone was selected for the study given it is
the highest populated city, which increased in recent years due to the decade-long civil
conflict (1991-2001), also because it is the administrative capital where the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) and line ministries, the Parliament and lead civil society groups are
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located. In short, it is the place in which all the drama surrounding budget transparency
and participation evolves.
6.1.2 Sample size and selection
To achieve a more representative perception of the public, sample for the study
was drawn from all sectors of the population of Freetown on a random basis to reflect
the purpose of the investigation. The survey was carried out in respect of the natural
distribution of the population in the city: those within the low income bracket live in
the east, those in the middle income level live in the central, and those considered
within the high income bracket live in the west of the city. Officials from key line
ministries with a wider mandate on financial management and public service delivery
were randomly selected. These include the following big spending ministries: finance,
development, health, education and agriculture. Similarly, the main civil society
groups and key activists were identified and selected for sampling (see socio-economic
data of respondents in Appendix H). The study interviewed 115 respondents from
across Freetown as follows:
a) 55 for the MDA’s of these 34 were received
b) 60 for the civil society, 46 questionnaires received from Respondents.
The remaining questionnaires were not returned. The socio-economic
characteristics of correspondents, including education, occupation and
gender distribution can be found in Appendix H
6.2 PRESENTATION OF DATA
A simple data collection and analysis technique was employed in the survey.
Questionnaires were used for data collection and data was analysed using simple
mathematical calculations to determine averages and converted into percentages. The
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results are then presented in the form of tables to demonstrate various relationships in
the order set out below:
(a) Budget participation
(b) Budget transparency
(c) Monitoring budget expenditure
(d) Interaction with Government and other stakeholders
(e) General oversight
(f) Recommendations
6.2.1 Budget Awareness, Transparency and Participation
To gauge public perception on budget awareness, transparency and
participation among civil society groups and MDAs, the following were considered:
Civil Society
Budget awareness among civil society activists
Level of participation in the budgetary process
Collaboration between civil society groups
MDAs
Budget transparency and participation
Supplementary budget
Release of funds
6.2.2 Budget Awareness
A sense of awareness and active involvement of citizens is required for the
success of any development initiative. In this regard, awareness and participation
among civil society groups in the capital compared to those operating in the rural areas
was investigated. Results from the findings ai indicated in the table below.
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Table 19
Is budget awareness and participation among civil society in Freetown the same
as in the rural areas?
Awareness No. %
Yes 14 30.40
No 11 23.90
Don’t know 21 45.70
Total 46 100%
Source: Field Survey 2006
The results of the survey indicate that 45.70 percent of the public are not aware of the
existence of budget awareness campaigns among the civil society in Freetown and in
the rural areas, while 30.4 percent confirm that the level of budget awareness among
civil society in Freetown is the same as in the rural areas. However, the survey also
indicates most of the respondents are of the view that reports from the provinces would
normally not be channelled to the civil society groups in Freetown; and that civil
society groups in the rural areas are not as organized in order to create significant
impact on the budget process. In this regard, it must be mentioned however, that the
mixed results is a possible reflection of the early stages of participatory governance,
given that it is a new and prescribed concept that is yet to flourish.
6.2.3 Budget Participation
Respondents were asked whether their organizations participate in the budget
preparation exercise at any time, and whether in any way influence the draft budget.
Results from the investigations are shown in the table below.
Table 20
Civil society participation and influence on the draft budget
Organisation / Participant Influence on budget draft
No % No %
Yes 38 82.6 21 46.0
No 7 15.2 9 20.0
Don’t know 1 2.2 16 34.0
Total 46 100 46 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
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As shown in the above table, 82.6 percent of respondents which are drawn from civil
society organizations upheld the notion that civil society groups participate in the
budget preparation exercise through consultations and discussions, for example, their
recommendations are sometimes considered by the Budget Bureau in the Ministry of
Finance when finalising the final budget document for parliamentary debate and
approval. However, about 2.3 percent say they do not know whether civil society
groups influence the budget draft, but sample respondents – 46 percent - say that civil
society groups do influence the budget draft developed by the Budget Bureau. A
smaller proportion of the respondents - 20 percent - believe that civil society groups do
not influence the budget draft. The overall survey outcome demonstrates civil society
groups believe they do influence the draft budget by participating in the Budget
Hearings in the MOF and by making recommendations at such a forum.
6.2.4 Participation and Collaboration between Groups
Sample respondents are drawn from civil society groups participating in budget
oversight and influencing national politics. Perception among these groups on civil
society participation and collaboration among their ranks with a view to improving
transparency in the budgetary process was sought. Results from the investigation as
shown in the table below demonstrate that more than half of the sample respondents -
67 percent – perceive civil society participation is on the increase, while a
corresponding 66 percent hold the view collaboration between and among civil society
groups is appreciably improving.
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Table 21
Civil society participation and collaboration
Level
Level of Civil Society
Participation
Level of Civil Society
Collaboration
No % No %
Very high 8 17.0 7 16.0
Appreciably Improving 31 67.0 30 66.0
Not Improving 4 9.0 5 11.0
Don’t Know 3 7.0 3 7.0
Total 46 100 46 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
The above findings illustrates public perception is relatively positive about the
participatory policies being introduced by the Kabbah administration to improve
budget transparency and accountability. However, it also underpins participatory
governance is still in its infancy as demonstrated in the survey of public sector
officials.
6.3 MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCY (MDA) OFFICIALS
6.3.1 Budget transparency and participation
The perception of MDA officials on budget transparency and participation at MDA
levels is positive. The table below presents that most of the respondents drawn from
middle level accountants on MDA Budget Committees, were involved in the drawing
up of budget estimates for their MDAs. There is also a positive 65 percent of
respondents saying the system allows for a dialogue between MDA officials and the
Budget Bureau (the body responsible for budgeting in the ministry of finance) to
discuss and defend estimates.
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Table 22
Involvement in drawing up of estimates
Involvement in drawing
up estimates
Window to defend
estimates
No % No %
Yes 37 80 30 65
No 9 20 7 15
Don’t Know - - 9 20
Total 46 100 46 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
6.3.2 Supplementary Budget Preparation and Release of Funds
Opinions were also sought on the preparation of supplementary estimates to
cover for shortfalls, unplanned activities and emergencies within spending agencies.
As shown in the table below, each year, a below 45 percent average of respondents
prepare supplementary estimates; another 32.6 percent do not prepare supplementary
estimates; while a 19.6 percent prepare supplementary estimates once in the past three
years, and 2.2 percent did so once in the last five years. The results suggest that budget
implementation is fraught with challenges. Firstly, it is apparent that if preparation of
supplementary estimates is below average, it could be the case that resources are not
available to warrant supplementary spending; or secondly, that the agencies do not
exhaust allocated funds and, therefore do not require additional funds during the fiscal
year.
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Table 23
Preparation of supplementary budget and release of funds
Preparation of Supplementary Budget Release of Funds
No % No %
Every year 21 45.6
Once in the past 3 years 9 19.6
Once in the past 5 years 1 2.2
Not at all 15 32.6
Delay is common 29 63.0
Some delay 16 35.0
Less delay 0
No delay 1 2.0
Total 46 100 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
Thirdly, even where supplementary estimates are prepared, release of funds by
the office of the accountant general often results in delays as reported by 63 percent of
respondents. In addition, 35 percent say they experience some delay in the receipt of
funds. Reasons advanced for delays points to the National Revenue Authority (NRA)
not been able to generate sufficient funds to meet MDA quarterly allocations at the
beginning of each quarter. In a number of cases, the process drags onto the second
month or even the last month of the quarter. Ministry of finance officials on the other
hand, say delays are due to poor revenue collection, and also that Sierra Leone being a
donor-driven economy, development partners would normally not honour their
promises on time, and sometimes, may fail to contribute pledged resources. A caveat
worth noting is that no reasons were advanced for development partners failing to
honour pledges on time. The usual occurrence is that untimely release of funds to the
MDAs negatively impact sectoral performance and the general health of the economy.
An ominous question to be asked in regard to irregular disbursement of funds is
what the leadership has done over the years to stem the perennial problem. The answer
may rest in a two-fold possible strategic failure: the leadership has not demonstrated
required levels of commitment in instituting transparent budgeting systems as
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demanded by the development partners to facilitate timely donor support, and inherent
weaknesses persist, failing to transform the national revenue agency into a robust and
forward looking institution.
6.3.3 Expenditure Monitoring
Public perception was sought on the levels of expenditure monitoring designed
partly to enhance transparency and participation in the budgetary process. The survey
focused on the following key areas:
 role of civil society in expenditure monitoring especially the usefulness of
Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS);
 effectiveness of the District Oversight Committees;
 preparation of expenditure report by MDAs; and
 monitoring MDA expenditure by internal auditors.
6.3.4 Role of Civil Society in budget monitoring and the significance of PETS
The strengthening of monitoring mechanisms in spending institutions is a
significant component of expenditure management. To test public trust in the
mechanism being introduced in the budget management system, sample respondents
were asked how they would consider the role of civil society in monitoring the
expenditure stream of government and whether the Public Expenditure Tracking
Survey (PETS) – a post expenditure survey conducted by government - is a useful
monitoring and evaluation tool. As indicated in the table below, a poor 32.6 percent
perceive expenditure monitoring less active, corroborated by the same number of
respondents as not active. However, 28.3 percent suggest there is some amount of
active time being put into budget monitoring by civil society groups.
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Public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) is considered a useful monitoring
tool according to 54 percent of those who participated in the survey, as opposed to 6
percent who did not think so. A worrying 39 percent however, say they are not aware
of the existence of PETS. Overall, while the results suggests civil society activities
around the budget is improving, there remains the critical function of mainstreaming it
in the national engagement strategy to engage as many community activists as possible
and build capacity on financial oversight.
The results further demonstrate the significance of “political will” as a driving
force behind successful reforms as in the case of the PETS initiative, which is
sufficiently resourced by the Government. On the contrary, it could be said that a civil
society initiative which fails to win both political buy-in and financial support, would
normally deliver little or no impact as indicated in the table below.
Table 24
Role of civil society in budget monitoring and usefulness of PETS
Role of Civil society in monitoring Usefulness of PETS
No % No %
More active 13 28.3
Less active 15 32.6
Not active 15 32.6
Don’t know 03 6.5 18 39.0
Yes 25 54.0
No 03 6.0
Total 46 100 46 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
6.3.5 Effectiveness of the District Oversight Committees in budget monitoring
With the dawn of decentralization to enhance service delivery through the
direct involvement of grassroots communities in the budgetary process, government
established the District Budget Oversight Committees (DBOCs) – in all the twelve
administrative districts of the country - under the Government Budgeting and
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Accountability Act (2005), to engage government functionaries as a means to
achieving a citizens’ oriented government. Public perception of DBOCs was sought
and a positive 94 percent feedback was received that the strategy has been a useful
process that delivers financial oversight strategy – see table below.
Table 25
Impact of DBOCs on the budget process
Impact Effectiveness
No % No %
Yes 43 94
No 1 2
Don’t know 2 2
Highly effective 2 4
Improving 30 66
Not effective 13 28
Don’t know 1 2
Total 46 100 46 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
In addition, 66 percent say the role of DBOCs in providing monitoring and
oversight is appreciably improving, as against 28 percent who say they are not. Only 2
percent say they have no knowledge about the existence of DBOCs. The appreciable
improvement in the activities of DBOCs can also be explained by the government’s
direct involvement in the process, hence a further confirmation of the notion that
leadership, backed by political will, invariably drives reforms. Of grave concern is the
simple consideration for the sustainability of adequate political support when donor
funds will recede in the near future, and when development partners leave the reform
environment. It stands to reason that where a reform initiative is being supplied by the
development partners and compliance with conditionalities is adequate, perhaps
financial consideration as the main incentive for change cannot be discounted. This
argument casts a shadow on the sincerity of leadership and makes clear the case that,
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reforms are only implemented in order to access donor funds – and not because they
want to meet electoral mandate.
6.3.6 Preparation of Expenditure Reports by MDAs
Financial reporting is integral to effective expenditure management and underpins
institutional disclosure. Sample respondents were asked whether MDAs prepare timely
expenditure reports to enhance expenditure monitoring by internal auditors, as well as
to feed the accountant general’s reports. The results demonstrate in table below that
almost all sample respondents prepare timely expenditure reports; only 8 percent do
not prepare timely expenditure reports and 8 percent do not know about expenditure
reports being a requirement.
Table 26
Timely expenditure reporting by MDAs
Expenditure Reports
No %
Yes 18 53
No 8 23.5
Don’t know 8 23.5
Total 34 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
Monitoring of MDAs by internal audit mechanisms
To maintain proper accounting systems in the institutions and to be able to
meet outlined departmental objectives, internal audit function is mainstreamed within
MDAs to enhance accountability and strengthen expenditure monitoring. Public
perception on effective internal auditing as indicated in the table below is below
average – 44.1 percent.
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Table 27
How effective is internal auditing?
Internal Auditing
No %
Yes 15 44.1
No 12 35.3
Don’t know 07 20.6
Total 34 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
In addition, 35.3 percent say they are not aware of the existence of such activities in
their institutions, while 20.6 percent are not aware of internal audit teams functioning
in their MDAs. Regardless of the discrepancy, some institutions have operationalised
internal auditing between 5 to 10 years, while in 35 percent of the case, hiring of staff
and building capacity of internal auditors is still in the formative stages. It was also
revealed that recommendations of internal auditors are mostly adopted by the
management teams in MDAs.
The overall distribution suggests that some amount of internal audit does take
place in MDAs but the extent of the mechanism used is not revealed. This is in line
with the opinion of the Deputy Director of Internal Audit Department, MOF, Olayinka
Phillips (See Appendix A) that internal audit is still in the early stages of development.
In addition, the results further indicate that internal audit is yet to be entrenched across
Government. This is evident of the 35 percent no monitoring, and 20.58 percent don’t
know – further demonstrating significant levels of ineffective monitoring and internal
control process across MDAs.
6.4 INTERACTION AMONG STAKEHOLDERS
One of the key requirements of development partners for donor-driven
economies as Sierra Leone is building partnerships through wider consultations with
stakeholders on all strands of financial management. These include budget drafting and
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implementation, monitoring and evaluation of budget performance. Thus, high level
interactions between civil society and government and other stakeholders such as the
Parliament becomes central to transparent and participatory budgeting; at the other end
of relationship building is that which exists between civil society groups and
development partners.
Public perception was sought on all the levels of collaborations mentioned
above. On the relationship between civil society and development partners, 70 percent
think it is moderate and requires improvement. Secondly, government strategy towards
improving civil society participation through active engagement is rated 65 percent,
although 26 percent think there is room for improvement on the part of government. In
this regard, 57 percent say government has failed in providing adequate financial and
logistical support to enhance civil society participation in the budget process, while 39
percent think that government assistance has moderately increased over time.
Opinions on parliamentary - civil society interaction were mixed with opinions
split between appreciable relationship and low interactions. In addition, 43 percent of
respondents think the civil society does not influence parliamentary debates and
decision-making, while 26 percent think they do.
The issue of partnership building between parliament and civil society although
not as robust as expected is a marked improvement in a poor governance environment
such as Sierra Leone. However, the acid test of the several achievements being made
rests on the sustainability of systems and structures already put in place when the
development partners shall depart the scene. This again is a call on the leadership to be
sincere and to demonstrate a true spirit of the social contract with no external influence
required to influence behaviour.
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6.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the opinions of all levels of civil society activists and
officials in MDAs on the relevant areas underpinning budget transparency and
participation. In particular, the survey explored the following key areas:
 Awareness and participation among civil society on budgetary matters,
participation of and collaboration among civil society groups and between civil
society and the Parliament; and
 Transparency measures, including MDA internal controls, supplementary
budget and release of funds, budget monitoring and the role of civil society in
all the processes.
From the above survey results, it is observed that awareness, participation and
collaboration between and across groups and institutions in the budgetary process are
appreciably on the increase. In addition, matters of transparency touching on internal
control mechanisms are weak but that considerations for further improvements are
being actively considered by government and implemented in some MDAs.
A most notable observation is that political will does influence and shape
reforms; this is demonstrated in the perception survey, for example, that government
initiatives, in particular, the DBOCs, PETS and Budget Hearings have been more
effective than those, if any initiatives emanating from both the Parliament and the civil
society. This is suggestive, however of the fact that the lack of direct access to and
control of resources by both the Parliament and civil society gives government the
clear lead and advantage of driving the pace of reform.
It is apparent therefore, that although the government is in the driving seat in
terms of leading the initiatives and exercising control over resources, oversight bodies
including the Parliament and civil society do exercise some influence on budget policy
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and implementation. In addition, a range of opinions of interviewees on internal
controls and audit, such as those of Olayinka Philips, are well reflected in the survey
results, in which 35 percent of respondents say that hiring and training of staff to
manage internal audit is still baby-walking, while 20.6 percent say that they have no
knowledge of internal audit in their institutions. Later in the study a lot more
ground will be covered on external oversight from Parliament, civil society and the
office of the auditor general, complemented by interviews of a wide range of officials
drawn from among stakeholders.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CHAPTER SEVEN: PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM (1996-2005)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the democratic government of President Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah after the 1996 presidential and Parliamentary elections, the government in
collaboration with development partners, principally, the World Bank, the IMF, the
United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) and the European
Union (EU), has carried out a holistic good governance reform in a number of sectors.
These include, the Sierra Leone military: right-sizing the force and delivery of
technical training by the British International Military Assistance and Technical
Training (IMATT); the police: restructuring and system improvement to reposition the
significance of the force; and the public sector: modernisation and structure renewal to
enhance public service delivery.294 Local government administration units, which were
suspended by the Siaka Stevens administration in 1972, for example, have been
resuscitated through the enactment of the Local Government Act 2004. The policy was
aimed at engaging grassroots communities in the mobilization of local resources to
foster development in collaboration with the central government. The overall reform
agenda of government is captured in its Vision 2025, which is also in line with meeting
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 295
In discussing the transformation of Sierra Leone’s budgetary process within the
identified timeframe, a number of issues will be covered, which would unavoidably
make this chapter unusually very long. For the same reason, reforms on public
294 Governance Reform, Ministry of Finance Document, 2005 p2
295 Ibid., p4
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procurement – a core function of the budgetary stream - has been dealt with in a
separate chapter.
7.2 PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM
The fact that sixty percent of Sierra Leone’s budget is donor-driven has resulted in
the donor partners putting increasing pressure on the Government to institute as well as
strengthen the financial management environment to achieve transparency,
accountability and participation, as well as reduce budgetary dependence on
development partners in the long-term. 296
The 2002 Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) report of the
World Bank on Sierra Leone brought to light a number of lapses in the then Public
Budgeting and Accountability Act (PBAA) of 1992, and the Public Amendment Act
1996. It was put to light that the instruments did not adequately emphasise the
significance of the oversight roles of both the Parliament and the Audit Service in the
execution of the national budget. The following system weaknesses were also
highlighted warranting the need for robust budgetary reform:
 “That the budgeting system does not yet present a real and comprehensive view
on planning;
 That the central accounting system has not yet progressed to produce reliable
financial statement or meaningful figures for the purpose of budgetary control;
 That the system of internal control has unclear rules and weak enforcement,
enabling inefficient use of public funds and contributing to lack of transparency
and accountability;
 That serious human resource constraints hamper effective financial
management;
 That management of assets, liabilities and internally generated revenue is very
weak;
296 Governance Reform, Ministry of Finance, Document, 2005 p8
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 That the Financial Management and Accounting System (FMAS) lacks critical
functionality, controls, audit trails, system documentation, is unsuitable, and is
not accessible for departments;
 That service delivery continues to suffer in the absence of monitoring of
results, poor information, and a weak control environment in line ministries;
 That external auditing is in arrears and at present still not addressing high risk
areas, and
 That Parliamentary oversight is not yet effective”.297
In the light of these findings, the Government attracted support from the World
Bank under its Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP), United
Kingdom DfID, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the EU and the
African Development Bank (ADB), to provided technical and financial assistance in
support of the Government’s Public Financial Management (PFM) Reform agenda. As
a result, the need arose for the promulgation of a new and robust organic budget law,
which led to the crafting and passing of the Government Budgeting Accountability Act
(GBAA) in April 2005. to secure transparency, accountability, and sound management
of the government budgets298. The measure became part of a wider agenda to improve
financial management along the lines of transparency and participation, as well as
delivering on plans contained in the country poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP)
under the heavily indebted poor country initiative (HIPC) – all driven by the World
Bank and the IMF.
In general, the Government took a holistic outlook of financial management to
include the following initiatives:
 Introduce a new legal framework (Public Budgeting and Accountability Act
(GBAA) 2005, to improve budgeting and meet laid down poverty reduction
policies;
 Introduce the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) to improve
budgeting;
297 Ibid., p12
298 Ibid, p12
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 Enhance the Accountant-General’s Department (AGD) and improve the
integrated financial management information system (IFMIS);
 Create internal audit department within the ministry of finance to institute
controls;
 Introduce public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) to monitor and evaluate
expenditure; and
 Create an independent national public procurement authority (NPPA) to
achieve fair and transparent procurement.
7.2.1 The Legal Framework: Overview of PFM
The legal framework for public financial management (PFM) in Sierra Leone
consists of the 1991 Constitution (sections 110 – 119), The Government Budgeting and
Accountability Act (GBAA) No. 3 of 2005, the Audit Services Act 1998, the Local
Government Act 2004, and the Public Procurement Act 2004. With the exception of
the 1991 Constitution which preceded the 1996 democratic elections, all other
financial management laws are recent and were as a result of donor recommendations
and the resolve of Government. In principle, the Government was receptive to change
as well as prepared to introduce positive thinking in financial governance, however, it
must be mentioned for clarity (as reiterated by MOF officials, including Senior Budget
Analyst Mariama Anthony-Williams) that change was driven by the donor community,
largely the World Bank, the IMF, DFID, and the European Union. Also, that the
Government in most cases has emerged as a lame duck in the midst of development
partners when critical decisions are being made.299
The GBAA is structurally robust and it lays a foundation for sound public
financial management with emphasis on transparency, accountability and participation.
Put explicitly, Section 2(f) purports to “promote and enforce transparency and sound
management in respect of the revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of budgetary
agencies”. The GBAA also emphasises participation such that the minister of finance
299 Interviews with Mariama Anthony-William, Senior Budget Analyst, and Cyprian Kamaray,
Accountant-General, all of Ministry of Finance, June 2006
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is required under Section 2(b) to “ensure that all interested parties are able to
participate fully in the decisions taken on the budget within the medium term
expenditure framework”. 300 For the first time in the financial management system,
government adopted the policy of inclusion that leverages the role of citizens and
stakeholders in the decision making process. The GBAA also introduced a robust
financial management system. First and foremost, it provides that budgets are to be
prepared by taking a medium-term view (three years); Sections 1 and 2 established
internal audit unit within the ministry of finance with a room for expansion to other
MDAs to enforce expenditure control. The Act also provides for the strengthening of
budget oversight through enhancing the role of the Parliament, the Auditor-General,
and strongly prescribed for civil society participation.
Moreover, the instrument introduced budget oversight committees (Section
2(1)) in all of the twelve districts to facilitate grassroots involvement in the budget
process; and it reinforced financial reporting and fiscal responsibility among vote
controllers. The new organic budget law also established a budget bureau in the
ministry of finance to develop, monitor and evaluate public expenditure.
7.3 MEDIUM TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK (MTEF)
Prior to the 2001 financial management reform, Governments of Sierra Leone
used an incremental annual system of budgeting. This approach treats existing
programme and departments as already approved, subject only to increases based on
the previous year’s figures.301 The financial resource allocation process lacked the
requisite policy focus at the Cabinet level that could create a buy-in framework to
300 Section 2(b)
301 Ministry of Finance, Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) Guidelines, 2003 p2
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guide spending agencies. Governments ran the risk of ‘creeping’ costs year on year.
For example, each year the Government may take 'last year plus 10 percent' as its
figure and fail to query the basis for the decision. In this way, an arbitrary decision in a
given year continued unchallenged for decades with no proper monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms to measure budgetary outcomes. The shortcomings of this
approach led Government to adopt a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
approach to budgeting.302
7.3.1 The MTEF Process
In striving to adopt good budgetary practices, the Government in 2001
introduced a new budget process known as the Medium Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF), which encourages line ministries to prioritise their activities within the given
resource envelop over a number of years, so as to maximise the benefits from the
limited resources available. The MTEF process is aimed at improving efficiency in the
allocation and utilisation of public funds as well as enhancing transparency and
accountability.303 In August 2003, a set of MTEF guidelines were prepared, approved
by Cabinet and circulated to all ministries departments and agencies (MDAs) for use.
The MTEF guidelines stressed the importance of strategic planning that sets outputs,
outcomes (performance) indicators for MDAs in order to monitor and improve service
delivery.304
The main challenges within the MTEF Process, as set out in the prescribed
MTEF Guidelines, are to establish and monitor the performance indicators in the
strategic plans of sector ministries within a given resource envelope, also consistent
with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The Process is also geared towards
302 Ibid., p3
303 Ibid., p7
304 Ibid., p7
141
ensuring a more comprehensive public sector budgeting prevails, by reflecting all
revenues and expenditures, including funds provided by the donor partrners, as well as
internally generated funds. Thus, the Budget document should incorporate all extra-
budgetary resources, record and report on donor funding, using the standard
classification and objects of expenditure (deepening the integration of the recurrent and
development budgets) and ensure that all revenues of government, especially internally
generated funds, are timely and completely collected, remitted and monitored.305
Starting from the 2004 to 2006 MTEF, Budget Policy Hearings are held and
thereafter preliminary budget discussions with key MDAs take place before budget
ceilings are set. MDAs have been advised to establish Budget Committees as required
in the MTEF Guidelines so as to resolve budgetary problems and to enhance
participation and transparency in MDAs’ budgetary operations, viz. budget
preparation, execution and monitoring.306
The MTEF approach could be defined as a Three Year, Integrated, Broad
Based, Performance Rolling Budget that sets out the government’s expenditure plans
for a three-year period within an available resource ceiling. It integrates both recurrent
(for example, salaries and wages) and capital expenditures (development projects) of
both the government as well as donor resources, and is based on achieving an agreed
level of performance within each sector. It also places emphasis on three aspects of
public expenditure management – Participation, Transparency and Accountability.
307
The MTEF seeks to discipline policy choices with a realistic aggregate resource
constraint over the medium term, with policies having to compete with each other, as
concepts and for funding. It translates longer-term strategic priorities stated in the
305 Ibid., p13
306 Ibid.,
307 K. Marah, Commonwealth Public Expenditure Seminar Paper, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007 p4
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country’s Vision 2025 and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) into sustainable
funded programme and activities over the medium term as set out in its poverty
reduction strategy. In addition, it ensures that policy and spending decisions are based
on full disclosure of their expected impacts and costs over the medium term; and it
seeks to improve the predictability of policy and funding.308
The MTEF seeks to reflect the following in accordance with the Guidelines:
 Better matching of spending with overall resource availability over the medium
term, thereby increasing the likelihood that policies will have their intended
impact and will be consistent with short term stabilisation needs;
 Sectoral allocations of spending more in line with government’s priorities, on
the basis of a comprehensive review of resources, policy options and their
costs;
 Improved sector planning and management, by requiring the simultaneous
programming of recurrent and investment expenditures; and
 Increased effectiveness and efficiency of spending, by requiring line Ministries
to define their Mission, Goals, and Activities and, where possible link spending
amounts to measures of performance in outputs and outcomes” 309
In order to achieve the above, the Ministry of Finance has since August 2003 placed
emphasis on three key aspects of public expenditure management – Participation,
Transparency and Accountability.
7.3.2 The key features of the MTEF:
7.3.3 Three Years:
MDAs are informed of the resources that are likely to be made available for
their operations over a three-year period so that they are able to plan ahead. The three-
year horizon seeks to introduce greater fiscal discipline. The MOF aims to maintain the
three-year estimates as much as possible and MDAs will need to phase the
implementation of their activities over the three-year period.310
308 Ibid., p5
309 Ministry of Finance, MTEF Guidelines, op.cit, p7
310 Ibid., p16
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7.3.4 Integrated:
The new approach involves planning of recurrent, capital and development
resources together so that MDAs consider whether it is more effective to spend limited
resources on the operation of existing facilities or on new investments. The integrated
approach also ensures that MDAs plan for the new operational costs that will arise
from new investments.311
7.3.5 Comprehensive and Broad Based:
The MTEF approach involves bringing together all resources available to
Government (from government’s own resources; internally generated funds and donor
funds) and for MDAs to allocate these resources in line with their priorities. This is a
key area which poses a challenge to the ongoing reforms, that is to say, harmonization
of donor resources and aid flows.312
7.3.6 Performance Budget:
The approach also involves MDAs setting performance targets to achieve key
objectives, such as increasing the enrolment of girls in schools, or increasing the rate
and quality of treatment in clinics. These performance indicators will enable
Parliament, Cabinet and MOF to assess MDAs on whether they have improved
frequency and quality of services provided rather than solely concentrating on
implementing expenditures. The focus on performance targets meant that MDAs have
become more attuned to meeting the challenge of providing the needs of their clients
or stakeholders.313 This process has been deepened by aligning the key performance
311 Ibid.,p17
312 Ibid., p18
313 Ibid., p18
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indicators in the country poverty reduction strategy and all other donor quantitative
and structural benchmarks.
7.3.7 Participation:
The MTEF attracts the involvement of every stakeholder in budget preparation
ranging from the communities to the national budget discussions. It encourages
community consultations through the establishment of District Budget Oversight
Committees (DBOCs) as provided in the GBAA. Grassroots participation helps in
identifying local needs and priorities which would be integrated in the budget
document, as well as plays a significant role in monitoring the budget implementation.
Within the same spirit, policy hearings and budget discussion are held and include the
participation of District Budget Oversight Committees (DBOCs) and non-state
actors.314
7.3.8 Transparency and Accountability:
The MTEF has helped to provide more information on the activities and costs
of Government operations, with which MDAs can be held accountable by Parliament,
Cabinet, MOF and the general public. The MOF gazettes quarterly allocations and
actual expenditure, also the allocation formulae for administration and development
grants are made public. 315
The predictability of available resources is critical to the success of MTEF;
however, predictability and the timely flow of funds pose a threat to Sierra Leone’s
development process, because the country heavily relies on the donor community for
direct budgetary support. Worse still, domestic revenue mobilization is at a low point.
314 Ibid.,p18
315 Ibid., p18
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Thus it is important that assurance for timely flow of donor resources for a given
period is provided, to enhance the ability of government to conduct accurate
forecasting on resource flow. In other words, support for Year N+1 to be determined
in Yr N as this will give credence to revenue forecast and enables government to
execute its budget according to the plan. Furthermore, all donor project interventions
in line ministries should be captured in the Annual Estimates as part of the total
resources available to government, so as to avoid duplication and waste of resources.
The focus of the process is illustrated in Figure one below:
Figure 1: The MTEF Process
Source: adapted from MOF MTEF Guidelines
In sum the MTEF process involves:
o Assessing the total resources available to the Government as a whole;
o Estimating the actual costs of policies in each sector;
o Comparing these requirements with resources; and
o Prioritising between activities and allocating scarce resources in line with
priorities.
Macroeconomic Framework
Available resources
Costs of Policy in each Sector
Prioritising activities and reviewing
policies to fit within resources
Three year Budget within available
resources
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7.4 THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The budgetary process of Sierra Leone runs from 1st January to 31st December
of the calendar year. Under the MTEF process, the MOF sends out the Budget Call
Circular in June setting out the ceilings of the total budget allocated to each MDA. It is
the responsibility of each vote controller in collaboration with budget committees316 to
prepare budget estimates against such ceilings. 317 After the preparation of MDA
estimates, the Budget Bureau in the MOF holds “Budget Hearings” during which
estimates are defended and clear explanations are provided by MDAs. The hearings are
attended by MPs of the Finance Committee of Parliament, civil society leaders and
other stakeholders as a means to integrate opinions from the social, political and
technical divide into the final budget document. The budget estimates are then
submitted to the Cabinet for approval.318
Since budget preparation and documentation are highly technical, the question
whether all category of stakeholders (interest groups) in a developing economy would
clearly understand the process as well as the information contained in the document,
always comes to mind. However, it emerged in an interview with Mohamed Jusu,
Senior Clerk of Committees (See Appendix E) that stakeholders do influence, and
indeed, cause some modifications to be made to the budget document. A classic case
cited was the Government decision to accept a proposal by stakeholders to provide
examination fees for all candidates (middle secondary school pupils) slated to take the
West African Basic Examinations Certificate Examinations, as a result of widespread
poverty in the wake of the rebel conflict.
316 Budget committees are a new creation of the reforms in all MDAs to facilitate and direct budgetary
reform at their own levels. Their role is fully discussed later in the chapter
317 Ministry of Finance, Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) Brief, 2005 p2
318 Ibid.p2
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The budget is presented to Parliament in a speech delivered by the MOF; in
most cases this is done in November at least one month before the budget comes into
force. The budget speech is considered the first reading of the Appropriation Bill that
outlines the Government’s recurrent expenditure plans, estimated revenue in the
medium term, and debt. When Parliament passes the budget, implementation takes
effect across MDAs. At the end of the financial year, the Accountant-General prepares
national accounts and submits a report to the Auditor-General for audit purposes. The
Auditor-General in turn submits an audit report to the Public Accounts Committee of
Parliament for review and action.319 The process cycle is illustrated below in Figure 2
319 Ibid, p6
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Figure 2; The Budgetary Process (Source: MOF)
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7.4.1 Linking planning and budgeting
Linking planning and budgeting is made possible by the MTEF being used as a
strategic tool to integrate what government wants to achieve (goals), how it will go
about achieving it (strategy) and what (resources) it will take to achieve the goals.
Under the MTEF process, the preparation of strategic plans provides an opportunity for
MDAs to review the reasons for their existence, what they are trying to achieve, and
the resources required to achieve those objectives. However, as resources are limited, it
will not be possible to implement all they require – thus requiring prioritisation in the
planning process.320
Preparing a strategic plan is an interactive process that links MDA objectives
and policies to the national goals and policies as described in the Medium Term Plan.
It agrees the mission statement, objectives, outputs and activities, as well as the cost of
the activities. In addition, it assesses whether the activities are affordable within the
resource envelop, and provides an opportunity to revisit the activities and to identify
lower ones that can be eliminated or scaled back (prioritisation), redefine output and
objectives if necessary.
As is required by the MTEF Guidelines, all MDA plans must include the
following components as part their Strategic Plans:
 National and sectoral goals
 Mission statements
 Objectives
 Activities
 Outputs
 Outcomes
320 Ministry of Finance MTEF Guidelines , op.cit., p21
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7.4.2 National and sectoral goals
Sierra Leone being a poor country emerging from a civil conflict (1991-2002),
has embarked on a holistic strategy to achieve its proclaimed Mission 2025 and the
Millennium Development Goals. Part of the strategy adopted by the Government is
restructuring the sectors into clusters for better planning to guide the delivery of
results. The sectoral goals are set out in the annual speech of the President delivered at
the State opening of Parliament and it is included in the National Recovery Programme
(NRP) and various sectoral master plans. However, since 2005, the MOF decided that
national and sectoral goals would constitute elements of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP).321
7.4.3 Mission statements
MDAs are also required to make clear their mission statements. This is
considered the most critical role of MDAs in the whole MTEF process. The first
requirement is the mission statement of MDAs spelling out values of existence, their
core business they wish to deliver on for stakeholders and what guides their operations.
This is to be based on the legal instrument establishing the MDA.322Where a ministry
has several departments and subvented organisations under its operational ambit, it
will prepare a general Mission Statement to be followed by sub-statements for such
departments and agencies. In the parent ministry’s submission, the departments and the
agencies under its mandate would be presented as sub-sets.323
321 Ibid.,p21-24
322 Ibid.,p25
323 Ibid., p30
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7.4.4 Objectives
The next stage in the strategic planning process involves stating the broad
objectives or goals for the MTEF period - normally, three years. These will outline the
overall Government policies as they affect the MDA, as well as specific policies of the
MDAs within the broad framework of government. The broad objectives are followed
by strategic goals, which gives expression to the fulfilment of the MDA’s Mission as
well as the broad objectives or goals for the MTEF period. The objectives stated
should be accompanied by the outputs to be produced to achieve them.324
7.4.5 Activities
Setting out activities to be undertaken by the MDA is also relevant as a measure of
performance. This is significant as MDAs are impelled to meet self-generated
activities against the specified period. Another requirement is that both the outputs and
activities must be ‘SMART’, in other words, they must be Specific, Achievable,
Realistic and Time bound, and should be prioritised in the light of available
resources.325
As a general rule for the preparation of the MTEF budget, MDA submissions must
include a statement of prioritised activities (which should not be a shopping list). The
activities should further be expressed in terms of inputs required to produce them.
These should then be costed and presented to the MOF. These activities are classified
into three types:
 Administration: those activities involved in the day-to-day running of an office
such as office supplies;
 Service Activities: those activities involved in the provision of the services for
which the MDA exists. For example, treatment of patients, preparation of the
budget; and
324 Ibid., p30
325 Ibid, p31
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 Investment Activities: the acquisition of capital assets such as construction or
purchase of equipment.326
7.4.6 Outputs
Outputs are the tangible products of the activities, which could be for example,
school buildings. Other examples include, the kilometre of roads rehabilitated; number
of farmers provided with extension services; number of policy documents reviewed;
and the number of textbooks supplied to pupils.327
7.4.7 Outcomes
This is the result or impact of the activity on recipients. For example, increase in
pass rates that would result from providing more textbooks and better-trained teachers,
increase in rice production that would reduce the importation of rice. In other words, it
is the measure of whether goals have been achieved. The overall process is an
interrelated work chain which requires continuous review of all the components to
reflect ongoing realities, and the changing needs and policies of government. The
process in short, requires the following:
 Inputs will lead to the activities;
 These activities will produce the outputs;
 The outputs will lead to the accomplishment of the objectives; and
 The objectives will fulfil the MDAs’ mission.328
The flow of activities is illustrated below:
326 Ibid., p31
327 Ibid.,p31
328 Ibid.,p31
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Figure 3: The Dynamics of The Process
Source: Ministry of Finance
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7.5 INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES
Given the new orientation on doing government business, the MOF has created the
following structures to support the MTEF process both at MDA and national levels:
1. MTEF Technical Committee
2. MDA Budget Committees
3. Policy Hearings
4. PFM Reform Unit
7.5.1 The MTEF Technical Committee
To facilitate the MTEF budget process, an MTEF Technical Committee was
created and empowered by the 2001 budget speech to guide MDAs in the preparation
and implementation of budgets under the new dispensation in respect to MDA
activities at regional levels.329 The Committee comprises officials from the MOF, the
Ministry of Economic and Development Planning (MODEP), the Bank of Sierra Leone
(BSL), Statistics Sierra Leone, and the University of Sierra Leone (USL). The
Secretariat of the Committee is the Budget Bureau in the MOF. The Secretariat also
liaises with civil society groups and media institutions to reflect their opinions in the
budget document. Responsibilities of the Committee among others are to:
 Assist MDAs to formulate budget estimates;
 Assist the Budget Bureau to finalise National Budget estimates for
cabinet approval;
 Prepare guidelines and documentations of the MTEF process and
procedures;
 Provide a channel for information flow between central budget
agencies and sector ministries;
 Coordinate the establishment of the institutional framework for the
whole MTEF process;
 Facilitate budget discussions involving all stakeholders;
329 The Budget Speech, Republic of Sierra Leone, 2001
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 Promote transparency in budgetary process by establishing and
coordinating activities of District Budget Oversight Committees
(DBOCs);
 Act as liaison between the MDAs, other stakeholders and the MOF;
 Assist in implementation of the budget process;
 Organise Workshops, training seminars and study tours; and
 Identify areas that require enhancement of the MTEF process330
The formation of the technical committee has brought with it a new orientation
and the value of technical inputs into the budget process.331 It also underscores the
significance of using local expertise in a country environment as a more proactive
approach to driving reforms.332
7.5.2 MDA Budget Committees
Under the MTEF guidelines, all MDAs have to establish Budget Committees
chaired by vote controllers. The committees take responsibility for leading the MTEF
process within their organisations and ensure compliance.333 This strategy not only
introduces the decentralisation of management responsibilities from the MOF but it
creates and encourages team management within the public service which was lacking.
In the words of Mariama Anthony-Williams, Senior Budget Analyst in the Budget
Bureau-MOF, “we want institutions to be proactive and be directly involved in driving
the reform process. The MDAs Budget Committees will therefore take responsibility
for their own success or failures and are accountable to the heads of institution. With
the MTEF, gone are the days when permanent secretaries sit on top of the pile alone
without any sense of accountability, and come are the days where permanent
secretaries as vote controllers, find themselves put on the spot and charged with the
330 Ibid.,
331 Interview with Mariama Anthony-Williams, op.cit.,
332 K. Marah, Guidelines for Public Financial Management Reform, op.cit., p14
333 MTEF Guidelines, op.cit., p25
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responsibility of team leadership. This is all about team building, leadership and
collective responsibility”.334
7.5.3 Membership
Membership of the MDA Budget Committee is a flexible process that is
determined by the team leader, who at the ministry level is the permanent secretary and
vote controller. The membership of the committee includes:
 The vote controller as chair;
 Membership to reflect the entire spectrum of the agencies under a line ministry;
and
 Departments and Agencies may also establish individual Budget Committees as
subordinate Committees.335
7.5.4 Role of Budget Committees
MDA Budget Committees carry out the following responsibilities:
 Review policies, strategic plan and budget performance;
 Manage and co-ordinate the preparation of the Strategic Plan on a
three yearly basis;
 Divide the total ceiling provided for the MDA between the cost
centres based on agreed criteria;
 Train cost centre managers in all aspects of budget preparation and
management;
 Co-ordinate and manage the preparation of work plans and cash
flow forecasts; and
 Co-ordinate and manage the preparation of quarterly monitoring
reports and expenditure returns.336
The aim of Government is to institutionalise Budget Committees as the
permanent focus of budget preparation and management in all MDAs. In order for
Budget Committees to perform their roles effectively, the vote controllers need to be
actively involved and brief their Ministers on the performance of Budget on a regular
334 Interview with Mariama Anthony-Williams, op.cit.,
335 MTEF Guidelines, op.cit., p30
336 Ibid.,p30
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basis; all members need to be involved and to be clear about their commitment and
functions. In addition, membership remains as constant as possible: change in
membership is minimised. Also, the Committees meet regularly during the year: at
least on a weekly basis during budget preparation and on a monthly basis to monitor
and manage the implementation process. Contact persons are being identified as the
links between the MDAs and the Ministry of Finance; and the Committees need to
make full use of the reports that will be generated from the software to analyse options
for budget preparation and management.337
7.5.5 Role of the Budget Committees in Managing Change
While the MOF manages the overall MTEF change process, Budget Committees
are mandated to manage change within their own organisations. In order to fulfil this
role, the vote controllers and Budget Committee members have to identify areas for
change and communicate such message and proposed strategy within the organisation.
The existence of a shared vision which expresses where the MDA/Government intends
to go as a result of the change must be clear. This visualizes the future in terms of
providing an effective response to the reasons why the change is being introduced;
identifying the desired future condition of the MDA, and creating a climate of
enthusiasm and participation. In view of these key requirements, the MTEF guidelines
provide that:
o Everyone involved in making the change has to feel as part of it and accept the
vision and how it is to be realised;
o Aspects such as the future structure, patterns of work, and procedures have to
be explained in detail to all within the organisation;
o Champions for the change have to be identified and charged with leading
reform within the organisation;
o Allocation of resources to maintain and review the change through the regular
meetings of the Budget Committee; and
337 Ibid., p29
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o It is the responsibility of the Budget Committee to allocate the MDA ceiling
between the cost centres and objectives. Once the MDA ceiling has been
provided, the Budget Committee meets to allocate the resources amongst the
various cost centres”.338
7.5.6 Policy Hearings
The Government of Sierra Leone introduced Policy Hearings in the budgetary
process in 2004, with the aim of discussing and reviewing sectoral policies as the first
stage in allocating resources between and within sectors.339 The hearings are organised
on a broad sectoral level and inform decision making process at MDA levels by the
Budget Committee. Prior to the hearings, sectoral MDAs meet to discuss cross sectoral
issues and areas of collaboration and linkages.340
“Until the introduction of the MTEF”, said, Mariama Anthony-Williams,
“policy hearings only focused on issues without a discussion of the expenditure
requirements and their implications on national development. However, with the
introduction of policy hearings that are structured on understanding the relationship
between policy and policy financing, a whole new approach is born. Indeed, ministers
and senior administrators now approach national development in a different light,
which has also helped the Ministry of Finance as the central management agency of
national resources”. 341
Policy Hearings, including budget consultations and the input of technocrats
between and across MDAs, have become a common phenomenon in the MTEF
practising nations. In the case of South Africa, with public financial management
reform, for example, the Treasury and Ministry of Finance have established a body
called the 4*4s that comprises technocrats and sectoral managers. The team informs
338 Ibid., p32
339 Ibid., p32
340 Ibid., p32
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decision-making at ministry level.342 A Budget Council, which also comprises regional
and MDA managers, do meet to link policy and expenditure before the cabinet
considers the draft budget.343
In Sierra Leone, Policy Hearings are hosted and driven by the MOF. The MDA
Strategic Plans provide sufficient information to kick-off discussions on the costs of
public policies at the hearings. Thus MDAs present their Policy Review Reports with
the three year expenditure requirements. The MOF would normally be interested in
three key areas:344
1. Review of cross sectoral meetings/findings/conclusions/recommendations: the
areas of potential overlap and duplication between MDAs will highlight
possible savings; while the interlinkages between MDAs will indicate areas of
inter dependence between the budgets.
2. Review of individual MDA Policy Review Report with emphasis on:
 consistency with national goals and objectives;
 reality of the planned outputs and outcomes;
 analysis of policy/ strategy options;
 revised objectives; and
 key outputs.
3. Review of estimates at the cost centre, and item levels:
 the reality of estimates for the planned objectives, cost centres and
items;
 the priorities as agreed with the MDAs and whether they reflect national
priorities; and
 how well the priorities have been reflected in the allocation of
resources.
The Policy Hearings are preceded by review meetings where MDAs share
individual Strategic Plans with the other MDAs within their sectors so as to be able to:
342 K. Marah, Public Finance Management Reform, A South Africa Case Study, op.cit., p61
343 Ibid.,p61
344 Ibid., p40
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a) identify areas of overlap and duplication between MDAs; and
b) identify areas for collaboration between MDAs.
Following the meetings, the convening MDA will prepare the joint paper for the
Policy Hearings. For coordination of sectoral meetings, the following ministries act as
convenors:
Economic Sector - Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food
Security
Social Sector- Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
Security Services - Ministry of Defence
General Services - Office of the President
Table 4: MTEF Budget Presentation in Annual Estimates
Title Content
Mission Statement and MDA Objectives Presents the Mission Statement and
Objectives for the MDA
Summary by Head and Sub-head by
Government of Sierra Leone-Donor
A summary of the annual estimates
broken down by Division and broad
category of expenditure for both GSL and
donor funds
Estimate of outputs and objectives Shows for each Division/Department the
objectives and related outputs.
Summary by MDA, Objectives and item
of Expenditure
Shows a summary for the MDA of the
Estimates for the three year period for the
three items of expenditure
Summary by MDA, Head and Sub-head Shows the total Estimates for all Estimates
for all Heads and Sub-heads for each of
the three years
Details of Development activities Shows the details of projects including
description, costs for the three year and
location
Source: adapted from MTEF Budget Bureau Staff work
Changes to the budget classification will be reflected in the Chart of Accounts
so that MDAs will be able to control, monitor and account for their expenditures
according to objectives. In addition, the outputs developed by MDAs as part of the
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strategic plan will be monitored during and after budget implementation to ensure that
actual performance by MDAs are met according to planned outputs and objectives, or
with little deviations.345
7.5.7 Public Financial Management Reform Unit
For the new reform to take a foothold, Government through the recommendation of
development partners, in particular the World Bank, has created a PFM Reform Unit
under the auspices of the MOF. The Unit is a US$6.2 million World Bank supported
institution charged with the responsibility of providing general support to facilitate and
strengthen PFM reform. The key focus areas are to:346
 establish a legal PFM framework with a focus on financial accountability;
 support the establishment of a decentralised budget, including accounting
procedures, reporting and control process; and
 provide intensive and sustainable training package for PFM officials and
managers across MDAs.
Institutional support also comes from the UK DfID to enhance the capacity of the
Audit Service, strengthen Parliamentary oversight, and provide technical support to the
National Revenue Authority (NRA). 347 The final phase of technical delivery from the
PFM Unit is strengthening the newly decentralised local government institutions along
similar lines with the national PFM reform: providing a legal framework, improving
expenditure execution and training of staff.348
7.6 SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
Drawing from the above processes and institutional arrangements, it is evident
in theory that all the core six OECD best practice benchmarks are in large measure
345 Ibid., p40
346 “Public Financial Management Reform” Institutional Reforms and Capacity Building Project
(IRCBP), Ministry of Finance, Sierra Leone, www.ircbp.sl May 2005
347 Ibid., p40
348 Ibid., p40
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captured in the reform: the successes lie in the fact that there is a significant departure
from the norm of poor budgeting. Within the new system, planning and resources are
linked with the emphasis on outputs and outcomes; goals are set by MDAs with clear
linkages to the national plan; and external oversight, including internal controls, is
being put in place to support reform. While much progress has been made a lot more
remains to be done, too. To this end, three major flaws have been identified in the
budgetary process, namely: the non-robust involvement of the Cabinet in decision
making; a fragmented budget development process continues regardless of the reform;
and the persistence of non-comprehensive budgeting.349 These challenges are
discussed below.
7.6.1 Limited Involvement of the Cabinet
A proactive and focused involvement of the Cabinet in the budget development
as well as the implementation process is very limited. In it is observed in the 2006
Country World Bank Review that:
The Cabinet “discusses” the budget for about one hour immediately prior
to its presentation to Parliament. That is not to say that the ministers are
not involved in the preparation of the budget for their ministry; the usual
budget hearings with the Ministry of Finance do take place. It is just that
there is no collective discussion of the priorities as an input into the budget
process. Instead, bargaining takes place largely on a bilateral basis
between Finance and each spending ministry.350
Although the new MTEF Guidelines of August 2003 envisaged a robust
Cabinet role in the budget process, much is still expected of the team. In its conclusion,
the World Bank team stated that “if the political leadership is not collectively involved
349 Sierra Leone - public expenditure review: from post-conflict recovery to sustained growth, The
World Bank, Washington, 2004, p70
350 Ibid., p72
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in setting the priorities by making the tough choices, then it will not be committed to
the budget that will fund the implementation of those priorities”.351
According to the Commonwealth Guidelines for Public Financial Management
Reform, the quality and comprehensiveness of the final document, and style of
implementation, largely hinge on the long-term commitment of the political leadership
and that of the central policy making body (the Cabinet) to institute change.352 Since
the inception of the reforms in Sierra Leone, several improvements have taken place.
For example, a standard Cabinet procedure was laid out in “Notes on Cabinet
Procedure (GSL 1998)”, with a standard format for Cabinet Memoranda. The
President can draw advice from the National Policy Advisory Committee (NPAC)
comprised of eminent Sierra Leoneans from outside of the Government. The group
which was set up in 1996 (in the wake of the President’s first term), make its own
proposals to the President. 353 It is reported that the NPAC reviews from 2 to 12
proposals a week. It does not, however, review the budget prior to its presentation to
Cabinet. The President can also obtain advice from the Ministry of Presidential
Affairs; the Secretary to the President, the National Security Council and the project
teams administratively located in his office, such as the governance and public sector
reform staff.354
Regardless of the above improvements in the recent past, recent studies on the
Cabinet procedures indicates a weak team that does not particularly study the budget
document. The report also demonstrates that neither the Cabinet as a collective body
nor the President as its chairman receives quality technical support to enhance better
351 Ibid.,p72
352 K. Marah, Guidelines for Public Financial Management Refrom, Commonwealth Secretariat, op.cit.,
p10-11
353 Sierra Leone - public expenditure review, op.cit., p12
354 Ibid., p13
164
decision making process. More than half of the decisions made by the Cabinet were
not implemented.355
7.6.2 Fragmented Budget Development
After ten years of reform 1996 to 2006, the process through which the budget is
developed remains fragmented:356 the non-wage recurrent budget is crafted by the
Budget Bureau in the MOF; the Development Budget is prepared by the Ministry of
Development and Economic Planning (MODEP), while the payroll estimates are
mainly prepared by the Establishment Secretary’s Office and the Public Service
Commission (PSC). Under the existing budget procedures, these elements are brought
together by the MOF without the benefit of a strategic review of priorities and trade-
offs at the national policy making level.357 There is a lack of synergy in the
development of the budget, and there is no single coordinating committee that could
take on the job.
7.6.3 Non Comprehensive Budgets
Another distinct challenge still bedevilling the Sierra Leone reform is that
budget documents are not holistic. In other words, they do not capture every source of
revenue or consider all expenditure areas. According to the OECD and international
best practice, a national budget should be comprehensive such that all sources of
revenue, expenditure plans and government debts (foreign as well as domestic) are
comprehensively recorded.358
355 Ministry of Finance Circular: Implementing Financial Oversight and Monitoring Units, 2005
356 Sierra Leone – public expenditure review, op.cit., 2004 p 68
357 Ibid., p68
358 K. Marah, op.cit., p14
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While the budget document covers the expenditure plans of the central
Government, including counterpart contributions, and donor disbursements and project
expenditures, donors would normally not provide data to the Accountant-General’s
Department (AGD) on grants in kind (drugs, equipment, vehicles, etc). The United
Kingdom DfID grant support to the Police force, for example, is a case in point. 359
This practice runs contrary to the spirit of the selected OECD best practice
benchmarks, for example, that budgets should be comprehensive and that the “the
integrity of information provided in the reports” should be ensured.
In addition, omissions in the budget report relates to local governments, special
funds (such as the Road Fund, and the Reforestation Fund), subvented institutions
(such as universities and teacher training institutions) and public enterprises. Because
of this fragmented system, there is no consolidation of the whole-of-government or the
public sector.360
In principle, the budget includes transfers to several ‘subvented’ or ‘self-
accounting’ institutions that maintain their own bank accounts, draw their own
cheques, and send monthly returns to the Accountant-General. In practice, most of
these agencies are legally separate from the Government such as the Anti-Corruption
Commission, the Office of the Ombudsman and the National Revenue Authority
(NRA). They prepare separate budgets and accounts in accordance with the statutes by
which they were established. However, the main exception is the Police Department,
which is part of central government but has negotiated to have its non-salary budget
treated as a grant.361, 362 In 2005 World Bank assessment mission report, it
359 Sierra Leone – public expenditure review, op.cit., p28
360 World Bank Report – Sierra Leone, Ministry of Finance, 2005 p7
361 The whole of their non-salary recurrent expenditure is classified as ‘Office and General’, which is not
correct. It should be counted as an advance, then cleared to expenditure on monthly reports
from Police.
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recommended that “the budgets of self-accounting units should be fully detailed and
integrated into the Government budget, even if the units are exempted from budgetary
review process and the controls over virement”.363
Some subvented units have other sources of funds, so the transfers do not
represent their total expenditure. There are some major funds such as the Road Fund
(under the Sierra Leone Roads Authority), and minor extra-budgetary funds, such as
the Reforestation Fund, which receive earmarked revenues. According to the World
Bank, the budgets of these projects should be included as annexes to the national
estimates, and their accounts as annexes to the Annual Statement of Accounts. The
situation is captured in excerpt of the World Bank Report.
Box 1: Non-Comprehensive Budget
The Public Accounts cover only the Consolidated Fund. Special funds are not publicly
reported. It would be better if their accounts were included as annexes to the Public Accounts,
so that data are publicly available. Examples are the Road Fund (which receives revenue from
sales of petrol and diesel and grants from the Consolidated Fund), the National Social Security
Insurance Trust (deductions from employee salaries and grants from the budget head 342), the
Agricultural Support Services Account (receives some agricultural revenues and acts as a
revolving fund for purchases and sales of fertilizer), and the Reforestation Fund (some
earmarked forestry revenues). In light of the above, it is therefore recommended that all
special funds and subvented units should be made accountable by including their budgets as
annexes to the Annual Budget document, and their accounts as annexes to the Public Accounts
The law requires that all revenues are payable into the Consolidated Fund unless by an Act of
Parliament they are payable into some other fund. For instance, the Reforestation Fee (Le 770
per cubic meter of first class timber) is payable into the Reforestation Fund in accordance with
the Forest Act (1988) and Regulations (1990). Whether departmental revenues are payable into
the Consolidated Fund or some extra-budgetary fund, they tend to be under-estimated and
unaccounted, e.g. proceeds of sales of fertilizer and oil palm seedlings and ploughing fees (hire
of tractor) collected by the Ministry of Agriculture go into a bank account called Agricultural
Support Services and are used for miscellaneous ministry purposes. Similarly, in the Ministry
of Health, 30 percent of the fees charged by Government doctors to private patients are
supposed to go to the Consolidated Fund, but these are not properly controlled. In GOSL
embassies, ‘temporary receipts’ are given for visa fees, i.e. the revenue is not brought into the
Consolidated Fund. It is thus recommended that all revenues should be fully accounted and
brought into the Consolidated Fund (or to some other fund if so required by law).
Source: World Bank Report, 2005
362 The other exception is the Office of National Security in the President’s Office. All their non-salary
expenditure goes to ‘State Security Expenses’, which is another catchall to avoid the virement
rules.
363 World Bank Country Assessment Report - Sierra Leone 2005 p8
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Non-comprehensive budgeting comes with several challenges such as under-reporting,
fraud as well as upsetting the macroeconomic framework of the country.364 With the
benefit of common sense a non-comprehensive budget would undermine all economic
data of the country as they fail to present a real economic outlook in terms of resource
inputs and outputs. It may also hinder the quest for transparency as it deprives
stakeholder access to relevant information. A case in point is the newspaper report
presented in Box 2 below.
Box 2; EU Funded Projects are a Recipe for Corruption
Mohamed Konneh, Standard Times (Freetown). 06 April 2005
The European Union funded HIPC projects have been described by Budget Oversight
Committees and District Task Teams throughout the country as a recipe for corruption. The
Budget Oversight Committees set up by government under the ministry of finance and the task
teams set up by the civil society groups have a mandate to monitor all HIPC funded projects
within their localities.
However members of these committees are finding it very difficult to monitor projects funded
by the EU, which has been a major concern. Information reaching this press reveals that
contractors of these projects fail in many cases to give details of contract agreements, noting
that they have no mandate to disclose whatsoever that is in the agreement.
The EU office itself is also unwilling to give information about projects that they are funding.
According to sources inside the ministry of finance, there is an agreement between the
government and the EU that forbids them from disclosing details of agreements to the public
especially regarding projects funded by support from the EU.
The concern here is that considering the fact that the European Union is here to help Sierra
Leone reduce poverty, what is happening in this matter at present appears to be a way of
getting the people of this country to become poorer and certainly not out of poverty. In the
absence of a rigid monitoring framework projects funded by the EU, or any other source, are
marred by corruption and incompetence, and the contractors do just what is good for them.
For example when the team of observers visited the site of the rehabilitation of the Municipal
School at Ferry Junction, the contractor deliberately refused to give details of the project, and
without knowledge of the contract agreement one will not be able to monitor, evaluate or
assess the work.
For this country to move ahead there should be transparency and accountability in all projects
of such nature for a sustainable development. People need to be informed on all
developmental programme within their localities.
Source: http://admin.corisweb.org/index.php?fuseaction=news.view&id=117028&src=pub
364 F. Lequiller and D. Blades, Understanding National Accounts, OECD, 2007 p18
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7.6.4 Expenditure Control
As the title implies, expenditure control comprises the strategies put in place to
exert control on public expenditure and ensure fiscal rectitude.365 According to OECD
best practice, a credible budgetary process is reflected partly in the effectiveness of
expenditure control as a fundamental to several key objectives: macroeconomic
stability, public service delivery, policy credibility, and transparency and
accountability. 366 It is opined further that the ultimate measure of expenditure
credibility is the variance between actual spending and the approved budget.367
Variance for expenditure item can appear for several reasons: “the sum of quarterly
allocations do not match the voted budget, actual spending does not match the
allocation and some spending is made without benefit of an allocation”.368
The above scenario poses serious challenge to the credibility of the system.
This is because the certainty of achieving development in a large measure hinge on the
minimum of variance in expenditure. However, expenditure control in Sierra Leone
comes with a number of challenges.
7.7 THE CHALLENGES
The challenges associated with expenditure control despite ongoing reforms
under the administration of Tejan Kabbah, are numerous. Government also recognises
that regardless of the institutional reforms, internal control mechanism in the budget
implementation is weak.369
One of the identified failings is the delays in the monthly reconciliation of
records which are maintained by the Accountant-General’s Department (AGD), Bank
365 W. Tan, Expenditure Control in the Public Sector, Commonwealth Public Expenditure Seminar
Paper, Singapore, May 2005 p4
366 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Management Brief, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005 p3
367 Ibid.,p3
368 Ibid., p3
369 Interview with Cyprian Kamaray, Accountant-General, Ministry of Finance, Sierra Leone June, 2006
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of Sierra Leone and the National Revenue Authority (NRA). This omission has had
some ramifications: delays in the preparation of the annual accounts of the
government, causing fraud to go undetected (double encashment of cheques) or the
non submission of updated financial data. As a stop gap measure, the Government
went as far as contracting the preparation of monthly bank reconciliation to an external
accounting firm in 2002.370 For a better illustration of the problem, a spending review
of 2001 to 2003 fiscal years presented below.
7.7.1 Spending Review 2001 -2003
As illustrated in Table five below, the deviation of expenditure from allocated
budgets as emphasised by the Budget Bureau and the Accountant-Generals’
Department (AGD) are due to the lack of adequate projections of cash requirements
from the MOF, capacity constraints and many others.
Table 5: Expenditure Deviation, 2001 - 2003
2001 2002 2003
Allocations vs. Voted Budget
Aggregate Deviation (%) b/ 4 6 9
Count of Budget Heads with Minimal Deviation 38 19 19
Count of Budget Heads with Deviation > +5% 11 18 23
Count of Budget Heads with Deviation < -5% 5 18 13
Total Budget Heads 54 55 55
Actual Spending vs. Allocations
Aggregate Deviation (%) b/ 2 -7 -3
Count of Budget Heads with Minimal Deviation 23 20 13
Count of Budget Heads with Deviation > +5% 6 10 4
Count of Budget Heads with Deviation < -5% 25 25 39
Total Budget Heads 54 55 56
Recorded Allocations without Recorded Spending 169 489 649
Recorded Spending without Recorded Allocations 165 292 801
Transactions Reviewed 2,625 3,974 4,311
Actual Spending vs. Voted Budget
Aggregate Deviation (%) b/ 6 -2 6
Count of Budget Heads with Minimal Deviation 23 17 15
Count of Budget Heads with Variance > +5% 10 15 14
Count of Budget Heads with Variance < -5% 21 23 26
Total Budget Heads 54 55 55
Source: Accountant-General’s Department, Ministry of Finance and staff calculations
370 Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) Reform Report, Accountant-
General’s Department, Ministry of Finance, August, 2003 p8
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At present data suggest that intra-budgetary expenditure control is deteriorating
across MDAs even though control at the aggregate level is adequate.371 This can be
seen in Table five above. Spending allocations were 4 percent above the approved
budget in 2001, 6 percent over in 2002 (including the Supplemental Budget) and 9
percent over in 2003.372 The number of budget heads with minimal deviations
between allocations and voted budget decreased from 38 out of 54 in 2001 to 19 out of
55 in 2002 and 2003. It is interesting to observe that the aggregate increase was not
uniform: to the contrary, many budget heads received allocations that were smaller
than the amounts in the voted budget. “This was often the result of shortfalls in
financing. For example, many MDAs received less than expected allocations in 2003
when expected loans and grants were delayed into 2004”.373
Actual spending slightly exceeded allocations in 2001 and fell short of
allocations in 2002 and 2003. Only 20 budget heads had minimal deviations from the
allocated amounts in 2001 and this fell to 20 in 2002 and 13 in 2003. Under-spent
heads increased sharply in 2003 due in part, again, to the shortfall in donor financing.
In this case, the MOF imposed spending limits after allocations had been made,
creating a situation where some suppliers could not be fully paid for goods and
services delivered. In spite of this situation, several MDAs also overspent their
allocations without benefit of a supplemental budget. 374
7.7.2 Instituting Expenditure Control
In view of the above inherent challenge and a host of others, the MOF and the
AGD have introduced a number of expenditure control measures to achieve
transparency and accountability in the budgetary process. These actions brings with
371 Sierra Leone – public expenditure review, op.cit., p18
372 Excludes external funded portions in the Development Budget
373 Interview with the Cyprian Kamaray, op.cit.,
374 See for example, the 2 December 2003 letters from the AGD to the MDAs entitled “Allowable
Spending Limits for the Rest of the Fourth Quarter.”
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them the challenge of meeting the government wide Vision 2025, the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and the poverty reduction commitment of government.375
The following self-explanatory expenditure control and payment procedure in Box 3
have been introduced.
375 Ministry of Finance Public Expenditure Report, 2005
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Box 3: Expenditure Control and Payment Procedure
Step 1. Budget Bureau prepares the Quarterly Allocations of Expenditure for the year. Some are based
on the seasonal pattern of needs, e.g. agricultural activities and road building need funds in the
first half of the year before the rains come. The full amount appropriated for ‘other charges’
(i.e. excluding salaries and debt charges, which are paid centrally) and development
expenditure (mainly GOSL counterpart funds) is distributed over the four quarters, and notified
to AGD and MDA Vote Controllers in January. Allocations are broken down by division (not
programme).
Step 2. Vote Controllers sit with their Budget Committees and sub-allocate to programmes. This
process is often completed slowly.
Step 3. The MDA invites bids and selects a supplier according to the procurement procedure chosen
for each purchase. (In future, MDAs will have to prepare Procurement Plans and get them
approved centrally).
Step 4. The MDA prepares a Commitment Form for the amount of the purchase, attaches the supplier’s
pro-forma invoice and contract (such as a local purchase order), and submits it to AGD
(Expenditure Control). Since 2003, a further form, MTEF/PETS Form 1,* is required to be
attached.
Step 5. AGD enters the commitment in the FMAS. The system checks that the cumulative
commitments and expenditure are within the cumulative allocations at that point of time. If so,
the commitment is assigned a unique number. If it is not, the system rejects it. (The demands
placed on AGD could be reduced if the MDAs maintained their Vote Service Registers and did
their own prior check for funding adequacy; passing on only those they believe can be funded.)
Step 6. MDA requests the contractor to supply the goods.
Step 7. The Programme Manager or MDA’s storekeeper checks the goods when they are received and
issues goods received note (GRN). The AGD’s Stock Verifier also checks the goods and issues
a stores verification certificate (SVC).
Step 8. The MDA prepares a payment voucher, attaches the commitment form, LPO, GRN, SVC, and
MTEF/PETS Form 2, and submits the package to AGD for payment. The PETS Form 2 has to
be signed by the Programme Manager, the professional head to whom s/he reports, the Vote
Controller and the Minister. Payments for development projects are routed through the
Development Secretary (MODEP) for her approval before going to AGD.
Step 9. AGD (Expenditure Control) checks that the documentation is all complete and in order, and
appropriately signed, and keys details of each payment into the FMAS database. The system
prints a check. Checks are signed by the Accountant-General and Deputy Accountant-General,
and issued.
* The two Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) forms are misnamed as they are not used in
PETS studies. Expenditure tracking is through the AGD’s FMAS, not by these forms. Their function is
only to ensure the participation of Programme Managers and Ministers in the expenditure process. It is
claimed that the PETS Forms have improved relationships between administrative officers and their
political masters, but the process is often protracted by Ministers’ absence or delay in approvals.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Freetown
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7.8 THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT (AGD) – VEHICLE
FOR FINANCIAL CONTROL
In discussing financial reporting and internal controls, it is worth looking at the role of
the Accountant-General’s Department (AGD) as the institution driving the cash
management of the Government.
The Sierra Leone Treasury known as the Accountant-General’s Department
(AGD) is headed by an Accountant-General – the Government cashier. The AGD is
responsible for all government accounting, which include the recording of financial
transactions, production of financial reports and accounts, serving as a catalyst for the
implementation of financial policies, regulating, monitoring and controlling
government revenue and expenditure.376
In the 1920s, a Colonial Treasury was set up charged with responsibilities
similar to those stated above. The first known financial report of the colony of Sierra
Leone was published on the 18th June 1928. The Colonial Treasury was transformed to
the National Treasury in the 1960s, after Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961.
The first known report of the Accountant-General was published for the period 1969 –
1970 on the 30th June 1970. The Treasury building was burnt down during the May
25th coup. “Until June 1998, the AG’s department was operating a system using a one-
sided cash book developed on a computer spreadsheet application, prepared the
government cheques manually, operated a non-computerised payroll and pension
system and used antiquated waybill and vote service ledger”. 3
7.8.1 Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS)
Progress has been made under President Tejan Kabbah to strengthen financial
management and accounting systems of the AGD to which the European Union (EU)
376 Government Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005
3 Annual Statement of Public Accounts for the Period 1st Jan. 1998 to 31st Dec. 1998. Volume 1, page 3
lines 1 and 2.
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provided technical support from 1998 to 2003.377 Also, the United Kingdom DfID
funded two diagnostic studies on the Financial Management and Accounting System
(FMAS) and Charts of Accounts were completed in 2003.The studies recommended
the replacement of the FMAS with a new Integrated Financial Management
Information System (IFMIS) that went into full operations in 2004.378 The then FMAS
lacked functionalities such as automated bank reconciliation, user defined reports,
audit trails and screen viewing.379 The new IFMIS will be transformed to support the
more decentralised financial control and accounting system critical to meeting the
objectives of accountability and transparency under the umbrella of good
governance.380
A Statement of User Requirement (SOUR) for the IFMIS has been prepared
and the procurement process is ongoing. The IFMIS will be rolled out eventually to all
MDAs and Local Councils, and the AGD has made some improvements in the
reconciliation of records through the IFMIS. Also, a new chart of accounts that is
compliant with international standards and enables budget estimates to be classified
has been introduced.381 According to the Accountant-General, Cyprian Kamaray, “the
IFMIS will in due course enable the Government to publish accurate Annual
Statements of Public Accounts on a timely basis, thereby improving transparency and
accountability”.382
377 M. Sandy, The Impact of Computerisation on the Accounting Systems Adopted At The
Accountant-General’s Department, 2005, p35
378 Ibid.,p37
379 Ibid.,p38
380 IFMIS Reform Report, Accountant of General’s Department 2005
381 M. Sandy, op.cit., p40
382 Interview with Cyprian Kamaray, op.cit.,
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7.8.2 Implementing IFMIS for new Local Government Councils
According to the Accountant-General, plans are underway to develop and
implement an interim financial management system for the newly established local
government councils, which would be followed by intensive training for users and
local government staff. The local government financial management system will
initially be implemented on a manual basis. The project will later finance the
acquisition and implementation of a small standard accounting package for local
governments. The experience of using this simple computerized system will prepare
local governments for operating the IFMIS, when it is rolled out to local councils after
three years.383
7.8.3 Challenges of Financial Reporting
Financial reporting as part of financial control is critical to transparent
budgeting. It highlights when and what was received, and when and how moneys were
spent with variance – the reconciliation of accounts.384 Under the revised Financial
Regulations, the AGD must give high priority to the regular and prompt reconciliation
of the Treasury Accounts. The AGD must ensure that MDAs are fulfilling their
responsibilities to reconcile their accounts for deposits monthly under Financial
Regulations 139.
Regardless of the above provisions and requirements, the World Bank
assessment team notes that “the AGD needs to further improve its capacity to detect
errors and fraud through the reconciliation of expenditure data with banking data”.385
The failure to reconcile fiscal data with bank data has been the main impediment to
383 Interview with Mr Cyprian Kamaray
384 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005 p4
385 World Bank Report – Sierra Leone, Ministry of Finance, 2005 p23
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prompt finalization of the Public Accounts each year. The Government of Sierra
Leone (GSL) bank accounts comprise 47 ‘Treasury’ accounts maintained by AGD
with the Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL), which is the the central bank, and about 180
accounts maintained by departments with the BSL and the commercial banks.
With regard to the Treasury Accounts, the FMAS was intended to include a
bank reconciliation module of the integrated financial management system, but this
was not satisfactorily completed. The computer system used by BSL is not linked to
the FMAS and the two systems keep data in different formats. To date, the only
practicable way of reconciling is done manually, matching lists of checks issued by the
FMAS and checks cleared according to weekly tapes from BSL. An outside team was
contracted and reconciled all the records up to December 2002. The 2003 records are
being reconciled by AGD, and are complete up to November 2003: at end of January
2004, only a few of the 47 accounts were yet to be reconciled. There is still one
Treasury account for salaries not reconciled to end-2003. 386
Commenting on the non-Treasury Accounts, Joshua Ellie, Principal Accountant
in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST), said, “Nothing is
known centrally about the operations of the non-Treasury Accounts, or whether they
are reconciled, because AGD does not receive or check departmental bank
reconciliations. They are only able to monitor and report the BOSL closing balances
in the Public Accounts.387 In some departments, it was discovered that reconciliation
is annual rather than monthly. As you can see, we are still not there but we will be
there soon”.388
386 Interview with Cyprian Kamaray, Accountant-General
387 Any increase in the overall balance on these accounts is treated as an increase in deposits.
388 Interview with Joshua Ellie, Principal Accountant, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology,
June, 2006
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7.8.4 Virements
In budget execution, virement is simply the movement of resources from one
budget head to another.389 This is a common practice as all spending institutions
occasionally find themselves in need of the flexibility to move resources from one
project to another during the year as the case may be. However, excessive recourse to
virement is a sign of “either weak planning or weak expenditure controls”.390 At
present, shifting budget provisions from one project to another is tightly controlled by
the MOF. The revised Financial Regulations disallow any virement between
departmental objectives and it is a Parliamentary prerogative. Virement is allowed
only within groups of sub-heads (for example, personnel, other charges, capital).
Virement to or from the overseas travel vote or out of a utility provision is disallowed.
Within the rules, application for such virements has to go through the Budget Bureau,
which tends to discourage any virement, and must be approved by the Minister. This
process typically takes one month.391
Asked whether virement doesn’t open a door to abuse across MDAs, Mariama
Anthony-Williams of the Budget Bureau responded: “MDAs have various ways of
getting around the controls. For instance, expenditure may be misclassified on PETS 2
forms so as to use unspent balances of allocations elsewhere. The Accountant-
General’s Department does check PETS Forms against supporting documentation, but
the staff does not have the detailed knowledge of the IFMIS programme that they can
use to detect programme misclassifications”.392 The MOF is still grappling with
finding ways to eliminate abuse in virement.
389 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005 p7
390 Ibid., p8
391 Sierra Leone’s Financial Regulations was recently reviewed under a joint Commonwealth-World
Bank support programme in June 2006.
392 Interview with Mariama Anthony-Williams, Senior Budget Analyst
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7.8.5 Internal Reporting
Regular and timely internal reporting is a high requirement for expenditure
control through which the treasury is able to collate and prepare its monthly, quarterly
and annual reports of the public accounts.393 Section 53 (1) of the Government
Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005) requires vote controllers within ten days
after the end of the month to prepare and submit information on actual revenue and
expenditure. The Minister of Finance is also required by sub section (20) to submit
quarterly financial reports of receipts and payment no later than one month after the
end of the quarter. It provides further that the Accountant-General presents monthly
statement of public accounts for publication.
However, evidence abounds that the MDAs do not produce accounts reports for
revenue and expenditure either on a timely or regular
basis, and neither the Minister of Finance nor the Accountant-General are able to meet
the legal requirements of the GBAA.394 Recently, the MOF recruited a Deputy
Accountant-General in order to revamp administration, but the institution is yet to meet
its mandate as required by law.
In addition, each vote controller has a Vote Service Register (VSR), and should
record allocations, commitments and expenditures promptly for each line item,
deducting each commitment and expenditure from the allocation to show the
remaining balance available. VSRs should agree with the AGD quarterly statements.
In practice, however, VSRs are not kept properly. According to the World Bank
Assessment Team, it was discovered that transactions are not entered promptly. For
example, “In one major ministry, commitments were not entered, only allocations and
393 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005 p4
394 World Bank Assessment Report – Sierra Leone, 2006 p17
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expenditures”, and VSRs are not reconciled with the AGD statements.395 Instead, the
MDAs have become entirely dependent on the central system maintained by the AGD.
Asked why the AGD is not arresting the situation such as by withholding
quarterly allocations until reports are updated as is being done in other countries, the
Accountant-General responded: “We have just started the reform process and it will
take some time for our stakeholders to digest the value of reform. We will do
something about it, hopefully soon, and part of the process is strengthening our internal
control functions”.396 In an interview with Joshua Ellie, Principal Accountant of the
MEST, he reacted to the above scenario that: “failure to report or record expenditure
does not necessary mean corruption is taking place. It means only that the right people
are not being hired to do the job”. Ellie further explained that the public sector is in
large measure populated by untrained and unqualified accountants doing the jobs of
accountants, and that Government reform must incorporate a change in the civil
service machinery in order to improve financial management.397
7.8.6 Internal Audit
Section 5 (3) (a) of the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005)
provides for the establishment of an internal audit department (IAD) in the MOF and
other MDAs (as will be required) to “measure, evaluate and report on the effectiveness
of internal control both financial and otherwise.” This strongly reflects the values of
OECD best practice benchmarks. However, though the IAD and audit functions are
supported by the GBAA, and are in line with the OECD standards, the department is
not adequately resourced with talent and logistics to be considered an excellent
benchmark. The IAD in the MOF has had no annual plan or programme, and it lacks
395 Ibid., p17
396 Interview with the Accountant-General, Mr Cyprian Kamaray, June 2006
397 Interview with Joshua Ellie, Principal Accountant, MEST, June 2006
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adequate resource to do a post-audit of transactions, systems audit or performance
audit. Also, standards of book-keeping and records management have fallen.398 The
IAD consists of a senior officer and about 4 to 5 part-time staff who are ‘borrowed’
from the AGD, including a contract EU Technical Assistant (acting as Deputy
Director), and one of them holds a diploma in accounting. 399
The IAD investigates cases at the request of the Financial Secretary or on its
own initiative, and follows up on the Auditor-General’s audit queries as well as queries
raised by external donors.400 Thus far, it is given access to the books and records it
may need for audit purposes. There is also a so-called ‘pre-audit’ that operates on
payments by the AGD. This, however, is more properly considered as part of the
accounting process.401
Asked about the structure of internal audit across MDAs as required in Section
3 of the GBAA, the Deputy Director of the Internal Audit, Olayinka Phillips, said
“some ministries have what is called an Internal Audit Department, but these are either
a single person, for example, in the Ministry of Agriculture, or are recently established
in accordance with the GBAA. I strongly believe it should be part of the Ministry of
Finance Internal Audit Department’s responsibility to supervise these internal audit
units in the MDAs. Moreover, as a Directorate of Internal Audit, we should be the
professional head of the internal audit cadre in the same way as the Accountant-
General heads the accounting class. There is no guidance or audit manual provided
from the centre and no training programmes are being put in place”.402
Internal controls are embedded in the Financial Regulations, but these are
widely ignored. For instance, MDAs receive advances from the AGD for monthly
398 Internal Audit Report, Ministry of Finance, 2005 p 3
399 Interview with Olayinka Phillips, Deputy Director of Internal Audit Department, Ministry of
Finance, June 2006
400 Ibid.,
401 Ibid.,
402 Ibid., (see full interview in Appendix A)
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petty cash and for special events.403 The revised Financial Regulations (2006) require
that actual amounts spent should be accounted for and the balance refunded or claimed,
as the case may be.404 In fact, the accounts and vouchers submitted to AGD invariably
add up to the amounts advanced. No unspent balance is ever returned. It is opined by
external auditors that vouchers are engineered to exhaust the amount available. Asset
registers are not kept up to date and the Boards of Survey do not verify stores and
inventory and send their reports to the Accountant-General and Auditor-General, as
required by Financial Regulations 215. According to the Deputy Director of Internal
Audit, there is a total breakdown in record-keeping.405
7.8.7 Records Management
Records management underpins the value of accountability as a critical
function of budgeting. The quality of records management invariably registers the
level of accountability as well as transparency in systems.406 Records are the heart and
soul of transparency and accountability.407 In the Sierra Leone context, management is
deplorable. Financial Regulations 110-112 provides that the Accountant-General shall
issue instructions to Vote Controllers on the safeguard of accounting records and
documents, and ensure that all vouchers in the Treasury are kept in an orderly manner
to be made available when required. But this largely is not the case; for example,
repeated requests of the Office of the Auditor-General to produce documentary
evidence of transactions has not always been met by the Accountant-General, as
demonstrated in Box 4 below.
403 The total expenditure from these advances is said to be less than 5% of total MDA expenditure. All
other expenditure is paid by the AGD on vouchers submitted by the MDAs.
404 The Financial Regulations was revised through joint technical support of the World Bank and the
Commonwealth Secretariat, in 2006
405 Interview with Olayinka Phillips, Deputy Director of Internal Audit, June 2006
406 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005 p17
407 Ibid.,
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Box 4: Voucher Storage in the Ministry of Finance
In the basement of the new Ministry of Finance building are the Voucher Archive Rooms. Here
all the documentary evidence for expenditure from 1998 to 2003 is loosely bundled by year
and stacked on shelves, boxes and cabinets. The Accountant-General has imposed substantial
order on the situation in 2004 though more organization is required.
Though the Auditor-General has requested delivery of all documents to her representative in
the building so that audit can immediately follow their entry in the computer system, the
Accountant-General’s Department does not comply, or soon gives up. The auditors have
continual problems in accessing the documentation for selected agencies, periods and
transactions. The Auditor-General, in her reports on the public accounts for 1996-1999 and
2000, expresses her inability to give any opinion on the accounts due to lack of information on
the regularity of the underlying transactions. Even the Anti-Corruption Commission has
difficulty in getting particular documents retrieved: a recent case took two months.
Piles of paper are a fire risk, and cigarette butts on the floor of the Archive Rooms indicate that
the new Ministry building is at risk of finishing like the former Treasury building across the
street from the present MOF.
These problems could be addressed by applying basic records management principles.
Adequate shelving, a simple indexing system and procedures for receipt, filing, retrieval and
disposal, security rules, training and supervision would, at minimal cost, result in high gains in
accountability.
Source: adapted from World Bank Report, 2006
7.8.8 Monitoring Assets and Liabilities
The ability to monitor goods between procurement, use and disposal,
determines how much Government loses or saves.408 Unnecessary purchase of foods,
for example, may be avoided when adequate stocks are available and losses from
deterioration and theft reduced. Similarly, careful monitoring of liabilities could also
assist government to reduce costs. Timely payment for goods and services, for
example, may as well help to avoid the accumulation of arrears and associated costs:
interest charges, legal fees, project restart fees and so-on.409
It appears in large measure that rules for asset monitoring have not been
followed. The GBAA and Financial Regulations are clear on proper custody, use and
408 K. Marah, Innovations in Public Financial Management Reform, Commonwealth Public Expenditure
Seminar, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, October 2005
409 Ibid.,
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annual verification of physical assets, divided between stores and inventory.410 For
example, it is provided that payment cheques must have the following attached to it:
the voucher, a Goods Received Note signed by the MDA Storekeeper (or a Programme
Manager), and a Stock Verification Certificate, signed by the AGD Stock Verifier.411
Stores that are not immediately allocated to a Programme Manager have to be taken on
charge by a Storekeeper and accounted for (in quantities not values). In accordance
with the Financial Regulations, the vote controller should appoint a Board of Survey
on an annual basis, who are independent of stores and store records to verify the
existence, condition and location of all stores and inventory.412 Any differences
between the records and the verified quantities have to be followed up and explained.
However, vote controllers neglect asset management without clear direction,
supervision and guidance from the centre.413
7.8.9 Annual Public Accounts
The publication of annual public accounts is a strict transparency and
accountability requirement in budgeting and a best practice criterion of the OECD –
which in principle, as provided for the in the GBAA – is largely being met.414 For
example, the MOF publishes quarterly resource allocations and half-yearly
expenditures for all MDAs in the Government Gazette. However, the last published
Public Accounts issued for FY 2002 and 2003 were finalized in 2006. Asked why the
AGD is lagging behind publishing Annual Accounts, the Accountant-General
responded: “we are just coming out of a long brutal war, and I am convinced we need
410 Section 34, Government Budgeting and Accountability Act 2005
411 World Bank Report – Sierra Leone, Ministry of Finance , 2005 p24
412 Ibid.p24
413 Ibid.,
414 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Review, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005 p23
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time to catch up with best practice”.415 Despite significant progress made, the timely
publication of Public Accounts has not met the international accepted practice of
budget transparency. Public Accounts are not yet uploaded on the official Government
of Sierra Leone website.
7.8.10 Payroll Management
Management of the payroll system has undergone some changes. Over the
years, management of the wage and salary bills posed significant challenge to
Government. According to MOF records, Government employment by the 1980s
reached unsustainable levels with over 100,000 employees on the payroll.416 By 1996,
this figure was reduced to less than half.417 Further improvements have been made
such that by 2000, payroll management was developed into a computerised system and
has made a drastic reduction in the number of “ghost workers”. 418 419
As a matter of procedure the AGD pays all salaries centrally. Salaries are
being increasingly paid through bank transfers into employees account. The
Accountant-General has entered into a special arrangement with commercial banks to
exempt these accounts from bank charges and minimum balance requirements.420 For
MDAs, all payees without bank accounts (still in the great majority) are grouped under
programmes and a cheque is prepared by AGD for each programme. The programme
paymaster cashes the cheque and pays officers personally through the show of
identification cards and by signing the payroll. Unclaimed salaries would normally be
returned into the Consolidated Fund, followed by issue of a receipt, also entered on the
415 Interview with Cyprian Kamaray, Accountant-General of Sierra Leone, 20 June 2006
416 Sierra Leone Structural Adjustment Programme, Ministry of Finance, 2000 p8
417 Ibid., p8
418 IFMIS Reform Report, op.cit., p16
419 Ghost workers are merely deceased staff whose names are retained by heads of institutions and
continue to receive salaries and wages on behalf of the deceased.
420 IFMIS Reform Report, op.cit., p18
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payroll. The AGD enforces these controls by insisting to receive the returned payrolls
and checking that all salaries are accounted for before releasing the following month’s
cheques.421 Much more progress has been made in the management of the payroll than
in other expenditure areas examined in the previous chapters.
7.8.11 Salaries and Salary Arrears
Teacher salaries – which used to be a major issue in the education system of the
country - have been brought under control. Almost all teacher salaries are now paid
directly into school bank accounts. In the Western Area, for example, 98 percent of
the primary schools have bank accounts. By 2004, 30 percent of police have their
salaries paid into their personal bank accounts. Also, special arrangements have been
made for the military payroll.422
However, there remains ongoing problem with salary arrears for teachers. This
can be attributed to poor record keeping. According to the AGD the total number of
teachers being paid by Government in January 2003 were just under 19,000 and it went
over 21,000 in January 2004. By contrast, Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology data show that in May 2003, the numbers of teachers were 17,611
primary, 5,325 secondary and 989 technical/vocational, a total of 23,925. Comparing
this number to the payroll numbers suggest that many teachers were not being paid.
7.9 EXPENDITURE CONTROL
Two initiatives have been introduced by the MOF to control public
expenditure; these are PETS Form 1 and 2, and the Control Commitment Form.
421 Ibid., p18-19
422 Ibid., p23
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7.9.1 MTEF/PTES Form 1 and MTEF/PETS Form 2
To strengthen general expenditure control the Budget Bureau in the MOF in
collaboration with the Accountant-General’s Department introduced the PETS Form 1
and PETS Form 2 in 2003 under the management of the Budget Bureau and the
AGD.423 According to MOF officials the introduction of these tools has recorded
some amount of control by reducing corruption and instituting fiscal rectitude to a
commendable level. 424 It is clear however, that this instrument was introduced on the
initiative of the donor community as part of their conditionalities or benchmarks for
budgetary support.
7.9.2 The Rationale
The introduction of the PETS Form 1 and PETS Form 2 take root from a public
expenditure tracking survey carried out by the Ministry of Finance in collaboration
with donor partners in 2002. The survey was carried out to verify whether projects
budgeted for in the fiscal year were indeed implemented on the ground.425 While the
outcome of the survey recorded a high incidence of misappropriation and under-
performance across the MDAs, the tool underpins a valuable OECD benchmark for a
strengthened financial environment. Some projects were found either not to have been
completed or not initiated on the ground at all. There were cases in which vote
controllers in the capital, Freetown, initiated and executed programmes without going
through a competitive bidding process (procurement) as well as bypassing the
programme managers, who were the real executors of the projects. In short, the system
423 Ministry of Finance, MTEF Guidelines, op.cit., p12
424 Interview with Mariama Anthony Williams op.cit.,
425 Ibid.,
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was prone to abuse where senior officials access funds, execute or decide not to
execute at all, without fear of sanctions. 426
It was as a result of these gross malpractices that the control tools, PETS Form
1 and PETS Form 2 were introduced to forestall unconscionable spending and to
institute fiscal discipline in the budgetary process.
7.9.3 How PETS Forms 1 and 2 function
PETS Form 1 captures the aggregate quarterly expenditure needs of MDAs by
line item. It is used after the budget has been authorised by Parliament and the
expenditure commences. MDAs complete the form by outlining their expenditure
needs for the quarter and submit it to the Budget Bureau for approval and to input the
data in the computerised accounting system of the AGD. Once the funds have been
inputted, MDAs could commit the entire inputted amount or roll over such funds to the
next quarter of the same fiscal year.427 However the preparation of the PETS Form 1
involves several key players at the managerial, professional and political levels. In
other words, the form is completed (prepared) by the Programme Manager, certified by
the professional head such as the Director General, and authorised by the Vote
Controller - in the case of a ministry, the Permanent Secretary. Finally, the completed
form is approved by the Minister and submitted to the Budget Bureau in the MOF.428
While some programme officers in MDAs complain about the bureaucracy
involved in processing the forms, officials in the AGD consider PETS Form 1 an
effective control tool that has improved resource management reduce leakages and
wastes since its introduction. (See PETS Form 1 and PETS Form 2 in Appendix B)
426 Ibid.,
427 MTEF Guidelines, op.cit., p25
428 Ibid.,
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The PETS Form 2 on the other hand, is a detailed line by line expenditure
function of the PETS Form 1. In other words, it is activity-based execution tool.
“Assuming a ministry’s approved estimate as stated in the PETS Form 1 for overseas
travel is 20M Leones,” explained Joseph Kaiwa, senior accounting official in the
AGD, “a PETS Form 2 has to be raised under the Travel Head as indicated in the
PETS Form 1, each time the ministry wants to utilise moneys under the travel vote”.429
Regardless of the fact that the preparation of the PETS Form 2 is the same process as
that of the PETS Form 1, the process leverages control and effectively tracks
expenditure across MDAs.
7.9.4 Commitment Control Form (CCF)
The Commitment Control Form (CCF) is another expenditure control tool used
by the AGD. The CCF as a matter of procedure is submitted to the AGD after the
PETS Form 1 and 2 have been processed. The CCF is prepared by the Accountant in
the MDA, approved by the Vote Controller and submitted in duplicate to the AGD. It
is then entered into the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS)
using its pre-number. A unique number is then generated and attached to the activity.
If funds are available for the activity, the original copy of the CCF is returned to the
MDA with a Y (yes) – indicating the vote controller can go ahead to execute the
activity, or returned with an N (no) if there is no fund available to cover the proposed
activity – plus a hold on the activity until a Y is received.430
The CCF is multi-functional. Firstly, it confirms the availability of funds to
meet the commitment raised in the PETS Form 2 – preventing over-expenditure.
Secondly, it introduces a stringent coding system that enables officials within and
429 Interview with Joseph Kaiwa, Senior Accountant, Accountant-General’s Department (AGD),
Ministry of Finance, June 2006
430 Interview with Cyprian Kamaray, op.cit.,
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across MDAs to track activities; thus preventing fraud and unconscionable spending;
and thirdly, it introduces fiscal rectitude and transparency in the expenditure system.
7.9.5 Effectiveness of tools
Officials in the AGD are of the opinion that the control tools have been crucial
to instituting controls in the system.431 First, the PETS Forms expand the scope of
participation in which professional heads, vote controllers and the political heads of
institutions collaborate on expenditure decisions – which was lacking in previous
systems. Thus, while the process leverages the role of programme managers, it equally
institutes transparency by involving all key players in a given MDA. Secondly, the
participation process creates a sobering environment so that senior managers must take
responsibility for their actions – as it would be easy for the Budget Bureau and the
AGD to trace moneys to the implementers of particular projects, if the need arise.432
Thirdly, senior officials in the AGD say that the CCF prevents reckless
spending in MDAs as well as limits domestic arrears on contracts. This is because all
vote controllers are required to seek clearance from the MOF for the availability of
funds through the CCF, before making financial commitments to contracts. Officials
further note that before the introduction of the control tools, a reckless pattern of
expenditure system prevailed: any expenditure line could be charged to any head. “For
example, overseas travel could be charged to a stationery head or any other line item in
the MDA estimate”. 433It is argued further by proponents of the PETS Forms that the
signing of the forms by ministers as a requirement expands the scope of accountability
to the political level – holding politicians accountable instead of administrators also
reduces system corruption.
431 Interview with Joseph Kaiwa, op.cit.,
432 Ibid.,
433 Ibid.,
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Regardless of the effectiveness of the tools, their introduction does not go
without drawbacks. Senior officials in the MOF, in particular within the AGD, opined
that the PETS Form 2 is a duplication of the CCF and have gone ahead to call for the
elimination of the CCF. Further, it appears from common sense that accessing funds
for programme implementation is cumbersome and time consuming. The initiation,
preparation and the signing of the forms by the respective authorities within an entity
alone, could take more than a week, while the approval process within AGD is also
multi-layered and can go for as long as for weeks. In short, implementing agencies
have to complete three forms in total (all of which have to be approved by more than
one senior official within an MDA at different intervals) submit them to more than one
division in the ministry of finance (Budget Bureau and AGD) and obtain approval
before implementation could take place.
Moreover, the role of politicians in the preparation of PETS neither guarantees
accountability nor enforces transparency. William Reno, an extensive writer on Sierra
Leone raises similar concerns: “Official corruption lay at the heart of the collapse of
state authority and legitimacy in the decades prior to the 1991 start of the war, and
corruption remains extensive today. It regularly features in citizens’ characterization of
their government, despite the advent of civilian rule and regular elections. Sierra Leone
government officials recognize the seriousness of this situation. The minister of
finance, for example, announced that about 70 percent of customs revenue disappears
into the pockets of customs officers”.434
In addition, a general complaint by officials in the Budget Bureau speaks to the
ill practice of late submission of PETS Form1 by the MDAs. The forms are mostly
submitted when they have gone more than half way through the tender process and
would normally want to access funds to meet contractual commitments. “We have
434 W. Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, op.cit., p10
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preached against late submission of PETS Forms as the wrong sequence but only few
have heeded our advice”.435 As Chris Mahony of Campaign for Good Governance (a
local NGO for civil advocacy) puts it “Controls are also being introduced in the
Ministry of Finance, especially in the budgeting process. Nevertheless, these controls
are being flouted already by various ministries in the face of both anti corruption
agencies and public sector reform mechanisms”. 436 While reasons for the weak control
environment are explained in part two of the research, it is worth mentioning in
passing that the prevailing situation is in a large measure due to the reluctance of the
judiciary to institute action against defaulters.
7.10 BUDGET EVALUATION - PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TRACKING
SURVEY (PETS)
This section focuses on the evaluation of public expenditure and the process
involved measuring budgetary outcomes through Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
(PETS). PETS is an annual post-expenditure evaluation exercise to measure the impact
of the budget. Within the spirit of transparency, accountability and participation, the
MOF in collaboration with stakeholders conduct post expenditure survey to measure
the impact of programme across the nation. In this sub section an in depth analysis of
the government’s post expenditure evaluation exercise is carried out to measure the
effectiveness of the evaluation tool and the changing trend in transparent budgeting.
435 Interview with Joseph Kaiwa, op.cit.,
436 C. Mahoney, “Addressing Corruption in Post Conflict Sierra Leone”, www.anticorruption.sl May
2006
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7.10.1 PETS -Field Exercise
Added to the financial control measures reflected in the PETS Forms 1 and 2,
the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) carried out in the field is meant to
track the flow of resources through various layers of government (central, regional,
district, chiefdom and village levels). The exercise determines how much of the
originally allocated and disbursed resources reach each layer and how long resources
take to get there. The survey therefore assesses leakages of public funds and hence the
efficiency of pro-poor public spending. The tracking of the flow of resources would
have more impact particularly if it is strongly linked to the assessment of service
delivery. Therefore, PETS in Sierra Leone also assesses the communities’ perceptions
of the quality of service delivery.437
7.10.2 Rationale
The Government of Sierra Leone introduced field evaluation of budgetary
outcomes in 2001 in collaboration with and on the insistence of donor partners,
including the World Bank and the United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DfID). The activity is mainly a donor driven initiative. The evaluation
has mainly targeted frontline service delivery, for example, health and education, and
poverty related sectors such as evaluating country-wide seed rice distributed to
community farmers under the Ministry of Agriculture.
Since its introduction in 2001, three rounds of PETS have been conducted.438
Two separate surveys were carried out in 2001 covering public expenditure for the first
and second halves of the year in eight sectors. Prior to the commencement of the third
437 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) Report, Ministry of Finance, 2003 p5
438 Ibid., p7
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PETS covering public expenditures for the year 2002, the Government in collaboration
with UK DFID, and the World Bank carried out a review of the PETS process in
March 2003.439 The review examined the scope, methodology, coverage, institutional
arrangements for the survey, as well as the link between the survey and other
Government resources management initiatives. The review culminated in the
development of a Resource Flow Model, which facilitates the calculation of leakages
of public resources and time delays in the delivery of services. The model was piloted
in a selected poverty-related expenditure in the education sector. The lessons learnt
were used to improve the effectiveness of the model, as well as in subsequent surveys.
440
The third survey, covering financial year 2002 poverty related expenditures in
the health and education sectors, was undertaken in October 2003 and the findings
published in May 2004. The survey traced the flow of school fees subsidy and teaching
and learning materials in the education sector and the distribution of essential drugs in
the health sector. PETS are now a key instrument for monitoring of the Sierra Leone
Poverty Reduction Strategy (SL-PRS), especially in terms of its capacity to probe
accountability, transparency and efficiency of public expenditures.441
7.10.3 How PETS are conducted
The process involves asking community members specific questions on service
delivery within their localities. This information is sought through score cards that are
publicly disseminated to demand accountability and lobby for change. PETS are also
439 Ibid., p17
440 Ibid., p15
441 Ibid., p24
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conducted in a participatory manner involving civil society groups and the Parliament
as participants as well as supervisors. 442
University students are mainly temporarily recruited by the MOF to carry out
the exercise. For example, a total of three hundred and thirty five (335) students took
part in the 2003 PETS as enumerators, while senior officers from the MOF, Ministry
of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP), Statistics Sierra Leone, Bank of
Sierra Leone (BSL), Lecturers/Research Assistants from the University of Sierra
Leone, and staff of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) formed the supervisory
team.443 A ten days intensive training exercise was organised by the PETS Task Team
in the finance ministry for supervisors and enumerators on the Resource Flow Model,
survey methodology and interviewing techniques prior to the commencement of the
field work.
The next sub-section presents a case study on the 2003 PETS on the education sector.
The rationale of the case study is to measure the effectiveness of PETS as a post-
expenditure evaluation tool.
7.10.4 Case study – Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST)
MEST - mission statement: “To provide sound policy guidelines and
programmes for the effective delivery of educational services, development and
promotion of basic occupational skills for the alleviation of illiteracy and poverty”.
442 Ibid., p17
443 Ibid., p19
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Table 6: Sectoral Plan for Education
NO OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS
ACTIVITIES
1 To provide access
to basic education
for all by making
it free and
compulsory with
special emphasis
on the girl child
1. No of children
enrolled increased
from 65% to 70%
in primary school
and 13% to 17% in
JSS
4 School enrolment
ratio of girls:boys
increased from 2:6
to 4:6
1.1 Pay school fee subsidies for pupils
in primary and junior and senior
secondary schools
1.2 Pay public examination fees for all
pupils to WAEC
1.3 Embark on enrolment drives and
campaigns to mobilize communities to
enrol their children and wards
1.5. Promote children’s clubs at basic
education level to promote child
development
4.1 consolidate support to the girl
child in the Northern and Eastern
regions and extend support to the
South and Western regions
(support includes School fees, 2 sets
of uniforms, procure text for core
subjects, supply games tunic and
assorted learning materials.)
NO OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE
INDICATOR
ACTIVITIES
2 To improve the
quality of
education
1. pass rate for
NPSE increased
from 48,077 to
54,700
2.Pupil teacher
ratio reduced from
52:1 to 40:1
1.1 Procure teaching and learning
materials for 4000 schools.
1.2 Distribution of teaching and
learning materials
1.3 Procure core text books at a ratio
of 1:4 ratio for 1:2 pupils.
1.4 Provide supplementary reading
materials for pupils.
2.1 Promote and implement distant
learning for untrained and unqualified
teachers.
2.2 conduct refresher courses for
teachers.
2.3 Institute performance based
reward scheme for teachers every
year.
Source: MOF, 2004
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7.10.5 Objectives of PETS on Education
The main objectives of the PETS on education are to:
i. track the flow of the distribution of school furniture from Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology (MEST) to beneficiary primary schools;
ii. provide quantitative evidence of transfer discrepancies in the distribution of
school furniture from one level to the other in the flow channel;
iii. provide quantitative evidence of delays in the procurement and distribution of
school furniture; and
iv. assess the perception of communities on the quality of service delivery of the
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology.444
7.10.6 Distribution of primary school furniture in 2003
In the 2003 financial year a number of contracts were awarded by the ministry
of education through the Local Purchase Orders (LPOs) for the supply of school
furniture to primary schools in the country. Most of the suppliers were resident in the
capital, Freetown and a few of them lived in the regional headquarter towns. The
contractors in Freetown delivered the furniture to the MEST headquarters, while those
in the regions delivered the furniture to the respective Regional Deputy Directors of
Education to be transferred to primary schools. The Accountant-General’s Department
(AGD) store officials verified both quality and quantity supplied. 445
The distribution of the school furniture was done through two channels: the
MEST directly distributed the furniture to schools in the Western Area (within the
capital, Freetown and its surrounding) while those in the provinces were delivered to
the Regional Deputy Directors of Education for onward distribution to primary
schools. The distribution channel is illustrated in figure four below.
444 PETS Report, op.cit., p21
445 Ibid.,p21
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Figure 4: Mode of Distribution of School Furniture in the Education Sector
Source: MOF, 2004
7.10.7 Transfer of furniture to Western Area schools
The PETS covered a total of 131 schools that benefited from the supply of
school furniture in 2003. Information provided by MEST indicated schools within the
Freetown environs benefited from 2,071 sets of furniture valued at Le 165.7 million
that were distributed directly to 67 primary schools - 62 in the Western Area, 1 in the
Eastern Region and 4 in the Southern Region.446
From among the 67 schools supplied 34 acknowledged receipt of the exact
number of furniture items reported to have been transferred by the MEST headquarters
- valued at Le 89.2 million. 24 primary schools reported not to have received any
446 Ibid.,p22
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supply from the MEST. This gives a transfer discrepancy value of Le 52.5 million. In
addition, six schools acknowledged receipt of more school furniture than was
reportedly transferred by MEST. The total receipt of the six schools was estimated at
Le 28.0 million, resulting into a negative transfer discrepancy estimated at Le 17.6
million. Moreover, three schools acknowledged receipt of less school furniture than
supposedly transferred by MEST. The estimated receipt amounted to Le 6.0 million,
giving a positive transfer discrepancy valued at Le 12.0 million. The results are
illustrated in Table seven below.
Table 7: Summary of the transfer of furniture by MEST and receipt by schools
Receipt Category
No. of
schools Value of Transfer
Value of
Receipt
Transfer
Discrepancy
Receipt = Zero 24 52,480,000 0 52,480,000
Receipt = Transfers 34 89,200,000 89,200,000 0
Receipt < Transfers 3 18,000,000 6,000,000 12,000,000
Receipt >Transfers 6 10,400,000 28,000,000 -17,600,000
Total 67 170,080,000 123,200,000 46,880,000
Source: Adapted from Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) Report, FY 2003
7.10.8 Reasons for discrepancies
MEST officials and Head teachers of schools put forward the following explanations:
a) Inability on the part of the Head teachers to distinguish between the financial
year and the academic year: the financial year runs from January to December,
while the school year runs from September to July;
b) Poor records management at all levels of the distribution chain;
c) Failure on the part of transferred Head Teachers to hand over updated school
records to succeeding Head Teachers; and
d) Most schools affected operate a two shift school system, (A.M and P.M); as a
result, the furniture supplies were not distinguished accordingly.447
447 Ibid.,p22
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7.10.9 PETS Results of furniture transfers from Deputy Regional Directors to
schools
A total of 1,826 sets of school furniture valued at Le 146.1 million were
reported transferred by the Deputy Directors of Education to primary schools in the
various regions. However there was an unexplained residual of 447 sets of school
furniture valued at Le 35.8 million448. Primary schools acknowledged receiving 1,087
sets of furniture valued at Le 86.9 million from the Deputy Directors of Education. 449
Out of the 64 primary schools to which school furniture were reportedly
transferred by the Regional Deputy Directors of Education, 36 reported not to have
received any furniture. This resulted in a transfer discrepancy valued at Le 76.8
million. 20 primary schools acknowledged receipt of the quantity reportedly
transferred to them. Only 3 schools acknowledged receiving less furniture than was
transferred. This gave a positive transfer discrepancy estimated at Le 1.5 million. On
the contrary, 5 primary schools reported receiving more school furniture than was
officially transferred. The estimated receipt of these schools was Le 30.0 million,
resulting in to a negative transfer discrepancy valued at Le 19.2 million.450 The
transfers and receipt are summarised in Table eight below.
Table 8: Summary of transfer of furniture by DDs and receipt by schools
Receipt Category No. of schools
Value of
Transfer
Value of
Receipt
Transfer
Discrepancy
Receipt = Zero 36 76,800,000 0 76,800,000
Receipt = Transfers 20 53,200,000 53,200,000 0
Receipt < Transfers 3 5,280,000 3,760,000 1,520,000
Receipt > Transfers 5 10,800,000 30,000,000 -19,200,000
Total 64 146,080,000 86,960,000 59,120,000
Source: MOF, 2005
448 Unexplained Residual: This is the difference of the total receipt of school furniture by the DDs and
the amount of these furniture transferred by DDs to the next level (2,273 minus 1,826 sets of furniture)
449 Ibid., p26
450 Ibid., p27
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7.10.10 Community perception of education service delivery
Within the spirit of Section 2 (b) of the organic budget law: “to ensure that all
interested parties are able to participate fully in the decisions taken on the budget
within the medium term expenditure framework”, the government has engaged not
only civil society activists in the furtherance of transparent budgeting and public sector
stewardship, but has also involved communities at the grassroots. In the 2003 PETS
exercise, for example, 320 communities were interviewed to share their perceptions on
the quality of education services delivered during that financial year. 30 of these
communities are located in the urban areas and 290 in the rural areas. About 87.2
percent of the communities interviewed rated education service delivery as good or
better in 2003 than previously.451 In almost all the communities interviewed, about
95.3 percent reported that the school within their communities faced lots of problems.
Some of the challenges facing communities included lack of trained and qualified
teachers in the schools, low teacher wage and inadequate teaching and learning
materials. The interactive process also involved the use of score cards.452 The survey
outcome is provided in Table nine below.
Table 9
Source: PETS FY2005
451 PETS Report, 2005 p4
452 Ibid., p8
Community Perception of the Quality of Education Service Delivery
No. of
Communities Percent
Very Good 59 18.4
Good 220 68.8
Bad 41 12.8
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Table 10: Score Card for Education Sector
Level Definition
Scores (in percent)
2001 2002 2003
Overall Integrity Index for
the distribution primary
school furniture
Value of School furniture received by schools as a
proportion of the total value reported transferred by
MEST (Headquarters and Regional Deputy
Directors) including excess receipts
- - 59.8
Quality of Education Service
Delivery
The sample of the community respondents perceiving
education service delivery to be good or better 69.0 76.1 87.2
Source: Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), FY 2003
7.10.11 Summary
Whilst the PETS exercise uncovered numerous discrepancies in the expenditure
stream of public financial management, several questions may be asked: given the
level of poor accountability in only a selected case of school furniture supply, what
would the results have looked like if the exercise were to cover the whole of
government? Another angle of looking at it is to examine the procurement reform
system. However, the results portray a huge loss of resource in the expenditure stream,
especially on contracts. According to records of the National Public Procurement
Authority (NPPA), the body created by government to manage and regulate
government procurement- MEST have recently awarded the highest number of
contracts – 20 percent of the total government contracts in 2002. This is illustrated in
Figure 5 below.
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7.11 CONCLUSION
This chapter has unravelled some of the positive steps being taken by the
Kabbah administration to improve transparency and accountability in the management
of public resources – an inspiring departure from previous governments. In the quest of
moving the country towards transparent and accountable budgeting, some of notable
significant decisions are worth celebrating, these include, the promulgation and at least
partial implementation of a number of enabling legal frameworks to guide the reforms,
for example, the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005), the Audit
Service Act (1998), and the Public Procurement Act (2004). These legal provisions
have made consideration contributions toward enhancing the reform environment, in
particular, the budget bureau now manages the release and management of funds
across government, the district budget committees engage decision makers and hold
public officials accountable, performance budgeting has been introduced to enable
medium term planning and execution, and notable, the civil society and the media are
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being involved in budget development at policy hearings and along with the
Parliament, they track public expenditures at the end of each financial year to ascertain
government performance.
These achievements amidst several others suggest that there is some positive
change in the development thinking and leadership approach to national
transformation. Also, that whilst challenges remain in ensuring that crucial policy
initiatives are effectively implemented as in the case of interactive cabinet engagement
in the budgetary process, and strengthening of the control environment and that of
institutional leadership, there is a marked indication of change in the internal dynamics
of the country management.
However, a notable variable that must not be lost in any attempt of appraising
the change process is, the dominant role played by the development partners, who to a
large extent seem to be driving the reforms of President Tejan Kabbah as they provide
both budgetary support and policy direction. This calls into question the preparedness
and the potency of leadership in leading the aspirations of the nation. As would be
observed in the next chapter, the procurement reform was more of an externally driven
initiative than a home-grown strategy aimed at improving public procurement.
In the next chapter, we will examine the evolution of the public procurement
function of Government as it has also been overhauled in the course of the reform. The
significance of public procurement in the budget process is that a huge chunk of
resources are expended through procurement of goods and services.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CHAPTER EIGHT: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORM
8.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Chapter XIV, Sections 411 – 418 of the Financial Orders of 1963 (which
replaced the 1954 Edition) established various tender boards throughout Sierra Leone
to undertake the procurement of goods, services and works. The Financial Orders
stipulated the composition, procedure and powers of each tender board – Central
Tender Board (CTB) – in the ministry of finance, Provincial Tender Board, Freetown
Tender Board, Departmental Tender Board and the Military Tender Board. The Public
Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1992 and the Amendment Act of 1996, scantily
dealt with the acquisition, payment and responsibility for Government stores in Part
IV, Sections 43 – 50. In addition, the Financial Orders of 1963 were not revised until
June 2006 through the collaborative support of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the
World Bank country capacity building project for Sierra Leone.453
Before the reform there existed no comprehensive procurement policy and no
proper procurement planning was carried out across Government spending agencies. In
the absence of a comprehensive procurement law or updated rules and regulations, the
Government had from time to time produced guidelines taking into consideration
particularly donor procurement practices, to guide public procurement at the Central
Tender Board (CTB) and in ministries. 454
Over the past decades, tender boards have been poorly organized and managed,
and ill-equipped in terms of trained and experienced procurement personnel and
material resources. Board and technical committee members were frequently part-
453 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Management Report on Sierra Leone, Commonwealth
Secretariat, June 2006 p13
454 F. J. Elliott, Procurement Reform in Sierra Leone: A Public Choice Mode3l of Analysis, National
Public Procurement Authority, October, 2005 p6
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timers brought from various line ministries, departments and agencies.455 Procurement
was never considered a required professional career and therefore affects public sector
performance and budgetary outcomes. Continuity in participation is often hampered by
the absence of board and technical committee members, who would be busy
performing their regular duties. This led to excessive delays in accomplishing tasks.456
Owing to the lack of human resources, there was a laid down mechanism
through which compliance was enforced or complaints addressed by the CTB, line
ministries or departments. Complaints were frequently made to the CTB, which
ironically had evaluated and awarded contracts with which suppliers were
dissatisfied.457 Thus oversight and monitoring machinery were virtually absent, and
many contractors who failed to meet their obligations had gone undetected with huge
sums of money. As a result of these deficiencies in the management of the
procurement system, with widespread malpractices and corruption costing the
Government huge sums of money, the Government decided to reform the system.458
8.2 INTRODUCING PROCUREMENT REFORM
In the face of an obsolete and inadequate legal framework, and with the
Government procurement volume averaging over an annual US$ 250 million, senior
advisors of the Government as early as 1996 showed interest in the operations of the
CTB and expressed a strong desire to bring about a reform in the public procurement
procedures and policies in line with modern-day best policies and practices.459 It was
observed that the change would secure value for money, reduce expenditure and
455 Ibid, p7
456 Ibid.,
457 Ibid., p9
458 Ibid., p10
459 Ibid., p11
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combat corruption.460 It was also realized that good procurement practice was an
essential aspect of sound fiscal management and a basis for donor confidence.461
In addition, the policy advisors noted that since the Government budget was
(and still is) highly dependant on external aid flows, implementing appropriate
procurement reform measures may save the Government an estimated $25 to 40
million per annum.462 In short, it became clear to Government that public procurement
constitutes a substantial portion of public expenditure and therefore a critical function
of its performance.463 These findings clearly manifest that the Government would have
never uncovered the leakages on its own without the intervention of external experts. It
must be mentioned also, that whilst Government advisors were grappling with the idea
of reform, the donor community was equally busy drawing the attention of the
Government to the much needed change. The World Bank, for example, had
demonstrated its commitment by providing an initial amount of $1.5 million towards a
procurement reform through the Transport Sector Project.464
Cognisant of the inadequacies outlined above and given the existing reform
environment, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah encouraged a quick start of the actual
procurement reform to include the modernisation of the legal and institutional
framework. These included building human capacity and institutions, and improving
the procurement processes. In this regard, the President requested the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) for technical intervention to improve procurement
management.465 As a follow up to the President’s request, the UNDP enlisted the Inter-
Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) to assess, evaluate and describe the
460 Ibid, p12
461 Ibid.,
462 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report, Support to Public Procurement Reform of
the Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2002 p13
463 Ibid.,p13
464 Ibid., p14
465 F.J. Elliott, op.cit., p2
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current procurement function of Sierra Leone and to provide recommendations for the
way forward. An exploratory mission was conducted in April 2002, and the first
mission of technical assistance for procurement reform was also conducted by
UNDP/IAPSO in December 2002. As a result of the key findings set out below, and
following a Cabinet Conclusion of 26th March 2003, the Honourable Vice President of
Sierra Leone, Solomon Berewa, whose office was charged with responsibility of
driving procurement reform, issued instructions that halted all procurement activities
by the CTB and line ministries, as an interim measure while awaiting procurement
reforms. A Steering Committee headed by the Vice President himself replaced the
CTB, and was responsible for interim public procurement directives. On the 22 April
2003, the Vice President issued the following Directives:466
1. “All Departments/ministries are to cease forthwith from awarding procurement
contracts either by themselves or through the Central Tender Board [Directive,
4(a)].
2. A list of all procurement contracts awarded but still to be performed wholly or
in part should be submitted to me without delay for the attention of the Steering
Committee…” [Directive, 4(b)].
8.2.1 Key Findings of the mission
The assessment mission made some revealing discoveries. One of the findings
was that procurement constitutes a substantial portion of government expenditure and
that Sierra Leone imports around $ 200 million worth of goods per annum. That goods
and services expenditure accounted for almost 40 percent of total recurrent expenditure
in 2002 (9.6 percent of GDP), and the total recurrent and development expenditure
minus wages and salaries were projected at Le 672,046 billion in 2003, equivalent to
approximately US$336 million (31.1 percent of GDP).467
466 K. V. Thai, Advisory Services on spend Analysis of Sierra Leone Government’s Procurement: Inter-
Agency Procurement Services Organisation,(IAPSO) Report, 2003, p7
467 UNDP Report, op.cit., p8
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Moreover, it came out strongly that the Government budget is highly dependent
on external aid flows: that external grants account for 53 percent of total Government
revenue as per 2003 budget forecast; the total aid recipient figure is even higher
(loans). The World Bank for example, estimated the total financing requirement for
Sierra Leone in 2003 to be $ 336.5 million.468 “Procurement is a critical function of
government performance”, concluded the report, “with wages and salaries only
accounting for 20 percent of total Government expenditure and working under the
conservative assumption that 80 percent of remaining expenditure is procurement
related we arrive at an annual procurement figure well beyond $ 250 million. If only
15 percent of $ 250 million gets wasted due to inefficiencies, bad planning,
malpractice and outright corruption, implementing appropriate procurement reform
measures may save the Government of Sierra Leone an amount in the measure of $ 30
to 40 million per annum (equalling HIPC debt relief).”469
8.3 SETTING THE REFORM STAGE (KEY OBJECTIVES)
As a follow up to the submission of the assessment report, the Government set
out to achieve a broad range of objectives on transparency and accountability. The
Government was determined to ensure value for money in the procurement of goods,
services and works prevailed; and that the Government shall procure goods, services
and works of the right quality, at the right price, at the right time and at the right place
through an open competitive bidding process. The leadership was cognisant of being a
steward entrusted with public funds to provide services and it decided that the use of
468 Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone, The World Bank, Ministry of
Finance, 2002 p6
469 UNDP Report, op.cit., p10
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public money shall be conducted in a transparent and open manner, allowing
stakeholders and the general public to access information on procurement.470
The Government was also determined that all public officials and practitioners
of procurement shall be held accountable for their actions, and that all suppliers,
contractors and consultants shall be treated fairly and be given equal opportunity to
obtain contracts.471 Thus to ensure that procurement is done in the most efficient
manner as well as upholding the principles of value for money, transparency and
fairness, the Government came up with the following key objectives as reflected in the
Figure six below.472
 Transparency and accountability;
 Efficiency;
 Value for money;
 Ethical conduct;
 Develop national businesses; and
 Achieve National Development objectives.
Figure 6: Actionable areas to achieve value for money
Source: Adapted from the UNDP Report, 2000
470 Ibid., p12
471 Ibid., p13
472 Ibid., p17
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8.3.1 Stakeholder participation
The Government adopted a broad range consultative approach by engaging various
stakeholder institutions to chart the path of procurement reform. The following
institutions took part in all deliberations, consultative meetings and workshops:473
 Highest political decision making institution
 Procuring Entities
 Central Tender Board
 Bilateral Donors
 UNDP, World Bank
 Chamber of Commerce/Private Sector
 Watch dogs of the system/civil society/media
 Anti-Corruption Commission
 Ombudsman
 Solicitor General
 Public internal and external audit institutions
In December 2003, following several stakeholder workshops and consultations, the
stakeholders came out with a number of recommendations (See Appendix C) and a
qualitative procurement analysis that would guarantee a rich, transparent and
accountable procurement system, as illustrated in Figure seven below. It could be
observed that the involvement of stakeholders marks a fruition of citizen–government
relationship in financial management matters. It also in large measure reflects the
observation of the principle of participation in contemporary governance arrangements.
473 Ibid., p16
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Figure 7: Integrated Approach to Procurement Reform
Source: Adapted from UNDP/IAPSO Report, 2003
8.3.2 Strategy for the way forward
In order to achieve outlined objectives and qualitative framework, the Government of
Sierra Leone adopted four key strategies on the recommendation of technical experts
and stakeholders as a way forward to a successful public procurement reform:
 Developing a legal and regulatory framework;
 The institutional set-up (creating a regulatory agency);
 Building capacity; and
 Improving the procurement process.474
The above strategies are discussed in details below.
474 Ibid., p17
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8.4 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The legal and regulatory framework for procurement needed an overhaul as the
existing legal frameworks were incomprehensive and obsolete (being in vogue since
1963). Also, a uniform and codified procurement procedures and regulations were
virtually non-existent. While procurement procedures and regulations abound in
various circulars, a practical body of knowledge and guidance was also missing and it
led to lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities among key players, contradictory
practices and misinterpretations of contract administration.475 Thus Government
promulgated a new comprehensive law, the Public Procurement Act in December
2004.
The new Act is based on the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law and is a comprehensive legal framework
designed to eliminate the shortcomings and organisational weaknesses inherent in the
procurement system.476 Furthermore, it provides a direct response to the overall
governance reform programme taking place in the country. The Act specifically
applies to the procurement of goods, works, and services by Ministries, Departments
and Agencies (MDAs) through an open competitive bidding process, including any
procurement financed in whole or in part from public funds. The overall objective of
the new public procurement system is to provide value for money by ensuring that
public funds are spent in a transparent, efficient and fair manner. In addition, the
implementation of the new Act is supported by a regulatory instrument (Public
Procurement Regulations, 2006) and will together form the basis for the entire
reform.477
475 The History of Public Procurement, National Public Procurement Authority (NPPA) Report, 2004
p3
476 Ibid., p3
477 Ibid., p5-6
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8.4.1 Provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2004
The Act provided for a comprehensive management structure for public
procurement. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act created a National Public Procurement
Authority (NPPA), as a body corporate that is responsible for regulating public
procurement. It also established a Board of the NPPA headed by a chairman including
a representative of the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General and other five persons
who are conversant with procurement matters, to be appointed by the Minister of
Finance. The Board is charged with the responsibility of controlling, supervising as
well as providing policy direction for the procurement secretariat or authority. The
Secretariat which is headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the secretary
and member of the Board.478
Section 18 (1) of the Procurement Act provides for the creation of Procurement
Committees in every procurement entity – ministries, departments and agencies. The
Committee will be appointed by the head of an entity and is responsible for all
procurement matters of the entity. Section 19 (1) also created Procurement Units in
every procuring entity and is responsible for the management of procurement functions
of the entity, such as the preparation of invitation to bid documents.
Furthermore, in order to institute the much required transparency and fairness
in public procurement, Section 20 (1) created an arbitration body known as the
Independent Procurement Review Panel (IPRP). The body is responsible for
conducting independent administrative review of complaints and challenges to award
decisions. The IPRP consists of three persons appointed by the Minister of Finance
from among eminent Sierra Leoneans with a procurement background. The members
hold office for three years.
478 F.J. Elliott, op.cit. p18
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8.5 INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP (CREATING A REGULATORY AGENCY)
As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, the procurement function was
totally over-centralized in the past. There was no clear procurement organizational
structure. The Central Tender Board was overloaded and inefficient. Every tender
above USD 5000, - passes the CTB. This meant that the Central Tender Board was
doing the work for most of the procurement entities instead of providing advice and
facilitating the process.479 The CTB was understaffed and overloaded with work. In
addition, participating in the Board activities was a part-time job. The division of
labour was confusing and procurement entities didn’t take ownership of their
functions. There was neither a common procurement platform nor vendor management
to measure performance, and there was virtually no control and monitoring mechanism
in place.480
Responding to these institutional weaknesses, the Government of Sierra Leone
in February 2005 established the National Public Procurement Authority (NPPA). The
NPPA is the main regulatory and monitoring body for public procurement in Sierra
Leone and it advises the Government on matters of contracts and procurement policies
(Section 14 (1)). The body ensures that a level playing field prevails and it facilitates
the participation of all stakeholders in public procurement. Thus its creation is a
significant step in the implementation of the new Public Procurement Act of 2004.
Section 14 (2) of the Act, sets out the remits of the Authority:
(a) to formulate policies and standards on public procurement and to ensure
compliance therewith by all parties to procurement contracts;
(b) to assess the operations of the public procurement processes and submit
proposals the improvement of the processes, including the introduction of
information and communications technology, and the development of
modalities for appropriate collaboration among procuring entities;
479 Ibid., p18
480 Ibid., p25
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(c) to ensure capacity building and human resource development for public
procurement, including development, promoting and supporting training and
professional development of persons engaged in public procurement;
(d) to develop and recommend to heads of procuring entities a career development
and management programme, and a system for selection, appointment and
termination of appointment of procurement officers;
(e) to disseminate information about, and promote awareness of the public
procurement system;
(f) to issue standard forms of contract and standard bidding documents for
mandatory use by all procuring entities;
(g) to provide interpretation of this Act and other instruments governing the
procurement process;
(h) to plan and coordinate technical assistance in the field of public procurement;
(i) to publish a quarterly Public Procurement Bulletin which shall contain
information on public procurement, including approved procurement plans,
proposed procurement notices, and notices of invitation to bid and contract
award information;
(j) to publish in the Public Procurement Bulletin or in the Gazette or newspaper
with wide national circulation or the electronic media, a database of suppliers,
contractors and consultants, and records of prices to assist in the work of
procuring entities;
(k) on its own or based on reports by procuring entities or the Independent
Procurement Review Panel, investigate and suspend from procurement
proceedings under this act, suppliers, contractors and consultants who have
neglected their obligations under a procurement contract, or provided false
information about their qualifications, contravened tax regulations, or offered
inducements referred to in this Act;
(l) to maintain and issue on a regular basis to all procuring entities a list of
suspended suppliers, contractors and consultants;
(m) to prepare an annual report on the overall functioning of the public
procurement system, including a profile of procurement activities, to be
presented to Cabinet and tabled before Parliament through the Minister;
(n) to share information and cooperate with other arms of Government to facilitate
the implementation of Government policies aimed at improved governance;
(o) to conduct, at least annually, a procurement forum bringing together public
sector, private sector, civil society and development partners to address issues
related to public procurement;
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(p) to perform such other functions as are incidental or conducive to the attainment
of the object stated in subsection (1).
In addition to the NPPA, other structures created under the Procurement Act as already
mentioned, include Procurement Committees, Procurement Units, Technical
Evaluation Committees and the Independent Procurement Review Panel (IPRP).
8.5.1 Building capacity to enhance procurement functions
Before the passing of the Procurement Act, procurement functions were
predominantly clerical in nature. Knowledge of international rules and regulations
existed in flux as there was no cohesive or focused professional approach to the
discipline. A discrete and acknowledged career track for procurement professionals did
not exist and there was no recognized community of procurement practitioners.481 In
response to the general lack of procurement capacity within the CTB and the procuring
entities, (operational, tactical and strategic), the Government not only provided for
capacity building needs in the law, Section 17 (1), but went as far as to engage
development partners in pursuit of meeting the critical need.
The NPPA has carried out a series of training events intended to address the
skills gap.482 Several development partners including the World Bank and the
Commonwealth Secretariat have made immense contributions in building the
institutional capacity of the NPPA. For example, the Commonwealth Secretariat under
its Public Expenditure Management (PEM) Programme has intensely engaged with the
NPPA in the delivery of a number of skills based training for officials involved in
481 The History of Public Procurement, op.cit., p6
482 Mission Report of Joint Team on Capacity Building in Public Procurement in Sierra Leone, NPPA,
Freetown, 2006 p2
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procurement.483 The PEM Programme is currently considering an NPPA request for
the publication of an abridged version of the Procurement Regulations. The project is
meant to reach out to stakeholders including busy senior government officials who
hardly find time to read the full text of the regulations.484 The NPPA is also a member
of the Commonwealth Public Procurement Network (CPPN) – a forum of procurement
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in Commonwealth West Africa. The forum creates
an experience sharing platform for procurement practitioners as well as a valuable
learning network for member countries.485
8.6 IMPROVING THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Prior to procurement reform, there was no procurement policy within
government as well as no proper procurement planning. Proper coordination and
communication between the ministries was lacking and Government extensively used
the single source method for selection of consultants and shopping procedures for
goods.486 Often the same firms were used. The procedures for bid openings, criteria for
bid evaluation and contract award were unclear and the practice of post contract
negotiations was rampant across MDAs. 487
Following the reforms, the NPPA has developed, revised and applied price
norms in the procurement market, implemented institutional structure staff needs. The
body has developed the Independent Public Review (IPR) manual and procedures.488
483 The Commonwealth PEM Programme has delivered 4 in-country training projects and it is currently
assisting the NPPA to publish an abridged version of the Procurement Regulations, as well as placing a
technical expert to map out procurement framework for monitoring and evaluation.
484 Request for Technical Assistance, NPPA, 2007,
485 Commonwealth Public Procurement Report, Commonwealth Secretariat, May 2005
486 History of Public Procurement, op.cit., p4
487 Ibid., p8
488 Annual Report of the National Public Procurement Authority – (NPPA) 2005 p6
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8.6.1 A success story
The procurement reform of Sierra Leone has yielded some success. Nearly
forty years or more (1963) since the law came into being, no action was taken along
the lines of improving the procurement system until 2002. Therefore the move to
reform the process is by it self a positive sign. In its country Public Expenditure
Review Report of June 2004, the World Bank opined “Government is to be
commended for its commitment to reform” and went further to urge government to
continue with the reforms.489
The passing of the procurement law in December 2004 and the creation of the
NPPA including the procurement units and committees across MDAs, also recounts
success. In its 2005, report for example, the NPPA Secretariat recorded progress that
has been made within the short period of its creation. For example, the Secretariat
conducted a regional Price Survey of common user items to guide pricing systems
within the procurement market. The survey was conducted in the capital Freetown and
other provincial headquarter towns of Bo, Kenema and Makeni in collaboration with
Statistics Sierra Leone, in late 2005. “The NPPA Price Norm” as the survey results is
known, has been widely distributed to all procuring entities as a guide in the
preparation of annual procurement plans.490
The establishment of the Independent Procurement Review Panel (IPRP), the
body that handles all complaints and adjudicates on such matters, is also part of the
success story. However, the IPRP is yet to deliver impact on the procurement
process.491 Another instance of success is the fact that MDAs are now responsible for
their individual procurement with a structured oversight coming from the NPPA. In
489 Sierra Leone Public Expenditure Review, World Bank Report No. 29075-SL, p vi
490 NPPA Annual Report, op.cit., p20
491 Interview with Farrel J. Elliott, Executive Assistant, NPPA (see full interview report in Appendix D)
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sum, the reform process championed by the structural inputs has had some positive
impact underpinned by transparency and accountability in the budgetary process.
One of the key success aspects of the reform is the launch of a website of the
NPPA: http://www.savepublicmoney.sl/. The portal has been very useful both to
suppliers, contractors and all stakeholders in the procurement process. The Website has
broken the traditional barrier of information access to information on tender, and has
brought people closer to the way government conducts its business. For example,
potential suppliers can now access information on contracts, notice of tender and
news.492
8.7 CHALLENGES FACING PROCUREMENT REFORM
Regardless of the success scored so far, a number of challenges becloud the
procurement blue sky. One of the key challenges facing the reform process is the lack
of commitment on the part of Government to continue adequately to resource the
NPPA to carry out its responsibility. In its 2005 report, for example, the CEO notes:
Although the Authority is grateful for the institutional support received both
from the Government and donor agencies in the year under review, inadequate
funding severely hampered the work of the NPPA in its first year of operation.
The Authority had no budget allocation from Government in 2005 and had to
source funds from donors to support its activities. As donors are not prepared to
support such government institutions on any long-term or permanent basis, the
need for substantial budget allocation from Government next year and beyond
will be very necessary in order to enable the NPPA to function effectively.493
The lack of commitment to provide financial support for the NPPA certainly raises
legitimate concerns about the good intentions of the Government in achieving a
transparent procurement system.
492 National Public Procurement Authority http://www.savepublicmoney.sl/ September 2006
493 NPPA Annual Report , op.cit., p4
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Another area of challenge is the failure of procuring entities to adhere to the
procedures and processes set out in the law for transparency in the procurement
process. In the World Bank Public Expenditure Review, for example, the team issued a
damning statement on the poor processes: “The majority of procurement transactions
do not benefit from open, transparent and competitive procedures. This might not be
unrelated to the rather low rating by Transparency International of Sierra Leone for
perceived corruption”.494 This prevailing public sector scenario is further underscored
in an interview with Elliot Farrell, the Executive Assistant to the CEO of the NPPA.
He said: “Possibilities for information leakage and insider trading are enormous. In
fact, there is suspicion in some quarters that some public officials are linked to some
companies.”495 (See full interview in Appendix D) Closely related to the non
adherence to the new procurement rules and procedures by MDAs, is weak
procurement reporting, which according to Farrell is lacking across MDAs.
Moreover, the quest of instituting transparency and fairness in procurement was
translated in the creation of the IPRP to review procurement complaints. It turned out
however that the IPRP is beset with the teething problem of not being able to make
impact on the dynamics of public procurement. Farrell:
“In my opinion [the IPRP is] not very effective as they have yet to fully assess
complaints brought by suppliers. In fact, there has been a noted reluctance on
the part of suppliers especially to bring cases to the IPRP. Maybe, this is
because they are afraid of losing business. There was a complaint once heard
by the IPRP on the supply of rice threshers and haulers for the Ministry of
Agriculture but I am not sure of the outcome. The problem was that the
contract was cancelled by the Office of the President and there are concerns of
political interference in the process”. (See Appendix D for full interview).
494 Sierra Leone Public Expenditure Review, Report No. 29075-SL, op.cit., p 70
495 Interview with Farrell Elliot
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8.8 CONCLUSION
The reform of public procurement as part of the overall public expenditure
management system is encouraging compared to what prevailed in the pre reform
period (1961 – 1995). The passing of the law including the creation of administrative
and oversight structures are all pointers to the right direction. However, much is
required of the government in terms of a continued commitment to the reform process
as well as the enforcement of sanctions.
The question of leadership and the capacity to generate, or groom and
implement integrated development plans or change initiatives seem to be missing. This
is not to suggest that governments did and have not been doing their lot – most
especially the Kabbah administration - however, almost all policies being implemented
are advised by international development partners. As in the case of public
procurement, the reforms process was mostly championed by donors. Thus a simple
question to be asked is, how could have the ministry of finance and the cabinet failed
to observe that, Chapter XIV, Sections 411 – 418 of the Financial Orders of 1963,
which regulates procurement process through a single Central Tender Board was not
only inadequate and inefficient a body to manage procurement across government, but
was also overdue for institutional review? They failed to not only observe the inherent
weaknesses in that body and the huge amount of money being wasted each year
through the procurement system, the leadership as demonstrated in the chapter had not
incorporated the culture of institutional review for far too long. For example, the need
was not felt to review the 1963 Financial Orders on procurement until forty-one years
later (2004) on the recommendation of external advisers.
Throughout the Kabbah reform initiatives, it appears change for the good is
being prompted by development partners and not the leadership; and it might be
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possible to posit that those who are in charge only support reform on account of
remittances involved (budgetary support). This is a worrying sign particularly, as Lord
Norton pointed: what happens when donor partners leave the scene? A sensible
response to that question partly lie in the next chapter, which explores the depth and
strength of external oversight provided by the office of the auditor general, the
Parliament, the civil society and the media, and the anti-corruption commission. The
chapter examines the transformation of the audit body to audit the books of
government, the robust engagement of the civil society and the media by the
government and the strategic transformation of the Parliament with new committees
imbued with such powers as the Supreme Court in the land.
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CHAPTER NINE
CHAPTER NINE: EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapters six and seven have unravelled reforms that have taken place in the
budgetary process from 1996 to 2005, under the Government of President Ahmed
Tejan Kabbah. This chapter unpacks the role of oversight institutions in the budgetary
process of Sierra Leone. It assesses the effectiveness of the following oversight bodies
in the quest of improving budget transparency and accountability. In this regard, the
roles of the following oversight institutions are examined:
 Parliament
 The Audit Service (Office of the Auditor-General)
 Anti-Corruption Commission; and
 Civil society.
9.2 PARLIAMENT
Chapter three of this research report traced the root of Parliamentary
development of Sierra Leone, whilst chapter four explored the dormant role of
Parliament in the budgetary process under the different regimes. Technically, the post
democratic reforms dating from 1996 brought a host of changes including a revamp of
the Parliament. In this section, the role of the Sierra Leone Parliament in the ongoing
reform as they impact the budgetary process will be examined.
In practice Parliaments derive powers of financial oversight from the
constitution and related instruments such as organic budget laws.496 In Sierra Leone
these powers are clearly spelled out in Chapter V1 of the 1991 Constitution with a
496 Y. Suleiman, Parliamentary Oversight in Commonwealth Africa, Commonwealth Public Expenditure
Management Seminar Paper, Accra, Ghana, May 2006
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broad range of activities, including the authorisation of the national budget, the powers
to promulgate laws on fiscal responsibility and financial management, and the exercise
of oversight on public expenditure and review of the audit reports. Parliament’s fiscal
muscle is entrenched in section 110 (1) of the 1991 constitution: “No taxation shall be
imposed or altered otherwise than by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament”.
In other words, only Parliament has the authority to impose taxes or approve the
generation of national revenue. Under the same Act, Parliament can delegate the power
of taxation to institutions such as local government bodies for purposes of
administrative convenience and development purposes.
In accordance with its law making powers, Parliament has promulgated a
number of fiscal and financial laws (although with donor influence and executive
direction) with the aim of improving financial governance as well as transparency and
accountability in the public sector. On 26 September 2002, for example, Parliament
passed the National Revenue Act which merged the two major national revenue
generating entities: the Customs and Excise Department, and the Income Tax
Departments into the National Revenue Authority (NRA).497 The NRA was created for
the purpose of harmonizing and consolidating domestic revenue collection as a means
to limit foreign aid dependency and to inculcate the spirit of self-reliance in national
development.498 This executive-backed constitutional initiative came with the
realization that more than 60% of Sierra Leone’s annual budget is donor-driven, in
addition to a long-standing record of dysfunctional domestic revenue collection policy
and administration.499
Apart from the powers of financial legislation, Parliament also has the remit for
financial oversight. In this regard, Parliament elicits explanations from ministers
497 Ministry of Finance, MTEF Report, 2006 p3
498 Ibid., p 18
499 Ibid., p18
225
regarding gifts and donations as well as grants and pledges made by bilateral and
multilateral partners.500 This instrument of checks and balance underscores the distinct
value of public accountability as a residual component of representative democracy. In
addition, section 118 (1) - (7) of the 1991 Constitution empowers Parliament to
superintend loans and grants flowing into the consolidated fund. Furthermore, while it
is conventional for the Executive to enter into agreements, be it political, economic or
military, with other governments or bilateral partners, Parliament on the other hand,
has the power to ratify such agreements. There are arguments, however, that the
sovereignty of Parliament over loan agreements is very limited, considering the fact
that neither the Government nor Parliament has got absolute control over loan
conditionality, which invariably is dictated by international financial institutions, such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).501
9.2.1 Parliament and the Budgetary Process
Before the budget is presented to Parliament, the Budget Bureau develops the
budget document in collaboration with several key players and presents it to the
Cabinet through the Minister of Finance for approval. Following Cabinet approval of
the Budget highlights and the Summary of the final Budget Estimates by MDAs, the
draft Budget is published in the national Gazette.502 “The essence” according to
Mariama Anthony-William, “is for the public to have a glance and contribute where
necessary within the constitutional timeframe. After a period of twenty-one days,
without any comment from the public, the document becomes authentic for reading in
Parliament”.503 This is a significant breakthrough in the budget process as citizens are
500 Ibid.,p19
501 Ministry of Finance MTEF Report, op.cit., p 4
502 Budget Bureau - Briefing Paper, Ministry of Finance, 2006
503 Interview with Mariama Anthony-William
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given another opportunity to have a say before the Budget is presented to Parliament
for authorisation.
9.2.2 The Budget Speech
According to the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA)
2005, the Budget should be submitted to Parliament by the Minister of Finance not
later than two months before the beginning of the fiscal year (an improvement on the
previous Public Budgeting and Accounting Act, which stipulated one month).
However, the Budget Speech is usually delivered in Parliament on the last Friday in
November or for some other reasons, the first Friday in December.504 Asked why the
presentation of the budget contravenes the constitutional provision since the financial
year begins on the first day of January, Mariama Anthony-Williams responded: “the
delay is totally due to the lack of human resource and logistical constraints facing the
Bureau in particular, and the Ministry at large. The Budget estimates books are usually
not submitted in time, in most cases, they are submitted a month or two after the
reading of the Budget”.505
The Budget speech which is considered the First Reading of the Appropriation
Bill outlines the government’s recurrent expenditure plans and estimated revenue in
the medium term. Copious volumes of estimates organized under head and sub heads
are presented to members and committee staff.506
The Second Reading takes place two clear days after the First Reading, and
five days are allotted for the Second Reading- this takes place in a committee
(Committee of Supply) comprising the whole house chaired by the Speaker. The
504 Budget Bureau Briefing Paper, op.cit. p3
505 Interview with Mariama-Anthony-William
506 M. Jusu, “Financial Supervision Parliament Contributes to the Recovery of Sierra Leone” The
Parliamentarian, 2003/Issue Three LXXXIV p282
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Parliamentary Appropriation Sub-Committees play a key role during the Second
Reading of the Appropriation Bill and they provide vital information to the Committee
of Supply in its consideration of the draft budget. When required, ministers are
summoned by the committees to provide evidence on policy or to clarify details before
the Bill is sent for the Third and Final reading. The Appropriation Bill is then rushed
through the House at the Third and Final reading by a motion without further debate or
amendments. 507
9.2.3 Restraining executive dominance
Regardless of the Bill-rushing scenario, Parliament has made considerable
progress in restraining executive dominance in the budget process, especially at the
formulation stage. For example, 26 of the 31 committees in Parliament exercise
oversight functions over the activities of ministries, departments and agencies
(MDAs).508 In addition, Parliament passed a motion in 1997 that empowered oversight
committees to review recurrent and development estimates contained in the executive
budget. This was meant “to enhance transparency and accountability in the system, so
that members of Parliament, as representatives of people, know where the money
goes”.509 Nine Appropriation Sub-Committees were further created from among the 26
oversight committees to thoroughly scrutinise MDA estimates and expenditure at the
formulation stage of the budget.510 These committees ensure that public officials
conduct financial affairs in accordance with the Public Budget and Accounting Act
(Amendment Decree 1996, GBAA 2005).
507 Ibid.p4
508 508 P. Kulagbanda, “Parliamentary committees Parliament and congress Meet in Sierra Leone” The
Parliamentarian, 2003/Issue Three LXXXIVp285
509 Ibid., p 282
510 Ibid., p282
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At the draft stage of the budget, the Appropriation Sub-Committees send
standard questionnaires to MDAs, demanding clarification on grey areas in the
projected estimates already submitted to the Budget Bureau. Upon receipt of response
from MDAs, the committees hold pre-budget meetings with respective vote
controllers, senior ministry officials and accountants to discuss previous budget
performance including the rationale behind spending proposals.511 See full interview as
appendix E.
9.2.4 Parliament and civil society on the budgetary process
According to the Honourable Ibrahim Sesay, Chairman of the Finance
Committee, Parliament in recent years seems to have come closer to the electorate to
restrain executive dominance. 512 Parliament has adopted an all-inclusive strategy by
working hand in glove with civil society activists at the draft stage of the budget. The
relationship is made manifest during budget hearings organised by the Budget Bureau
for the purpose of including the citizens’ opinion in the final budget document.513
During the hearings, civil society representatives are privileged to engage MDAs by
raising concerns and asking pertinent questions on service delivery under various
sectors such as education and health. Their inputs and concerns are to some extent
integrated into the draft budget.514 By the same token, Parliament, especially the
Finance Committee, is reportedly maintaining closer relations with civil society
groups, such as the Network Movement for Justice and Peace for the purpose of
influencing budget formulation and to restrain executive dominance.515
511 Interview with Mohamed Jusu, Senior Clerk of Committees, Sierra Leone Parliament, June 2006
512 Interview with Honourable Ibrahim Sesay, Chairman of the Finance Committee of Parliament, June
2006
513 Ibid.,
514 Ibid.,
515 Interview with Abu Brima, Co-ordinator, Network Movement for Justice, Peace and Development,
Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 2006
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The capacity of Parliament to relate to constituents and to check the Executive
has also been enhanced through external support. For example, an MP-Constituency
outreach project sponsored by the United States National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs (NDI) targets the improvement of MP-Constituency relations on a
broad range of issues, including budgetary matters.516 This fundamental democratic
requirement was markedly absent in pre-civil conflict Sierra Leone and has had
positive impact on the role, functions and public profile of Parliament.517
9.2.5 The Committee System
The Sierra Leone Parliament is an organisational construct reflecting values
and practices of the Westminster Parliamentary democracy as well as that of the
American Congress.518 While Parliament maintains the traditional Commonwealth
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) for example, its committee system is mostly
fashioned in line with the powerful U.S Congressional Committees. Section 93 (6) of
the 1991 Constitution, for example, vests such powers and privileges in committees as
are vested in the High Courts. The powers include the summoning of witnesses and
examining them under oath; compelling the submission of documents for evidence, as
well as examining witnesses living abroad. Moreover, as part of its transparency drive,
Parliament in 1997 opened the business of committees with the exception of the
defence matters, to the general public519. These changes have leveraged and
emboldened the influence of Parliament on the conduct of public affairs, which in the
past was totally within the executive domain.
516 Interview with Honourable Ibrahim Sesay
517 Interview with Mariama Anthony-William
518 P. Kulagbanda, op.cit., p284
519Ibid., p284
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Also, and as mentioned above, Parliament has restructured its committee
system with the emphasis on financial oversight. At present, 26 out of a total of 31
committees carry out an oversight mandate, while nine Appropriation Sub-Committees
scrutinise MDA expenditure management activities. In our analysis of the role of
Parliamentary committees in providing budget oversight, we will examine the two
committees that are specifically responsible for financial oversight. These are the
Finance Committee and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
9.2.6 The Finance Committee
The Finance Committee of the Sierra Leone Parliament is responsible for direct
budget oversight, overseeing budget formulation, implementation and evaluation. The
Committee also is charged with the task of reviewing the Supplementary Estimates
brought before the Parliament by the Minister of Finance for approval.
9.2.7 Responsibilities
In an interview with the Chairman of the Finance Committee, the Honourable
Ibrahim Sesay of the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), he outlined the
responsibilities of the committee of which the core mandate is to supervise the
activities of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and all institutions operating under the
supervision of the Minister of Finance, which include the National Revenue Authority
(NRA). However, “our remit is so large that we hardly find time during the year to
oversee all the bodies because we don’t have the manpower support, financial
resources and required logistics”.520
The Finance Committee is also responsible for overseeing the budget process.
As provided for in the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA), the
520 Interview with Honourable Ibrahim Sesay
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Minister of Finance presents a budget before Parliament in the last week of October of
the preceding year to give Parliament sufficient time - a month and half (November
and part of December) to debate and pass the budget before the new financial year
kicks off on the first day of January. The Committee gets involved at the formulation
stage of the budget. It does when invited by the MOF Budget Bureau (the division in
the MOF responsible for the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of the budgetary
process), attend budget hearings along with vote controllers of ministries, departments
and government supported agencies (MDAs) to discuss and defend expenditure heads.
“The relationship that has developed between the MOF and the Committee in the past
few years has been very useful and it promotes the culture of inclusion in our society.
We have made meaningful contributions to the hearing process and we sometimes
intervene on behalf of some ministries”. 521
On the advice and recommendation of the Finance Committee, Parliament has
created nine Appropriation Sub-Committees to look at various components of
submitted budgets in greater details.522 Under the leadership and guidance of the
Finance Committee, the sub-committees look at the previous year’s budgetary
performance of MDAs, the performance of vote controllers in accordance with the
GBAA and the Public Procurement Act. In their analysis of the previous year’s
expenditure records, the Sub-Committees focus on cases of excess expenditure, under-
expenditure and virements –whether they were allowed in the first place. At the end of
such investigations, the Sub-Committees would normally prepare a report and submit
it to the Committee of Supply for consideration and action. The recommendations of
521 Interview with Honourable Ibrahim Sesay
522 Ibid.,
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the Sub-Committees may affect some departmental allocations by suffering a decrease
in budgetary allocation.523
Commenting on breach and sanctions, the Chairman said: “If the members are
not satisfied with the conduct of a certain ministry, a member will move a motion to
hold the vote. Normally, Parliament will appoint a special select committee to look
into the case in a greater detail”.524 Some of the institutions being affected by this
special probe are the Sierra Leone Telecommunications (Sierratel) and the National
Fire Force. The chairman alluded to an ongoing Parliamentary investigation his
committee is handling – the Anti Corruption Commission - that was setup by the
Government to clamp down on corruption. “But now the Commission is under
Parliamentary probe by a special committee headed by myself. Some of the issues
involved are why moneys meant for the payment of staff salaries were moved to offset
costs for other activities without any authorisation or justification. The investigation
has been interpreted in some quarters more so from the media, as a witch-hunting
exercise sponsored by the Government to get rid of the head of the anti corruption
commission. I do not see it that way…someone flouts the rules of virement, and we are
investigating the actions”. A newspaper report of the ACC Parliamentary probe is
provided in Box 5 below.
523 Ibid.,
524 Ibid.,
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Box 5: Parliament Probes Anti-Corruption Commission Head
The Independent (Freetown)
June27,2005
Posted to the web June 27, 2005
Parliament is probing the Commissioner of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone.
Val Collier is facing two Parliamentary committees for two reasons; first to give explanation
on his reason for what Parliament calls violation of ethics, by referring to Parliament as
visionless. Second, to give explanation on what has been described as doubtful expenditures of
the Commission, involving act of impropriety. The Parliamentary committee probing Val
Collier is reported to be receiving incriminating documents as to how Collier has been
spending the Commission's funds, which some Parliamentarians described as frivolous.
This investigation has cost Collier his financial officer Mr. Koroma and the deputy financial
officer Mr. Sima Turay. Sources say there is likelihood for Parliament to question why Neneh
Dabo one senior official of the Commission collected 7,000 dollars as subsistence allowance
for just one trip to Vienna, Austria to attend an Anti-Corruption conference. The Commission
has been discovered to spend a whooping Le 20 billion on special operations alone and Le
118,540,000 on the Commission's generator. Expatriates also consume a huge chunk of the
Commission's money.
Collier's contract has not been renewed but extended for a 2 -year period. He has been in
controversy with successive Attorney Generals including the current one F.M. Carew.
Financial officers operate the Commission's finances but because Val Collier is the vote
controller, he bears the greatest responsibility for any impropriety discovered.
Val Collier entered the civil service in the 70s under the reign of Siaka Stevens and rose to the
rank of Secretary to Cabinet under Joseph Saidu Momoh, a post he held till the All Peoples
Congress was ousted in 1992. The National Provisional Ruling Council junta retained him.
Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/200506270761.html
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9.2.8 Incorporating private sector inputs
Parliament has expanded its scope of operations to incorporate private sector
concerns and inputs into its functions. The exercise is usually co-ordinated by the
Finance Committee. In the words of the Chairman, “Parliament is at present
considering matters raised by the Sierra Leone Manufacturers Association on the tax
increase contained in the proposed budget, which business community consider is too
much for businesses to meet in a post-conflict situation. The association has requested
Parliament to make some reduction… We have not decided on the request yet, and I
cannot say at the moment what our final decision will be”.525
9.2.9 Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)
Another function of the Finance Committee is to take leadership on behalf of
Parliament to champion the public expenditure tracking surveys across the country.
The survey evaluates whether moneys allocated are utilised by MDAs as contained in
the budget. “The Committee collaborates with the Ministry of Finance and donor
agencies to carry out a public expenditure tracking survey to look at what has
happened to the previous year’s allocations in terms of services delivered. The survey
is carried out in far and remote areas of Sierra Leone. We have scored some
success”.526
9.2.10 Budget authorisation diversified
On the recommendation of the Finance Committee, Parliament in 2006
proposed a separation of revenue authorisation from that of public expenditure. In the
past, budgets were submitted late to Parliament and authorisation was therefore not
525 Ibid.,
526 Interview with Honourable Ibrahim Sesay
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given in time to enable Government to start generating revenue and incurring
expenditure. This is partly owing to the delays in the reproduction (printing) of the
budget document in quantities for the use of MPs.527 Delays adversely affect the
following year’s expenditure operations as taxes can only be collected and expenditure
incurred, after the budget has been authorised by Parliament.528 In most cases, budget
authorisation is delayed until the middle of the first quarter of the financial year. To
forestall this problem, the Finance Committee’s proposal made the process easier to
manage. The MOF now presents two Authorisation Bills along with the budget: a
Finance Bill to authorise revenue mobilisation and the usual Appropriation Bill to
authorise expenditure only. The former when passed authorises Government to start
collecting revenue on time whilst awaiting Parliament to authorise expenditure.
9.2.11 Public Accounts Committee (PAC)
The Sierra Leone Parliament operates the traditional Westminster Public
Accounts Committee (PAC) system, which is responsible for reviewing audit reports
on the public accounts submitted by the office of the Auditor-General.529 The PAC is
by tradition a Standing Committee with enormous oversight powers in Commonwealth
member countries,530 and it also is by tradition chaired by a member of the opposition
party.531 However, there is a significant departure from this convention in Sierra Leone
as the chair of the 15-member PAC is the Deputy Speaker from the ruling Sierra Leone
People’s Party (SLPP).532 Membership of the PAC is proportional to the number of
527 Interview with Mariama Anthony-Williams
528 Interview with Honourable Ibrahim Sesay
529 Seminar Paper, Ministry of Finance , February 2005
530 M. Werunga, Evolution of the Kenyan Parliament, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
Seminar Paper, Banjul, The Gambia, August, 2005
531 J. Whener, op.cit., p24
532 Interview with Mohamed Jusu
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seats allotted to parties following a Parliamentary election.533 (See full text of
interview with Mohamed Jusu, Senior Clerk of Committees in Appendix E)
In an interview with a member the PAC, the Honourable Chukumu Johnson of
the opposition All Peoples’ Congress (APC) Party, he reiterated: “The timing between
the submission of the audit report from the Auditor-General and our action poses the
greatest challenge. We are still dealing with the 2001 and 2002 reports in the year
2006, and unfortunately, most of the government officials who should be appearing
before the committee are nowhere to be seen. Some, we are told have left the
service”.534 According to the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA)
reports should be presented three months after the financial year to the Auditor-
General. This provision of the law has never been put into force by the Accountant-
General and no one seems to care that a senior official of Government is breaching the
law. We have complained but we were told the rebel conflict destroyed the whole
system and that we have to be patient…in my opinion people are hiding behind the
rebel conflict.”
9.2.12 Constraints of Parliament
As is the case with Parliaments in most developing countries, the activities of
the supreme oversight institution is constrained by several factors, including but not
limited to finance, logistics, manpower and executive dominance.535 Sierra Leone is no
exception as explored below.
533 Ibid.,
534 Interview with Chukumu Johnson, Member of PAC, June 2006
535 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) Seminar Paper, 2003
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9.2.13 Inadequate financial resource
The institutional capacity of Parliament is weak; they range from inadequate
financial resource to support operations, logistics and manpower support to facilitate
the work of the committees. Except in 2004 when Parliament opted for the provision of
funds to support oversight work, resources had never been made in the allocations to
support oversight work. “For the first time in the history of the Parliament” says Mr
Johnson, “a token allocation of one hundred million Leones was allocated to support
the work of Parliament on oversight”.536 Regardless of this allocation, Parliament still
finds it difficult to carry out effective financial oversight given the paltry sum
allocated, and the cumbersome process of accessing the funds. “However, we find it
difficult to access the money from the Ministry of Finance even though it is inadequate
to support the activities of all the committees. For example, it costs about one million
Leones [approximately £200.00] to hire a vehicle for four days oversight work. It is
most discouraging fact that no increase has been made by the ministry since 2004,
despite clamour from us. The total budget allocated to Parliament in this financial year
is one billion five hundred million Leones”.537
The lack of adequate financial support has had adverse effect on the operations
of Parliament. For example, the PAC sits an average of eleven hours with an
inadequate sitting allowance. In addition, where a committee wishes to conduct
assessment on the activities of an agency or ministry, it has to rely on that institution to
facilitate the process - providing logistics such as transportation. “The last time we
conducted an expenditure assessment on the Ministry of Marine Resources”, said Mr
Johnson, “the Committee had no choice but to rely on the goodwill of the ministry to
536 Interview with Honourable Johnson: One hundred million Leones is approximately, £20,000.00
Great British Pounds
537 Interview with Honourable Johnson
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carry out the assignment by providing transportation, etc”.538 On the basis of Johnson’s
recount of events, it is clear that the prevalent situation will not only compromise the
outcome of the exercise but inadequate financial resource undermines the integrity of
the PAC and that of Parliament.
9.2.14 Inadequate logistics and manpower
The 124-member Parliament lacks the requisite logistics to carry out its
functions. There are only four laptop computers provided by the African Development
Bank (ADB) as part of its governance support programme.539 Parliament also has a
legislative library on the premises of Parliament but that is largely under-resourced in
terms of equipment and the lack of Internet facility to conduct legislative research and
policy analysis.540 “In addition to the state that there are no constituency and transport
allowances for MPs”, said Mr Johnson (speaking as member of the Finance
Committee), “there is no office facility provided for MPs to perform their duties as
elected officials. There is no privacy within the building of Parliament. We do not have
offices where we can sit and conduct research and there are also no research assistants
to assist us with research. So we have to either sit in the canteen or the in library with
no privacy to do our work. The loss or misplacement of important documents is an
everyday occurrence as there is no proper storage facility to support our work”.541
On the manpower side of things, there are only four Parliamentary committee
clerks serving all the committees.542 This has had adverse effect on the performance of
the institution as the highest oversight and law making body in the land. The
committees are handicapped by lack of special Parliamentary clerks that can be
538 Ibid.,
539 Ibid.,
540 Ibid.,
541 Ibid.,
542 P. Kulagbanda, op.cit., p287
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assigned to handle the affairs of each committee. This is frustrating to MPs, because
the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA) empowers the Parliament
to carry out financial oversight. “We have just received a report from the Governor of
the Bank of Sierra Leone on a matter relating to the State”, said Mr Johnson, “if we
have had research assistants, they would be busy looking at the grey areas in the report
and they would then provide appropriate advice to the Committee”.543
Another case cited by Johnson is the lack of support both from the Executive
and the Parliamentary leadership. “There are about forty officially registered foreign
exchange bureaux operating in Freetown, but those that are operating underground
more than double the number of the legally registered. But we do not have a vehicle
and the necessary logistics to chase them out. It is our estimation that a proper study
into the activities of illegal bureaux would save the economy a huge waste and would
bring extra revenue into the economy. This is a missed opportunity and nobody in the
Cabinet thinks so”.544
9.2.15 Executive dominance
The Executive arm of the Government has and exercises immense powers on
financial matters that seem to frustrate legislative oversight and the trend is
continuing.545 The Parliament’s investigative muscle over failed and mishandled
contracts had been felt lately although it is sometimes outmanoeuvred by the
Executive. For example, an investigation into the management of the sea port which
was under the Hamburg Ports Consultants (a foreign firm), was successfully concluded
by Parliament and its recommendations were adopted by the Executive546. However,
543 Ibid., p285
544 Ibid., p285
545 Ibid., p285
546 Ibid., p 285
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the same rule did not apply whenever investigations touch the direct interest of the
Executive. For example, the Government blocked the publication of a 1998
Parliamentary investigative report on the activities of the Sierra Leone
Telecommunication Company (Sierratel), of which the Government was the sole
shareholder. Upon blocking the publication, the Government claimed that the
investigation procedure used by Parliament was unconstitutional.547 This setback
among others, illustrates executive dominance. An interesting case of executive
manipulation of the Parliament as relayed by the Honourable Chukumu Johnson is
illustrated in Box 6 below.
Box 6: Executive Dominance
“We are empowered by the GBAA” said the Honourable Chukumu Johnson, “but whether
Parliament as a law making body and the Executive as an executing body is listening to us is
another matter. The Cabinet doesn’t recognise the Committees with any seriousness. I will
give you an example: last year, when the Committee of Supply (the whole House) was divided
into Appropriation Sub-Committees to study the budget document before the House could
debate and give its authorisation, the Sub-Committee on which I served, managed to carry out
a little research on the Ministry of Agriculture. Based on the wide remit of the ministry and the
level of poverty and low level food security in the country, the Sub-Committee suggested and
recommended to the House that even though the Ministry receives an annual estimated budget
of 14 billion Leones that a reasonable increase is made in its allocation. However, with further
research, we discovered that the ministry received the sum of 30 million US Dollars of extra
budgetary support from donors for the financial year. To our surprise, when we requested the
Ministry to present to us their short, medium and a long-term project plan to enable us evaluate
its standing against others, the Minister and senior officials refused to comply. As a result, we
referred the matter to the Oversight Committee for Agriculture for further consideration…as
you can guess the outcome, nothing came out of it, nothing! This is just an example of the
endless frustrations we experience in the hands of the Cabinet and Executive Heads of
cooperate bodies”.
547 Ibid., p285
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9.2.16 Control over Bills
The Executive is powerful such that no Private Member Bill has been tabled
before the House during the present Parliament and there is no evidence of what
happened in the past.548 If an MP wishes to introduce a Private Member’s Bill, he first
of all has to send it to the Law Officer’s Department for their inputs (as there is no
legal draftsman in Parliament to handle Bill Drafting). As a result of this resource
omission, 100 percent of the Bills passed by the Parliament are Government Bills. No
Private Member Bill (the research is informed) will receive the prime attention of law
officers who, it is alleged are under the tutelage of the Minister of Justice, who is also
the Attorney-General.549
9.2.17 Lack of Sanctions
Common sense dictates that sanctions are effective deterrents as well as robust
accountability and transparency tool in the budgetary process.550 The fear that
accountability comes with some form of punishment deters fraud and shapes behaviour
in accordance with laid down principles.551 However, not only has the lack of
appropriate sanctions stifled performance in the public sector of Sierra Leone for far
too long, but that the lack of willingness on the part of the Judiciary to impose
sanctions have created a weak accountability environment.552 Commenting on the
frustrations faced by the Anti-Corruption Commission - the body set up by the
Government to fight corruption - David White of the British Newspaper, Financial
Times, commented that: “Depending up to now on the attorney general’s office to
press ahead with any prosecutions, it has a long backlog of outstanding cases. It has so
548 Interview with Honourable Johnson
549 Ibid.,
550 Commonwealth Public Expenditure Management Review, Commonwealth Secretariat, London ,
2005, p27
551 Ibid., p27
552 Anti-Corruption Commission Annual Report, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2003 p35
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far failed to bring any top-level prosecution to a successful conclusion. A minister
convicted over diamond mining activities had his sentence overturned on appeal…The
commission complained in one report about the “lukewarm attitude” of Sierra Leone’s
judiciary and a lack of interest from Parliament. It said the public had developed a
“healthy mistrust” of the legal system”.553
According to Chukumu Johnson, the PAC is constrained by failings of the
judiciary to impose and enforce sanctions based on the recommendations of the
Committee. “We send the report to the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice who
has the mandate to take necessary action, but nothing comes out of it. It ends
there….ends there, I say. Let me say this with a broken heart that, no action has been
taken on the PAC’s recommendations from 1996 to 2000. I think the PAC should be
given the opportunity to impose sanctions”.
9.2.18 The way forward
Against the backdrop of the numerous constraints facing Parliament, some
MPs, mostly from the opposition All Peoples Congress (APC) party, have called for
the creation of a Parliamentary Service Commission to be independent of the civil
service, so that Parliament would determine its operational budget without any
hindrance or control from the Executive. 554
9.2.19 Summary
In spite of reforms in the area of Parliamentary oversight as spelled out in the
Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA) of 2005 and other
instruments, it can be said much is still desired for the reform to be successful and
553 D. White, Financial Times, Quoted in the Standard Times, Freetown, 24 February 2005
554 Ibid.,
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robust. Key among the requirements is enhancing the capacity of Parliament by
providing the institution with adequate manpower, financial resources and logistical
support. Most importantly, the institution must be robust enough to deliver oversight as
much as it possibly can. But this comes with political will and long time commitment
to change. However, the question that come to mind is, would the leadership do so
without the implicit intervention or much less motivation from the development
partners? As it has always been the case, each strand of reform has been prompted and
driven by external players, which is to suggest leadership has been relegated to the
back burner of national development – it cannot be blamed on the external players,
because, there is no shred of evidence to suggest there has been at least a conflict of
ideas on reform between the leadership and the development partners.
Regardless of the leadership and system failings, it could be said that much
progress has been made in recent years on Parliamentary oversight. Some of these
include the participation of Parliament in budget hearings, opening the business of
Parliament to the general public, enhanced Parliament - civil society engagements, and
the restructuring of the committee system to deliver oversight. The next section
examines the role of the auditor general in providing external oversight.
9.3 THE AUDIT SERVICE
This section examines the oversight role of the Audit Service of Sierra Leone to
measure the depth of transparency and accountability in the country’s budgetary
process. It identifies the characteristics of national audit bodies and discusses
institutional evolution of the Sierra Leone Audit Service, including new developments
and challenges facing the institution. It also discusses findings and provides
commentary on the overall audit structure and its effectiveness.
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The section is divided into two sub-sections, the first attempts to define the
supreme audit institution (SAI), its strategic role in the overall budgetary process, and
the general characteristics that defines the effectiveness of the institution in carrying
out its mandate. The second is dedicated to Sierra Leone’s audit service. The sub-
section also examines the state of the agency and attempts to measure its effectiveness
in delivering accountability and transparency in the budgetary process.
9.3.1 Sub-Section One: Overview of Supreme Audit Institutions
9.3.2 Defining the role of an SAI
A supreme audit institution (SAI) is a conventional or statutory body
responsible for carrying out public audit on government-wide expenditure of
ministries, departments and government sponsored agencies for the sake of probity;
and it forms a vital component of a country’s public financial management system.555
The oversight body highlights weaknesses in public expenditure and recommends
necessary measures to exert fiscal discipline. As such, it provides a check on
unconscionable spending. This public oversight institution is also core to contemporary
good governance arrangements as machinery that reinforces public confidence in
governments.556 A national Audit body is therefore an invaluable source to measure
the level of transparency and accountability in a government’s public financial
management system. 557
555 A. Aziz, “Audit Profile: The Auditor-General Department, Sierra Leone”, International Journal of
Government Auditing-January 2000, p17
556 “Working with Supreme Audit Institutions”, Department for International Development (DfID),
London, July 2005, p2-6
557 Ibid., p7
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9.3.3 SAI legal framework and mandate
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are normally established under a national
constitution or by a separate law enacted by Parliament or national assembly. Such
laws prescribe the mandate, responsibilities, powers and the independence of the SAI
and its head, usually the Auditor-General (AG), within the overall governance
arrangement. The mandate generally includes what is to be audited, how audits should
be conducted and the authority to which the audit report is to be submitted.558
9.3.4 Strategic role of an SAI
A supreme audit institution is a fundamental pillar of good governance as it
provides a check on the management of financial resources. If audit recommendations
tabled before the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) meets required outcomes, then
they may impact behaviour and future decision making at MDA levels.559 The
activities of a public audit body thus guarantee the maintenance of the democratic
value of creating a balance in public administration, as well as injecting sanity and
probity in the public sector.
Moreover, because governments are big spenders and each year they purchase
goods and services, Auditors General have the mandate and “moral obligation to
assure the public that monies allotted to the government have been spent in the most
judicious manner and to give assurances and report on the effectiveness and adequacies
of controls”.560 SAIs are therefore the financial “gadfly” of public financial
management and their role as lead stakeholders in accountability has, in recent times,
been brought to the fore in reaching bilateral and multilateral agreements on national
558 K. Coghill, “Auditing the Independence of the Auditor-General”, Seminar Paper, 11 February 2004,
The Australian National University, p3
559 Ibid., p4
560 A. Aziz, op.cit., p19
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budgetary support. Strengthening public audit, including guaranteeing the
independence of the Auditor-General, for example, now forms part of the United
Kingdom’s requirements for budgetary support to Sierra Leone. 561
Furthermore, the role of SAIs as strategic stakeholders has increasingly become
a lead component of public financial management reform as part of public oversight
arrangements. As highlighted by the Auditor-General of Sierra Leone: “the role of the
Supreme Audit Institutions in public service delivery as a result, has always remained
very critical more so if they are to be seen as oversight institutions in the collection and
disbursement of stakeholders’ financial and non-financial resources, which responsible
Governments are obliged to manage economically, effectively and efficiently”.562
In sum, robust display of public finance oversight has earned SAIs an increasing role
in the march towards achieving transparency and accountability in governments, and
has made them strategic stakeholders in the budgetary process.563
9.3.5 Independence of SAIs
The Independence of SAIs is an internationally accepted attribute of audit
institutions, and a fundamental requirement for attaining good governance. 564 Their
independence is underpinned by the oversight role which is critical to achieving
discipline in the public sector. Thus the status of an institution that provides detailed
audit on how the taxpayers’ monies are being expended, demands by common sense,
561 Strengthening the office of the Auditor-General including the audit service formed part of the
commitments of the Government of Sierra Leone when entering into the Poverty Reduction
Arrangement with the Government of the United Kingdom in 2004.
562 562 A. Caesar, “Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions” Seminar Paper Presented at the Abidjan
Summit of Audits General ,2002
563 “Working with Supreme Audit Institutions” op.cit., p3
564 Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, United Kingdom National Audit Office
(NAO), London, 1977
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that it should be protected and its independence guaranteed through a legal instrument.
565
However, a legal provision to secure institutional independence for SAIs is not
enough; rather, laws must be complemented with the provision of adequate financial
resources to enable the oversight body perform its functions effectively. Also, while
adequate resource allocation ameliorates operational and legal independence of SAIs,
institutional capacity is also a core requirement in terms of the availability of office
equipment, logistical support and meeting the capacity building needs of the staff to
enhance performance and organizational quality.566
While the above hold true in terms of requirement, there are marked differences
in the status of SAIs across nations. Audit bodies in developed democracies are
adequately resourced in terms of number and quality of professional staff. In the
United Kingdom, for example, the National Audit Office has about 750 skilled and
highly trained staff. Zambia has 511 qualified registered accountants, but only four of
them work for the Government. The rest are employed in the private sector. 567 This
scenario underscores the opinion that a poor human resource base pervades the public
sector in developing countries and it may partly be responsible for late submission of
audit reports to Public Accounts Committees in Commonwealth member countries.568
9.3.6 The Auditor-General
As a matter of convention, the Auditor-General is head of public audit body
and as such, the independence of the Supreme Audit Institution is hinged on the scope
of responsibility, powers and independence of the Auditor-General to carry out audit
565 Ibid.,
566 A. Caesar, op.cit., p 2
567 J. Wehner, Principles and Patterns of Financial Scrutiny: Public Accounts Committees in the
Commonwealth, op.cit., p9
568 Ibid, p9
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functions without hindrance. The independence of heads of public audit institutions is
captured in a manual developed for and on behalf of Commonwealth Auditors General
by the National Audit Office, United Kingdom. It covers the following key
requirements for the office of the Auditor-General:569
 Appointment and dismissal of the Auditor-General not to be within the
prerogative of the executive;
 The Auditor-General’s salary to be a direct charge on public funds and
not subject to annual appropriation;
 The Auditor-General to report directly to the legislature (rather than to
or through the executive) and to decide the nature and timing of the
report;
 The Auditor-General to appoint and pay staff taking into account the
civil service conditions of service but subject only to budgetary
approval by the legislature or a body empowered to do so by the
legislature;
 The Auditor-General imbued with discretion to decide the nature and
conduct of the audit, including value for money investigations, and to
decide whether or not to accede to requests emanating from outside the
Auditor-General’s office proposing matters for audit;
 The Auditor-General to have unrestricted access to information and to
obtain explanations from public servants; and
 The audit mandate to cover all public enterprises.”
569 “Strengthening Public Audit”, Background Paper - Commonwealth Auditors-General Conference
10-13 October 1999
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9.3.7 Sub-Section Two: The Sierra Leone Audit Service
Having discussed the general framework and characteristics of SAIs in accordance
with international best practice, this sub-section explores the role of the Sierra Leone
Audit Service within the research framework.
9.3.8 The Sierra Leone Audit Service
The SAI in Sierra Leone is the Sierra Leone Audit Service, established under
Section 119 (1) of the 1991 Constitution: “There shall be an Auditor-General for Sierra
Leone whose office shall be a public office and who shall be appointed by the
President after consultation with the Public Service Commission and subject to the
approval of Parliament.” Primarily the Audit Service is responsible for public sector
audit to ensure financial integrity in government agencies and to provide independent
information and assurances to Parliament that tax payers’ money has been used
efficiently and effectively by Ministries, Departments and the Government assisted
Agencies (MDAs) through timely and accurate reporting.570
9.3.9 Evolution of the Audit Service
Prior to Sierra Leone’s attainment of independence, the SAI was controlled and
directed by the Colonial Audit Service.571 When the country attained independence in
1961, administrative structures of most public institutions including that of the
Colonial Audit Service remained the same. However, some minor changes took place
on the mandate and authority – the indigenes replaced colonial officials in the general
administrative framework of things. Thus one year after independence, the Audit Act
of 1962 was passed and it established among others, the Auditor-General’s Department
570 A. Aziz, op.cit., p19
571 Ibid.,
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in the place of the Colonial Audit Service, with similar remits and functions. Typical
of post independence laws, the Act shifted responsibility into the hands of key
indigenous players.572 Since then, five nationals have held the post of Auditor-General
between 1962 to present. See Table 11 below.
Table 11
List of Auditors General Since Independence
1962-2005
No NAME PERIOD/COMMENTS
1 Pre independence era (Audit function was under
the Colonial Audit Service)
Pre 1961
2 Mr. M.A. Seray-Wurie 1963 - 1965
Served in an acting capacity
only
3 Mr. A.S.C Johnson 1965 – 1970
4 Mr. C.O. Mammah 1970 – 1989
5 Mrs A.O. Caulker 1989 – 2000
6 Mrs Anna Caesar 2000 - present
Source: National Audit Service, Strategic Plan, 2004-2008 p 10
In addition to the 1962 Audit Act, significant changes were made to the office
of the Auditor-General in both the 1971 and 1991 Constitutions that provided the basis
for the creation of an audit service. In particular, the latter laid the foundation for a
wider oversight function of the Auditor-General. In addition, Section 65 of the Public
Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1992, recognise the shifting trends - all of which led
to the enactment of the Audit Service Act in 1998. The new Act changed the name of
the Department to the Audit Service Sierra Leone, with a wider remit.573
Under the 1998 Act, the Auditor-General as well as that of the institution was
made independent. The Auditor-General was given wider remit and powers, for
example, the Auditor-General can levy a surcharge. The Government Budgeting and
Accountability Act of 2005 also put a premium on accountability and audit functions.
572 L. Johnson, “Introduction to Sierra Leone Audit Service”, Seminar Paper presented at the Sierra
Leone Audit Service Strategic Planning Review Seminar, Freetown, January 2005
573 Ibid.,
251
This trend has introduced organizational restructuring, including change in knowledge
base and skills set, and improvements have also been achieved in the conditions of
service.574 Most importantly, the audit body has been removed from the mainstream
civil service - an institution beset with multiple problems underscored by
underperformance. The Audit Service has been transformed into an independent public
oversight body and its creation is a pointer to the Government’s determination to bring
about good governance, transparency and accountability in the public sector. This was
achieved by the insistence of the donor community.
9.3.10 Functions of the Audit Service
In addition to the Audit Service Act (1998) and the Government Budgeting and
Accountability Act (2005), the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone clearly provided for
an independent Auditor-General with a greater audit mandate. Section (119) of the
1991 Constitution spells out the following functions of the Audit Service. The Auditor-
General shall audit the public accounts of Sierra Leone and all public service 119(2);
he shall decide the form and manner in which public accounts should be kept 119(3);
and he shall submit a report to Parliament within 12 months of the end of the
“immediately proceeding financial year”, drawing attention to any irregularities in the
audited accounts (119 (4). The Auditor-General is empowered to establish internal
audit machinery in MDAs in consultation with the respective MDA heads.
The 1991 Constitution and the GBAA provided further that the Auditor-
General can deploy in any MDA, any person, employed under his/her office in the
execution of audit functions. This strategy is a marked deviation from the traditional
practice of over-centralizing institutional operations, which in turn limits access to
574 Interview with Leslie Johnson, Deputy Auditor-General of the Sierra Leone Audit Service, December
2006
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valuable audit materials and negatively affects general performance of oversight
agencies in the public sector.575 For purposes of effectiveness, therefore, not only does
the deployment of Audit Service staff in respective public institutions facilitates easy
access to records and information, but it also raises the profile of the institution as an
effective watchdog over the wider public service. 576
The deployment of audit staff in the respective functionaries of the Government
is widely viewed by the Audit Service staff as a move in the right direction. According
to Leslie Johnson, Deputy Auditor-General, the presence of an audit agent in a division
sends a clear message to those managers responsible for the implementation of
departmental budget that it is not business as usual. “The closer we get to these
officials”, he said: “the tendency to be more transparent in doing their thing becomes
greater. We have also experienced some improvement in the submission of
expenditure reports and a relative progress has been made in our case by case access to
departmental expenditure records.”577
Within the framework of the Audit Service Act 1998, the Auditor-General is
also empowered to issue queries and can make such observations and
recommendations to the Accountant-General or any other person or agency on the
conduct of public accounts; and he may call for the submission of such accounts,
vouchers statement, documents and can demand explanations as he may deem it
necessary. The powers of the Auditor-General are such that he may disallow any item
of expenditure contrary to law on surcharges. In the case of failure to answer to an
audit query, Section 67 of the Public Budgeting and Accounting Act (1992) provides
that “without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act every person who fails or
575 R. Kibria, Propriety in the Public Service, Commonwealth Public expenditure Management Regional
Seminar, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, October, 2005
576 Interview with Leslie Johnson
577 Ibid.,
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refuse to reply to an audit query or observation within the appropriate period specified
in sub-section (5) of Section 66 shall, if the Auditor-General so directs, have his
emoluments and allowances withheld for so long as the officer fails to reply”.
According to Leslie Johnson, Deputy Auditor-General, the extensive remits of the
Auditor-General under the current instruments has had some positive effects on the
governance framework and has secured a facelift for the oversight institution as a
public watchdog. Both middle level and senior staff of the agency regarded these
changes as a robust confidence building mechanism for the Audit Service. 578
9.3.11 Independence of the Audit Service
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the independence of a supreme audit
institution is crucial to public oversight. The creation of the Sierra Leone Audit
Service as a Supreme Audit Institution with wider remits is a move in the right
direction and a remarkable indication that the Government of Sierra Leone meant
business. The extensive responsibilities of the Auditor-General imbued with
overwhelming powers underscores the fact that reform in taking root. The legal
instruments vests a wide mandate and defines the independence of the Auditor-General
as provided for in Section 119 (6) of the 1991 Constitution: “In the exercise of his/her
functions under this constitution or any other law, the Auditor-General shall not be
subject to the direction or control of any person or authority”. This provision in
principle establishes and entrenches the oversight authority of the AG such that he is to
carry out his functions without fear or favour or reference to a third party.
The independence of the Auditor-General as the official head of the public
watchdog also stands out prominently as a significant component of a meaningful
oversight machinery. As it is in most developing countries, however, the independence
578 Ibid.,
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of the Auditor-General regardless of the legal framework is limited and, there are
several shortcomings that affect the performance of the Auditor-General. The Auditor-
General, for example, is appointed by the president though in consultation with
Parliament. Thus the process through which the Auditor-General is appointed suggests
some limitations in the exercise of his independent functions, and therefore, the
position might be subject to political influence from above. Asked whether the
Auditor-General without fear could conduct effective audit in higher political offices,
is a question none of the officials contacted in the Audit Service had sufficiently
responded to. Leslie Johnson evaded the issue: “We may if we chose to, but one has to
be sensitive to the politics of the environment. You don’t want to put your job on the
line, so instead you focus on other high risk areas”.
To further illustrate the above, in a paper presented at an Auditors’ General
Meeting in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, the Auditor-General of Sierra Leone emphasized that
“political will geared towards accountability and transparency” is critical to
guaranteeing the independence of SAIs, but “in the light of practical experience, more
so in the African environment, SAIs are almost destitute or unable to capture full
political will geared towards accountability and transparency”579.
As mentioned in the previous sub section, SAI independence is invariably
underscored by the method in which the institution is funded as well as the size of
financial resources provided to carry out its functions. It is expected that the wider the
scope and the greater its independence, the immense the resource base to match
institutional commitments and operational needs. An inadequate resource base negates
effective oversight and erodes SAI independence. The latter has become a cause for
579 579 A. Caesar, op.cit.,
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concern in the Audit Service of Sierra Leone, as its budget estimates are subjected to
cuts by the Budget Bureau in the Ministry of Finance.580
As a matter of procedure the Audit Service submits its annual estimates along
with other MDAs to the Budget Bureau for approval. Under the said circumstance, the
Audit Service defends its estimates and in the process of justifying operational plans, it
discloses strategies to a unit that is subjected to audit scrutiny. This ugly situation is
viewed by the Deputy Auditor-General as a significant constraint that must be dealt
with to ensure independence of the Audit Service prevails. In his remarks the Deputy
Auditor-General reiterated that the procedure for budget allocation is critical to both
the quality of its performance and independence, and thus called for a review on the
allocation procedures.
Further, because the institution’s estimates are in all cases subjected to cuts and
review by the Finance Ministry, the ability of the oversight body is limited to recruit
and retain professional brains including meeting other logistical requirements in a
given financial year. 581 In the words of Leslie Johnson: “Limited funding has hindered
our operations as a Service. It affects the quality of our manpower and logistics. At the
moment, the independence of the Audit Service is impaired by budgetary constraints.
In the last financial year, the Ministry of Finance did not release our last quarter
allocations, and no proper explanations were given”.582
Given the above scenario, it stands to reason that providing for institutional
independence in a legal document such as in the 1991 Constitution is not enough.
What matters most, it can be argued, is providing the required elements to enable the
institution carryout its mandate. Thus SAI independence and its resilience to remain
an effective public oversight body, largely hinge on the scope of operations, adequate
580 Interview with Leslie Johnson
581 Interview with Leslie Johnson
582 Ibid.,
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resource base, access to relevant financial and non-financial records of MDAs, and
other institutional requirements such as enhanced human capacity to operate583.
The Auditor-General’s work stops at reporting while the implementation of
recommendations made in the report falls within the purview of the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) and the Judiciary. “We need an Act”, says the Deputy Auditor-
General, “that can extend the powers of the Auditor-General beyond mere reporting, to
enable us instil discipline”.
9.3.12 Challenges
9.3.13 Institutional Resource
As mentioned above, one of the challenges facing the Audit Service is the non
availability of an adequate resource base to match its remits- a situation that has
inhibited in-house and field operations. The mismatch has been exacerbated by the
devolution of governmental functions to local government units (since 2002) that are
now handling financial resources for the delivery of public services, such as health and
education. Devolution of service provision has not only extended the scope of audit,
but staff levels including inadequate resources have overstretched the institution
beyond its normal capacity to perform. 584
9.3.14 Logistics and staff
Another challenge facing the Audit Service is logistical constraint such as an
inadequate transport facility to reach far-flung districts and remote areas of the country
to carry out audit. At the moment, the Institution relies on two vehicles only (Land
583 Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, op.cit.,
584 Interview with Leslie Johnson
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Rovers) each provided by projects under the United Kingdom DfID and the African
Development Bank (ADB). Mobility problems have had a negative impact on the
activities of the institution as it limits the movement of auditors to access various
programmes and projects being implemented in remote areas of the country.585
Furthermore, low staff levels and the unavailability of adequate professionals in
the Audit Service also constraints the institution’s performance. For example, since
the rebel conflict ended in 2002, no audit staff has been deployed to carry out audit in
the Northern Province, which is the largest region of the country.586 This operational
failure is explained by lack of office premises as a result of the rebel conflict during
which Government property became a prime target for destruction by the rebels. In
addition, auditors who are assigned to the region have had no vehicles or office
equipment to conduct proper audit. Thus SAI activities in the northern region of the
country have been remotely directed from the capital, Freetown, limiting the scope of
the Audit Service’s effectiveness in that part of the country.587
While the oversight body suffers low staff levels, capacity building
requirements are also crucial and there does not seem to be any comprehensive training
or professional development scheme put in place except for ad hoc ones.588 The table
below provides a graphic explanation of the staff situation in the Audit Service.
585 Strategic Plan of the Sierra Leone Audit Service, Audit Service Sierra Leone, Freetown 2004, p6
586 Ibid., p12
587 Ibid.,p13
588 The Commonwealth Public Expenditure Management (PEM) Programme is implementing a three-
year capacity building programme with the Audit Service, including setting up if an internal audit unit,
and enhancing capacity for performance audit
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Table 12: Audit Service staff strength as at December 2005
Qualification Number of Staff %
ACCA 3 3
Accounting Degree 28 25
Non-Accounting Degree 5 4
TDA, CAT, AAT, LCCI &
ICM
25 22
Masters Degree 3 3
Pitmans, TC, HTC, and
Civil Service Entrance
Exams
48 43
Total 112 100
Source: Developed in the research process
Considering the volume of work, the above table demonstrates an under-staffed
Audit Service. The manpower level is very low (112) to be able to meet audit functions
across more than 20 ministries, 30 public enterprises, 19 local councils and all
diplomatic missions abroad. The modest manpower of 112 would have been adequate
if all of the audit functions were normally outsourced, with the Audit Service playing a
monitoring role and producing annual audit reports. However, an outsourced scenario
would not have also addressed the manpower situation given the low level of staff
calibre and professional qualifications among the team. Only three members of staff
are professional accountants, another three of them hold masters degree and 28 others
hold accounting degrees- the rest do not meet technical audit skills requirements.
The Deputy Auditor-General blamed the poor manpower level on financial
constraints and inconsistent budgetary allocations that limit the scope of the agency to
259
increase salaries and to attract qualified persons to serve. Moreover, inadequate
resource level is a disincentive for a sustained professional training. The unavailability
of adequate office equipment also inhibits the agency’s performance. At the moment,
there are insufficient computers, photocopies and fax machines for use by agency
staff.589
9.3.15 Evaluation of the Role of the Audit Service
In our evaluation of the role of the audit service in terms of providing quality
service and delivery of impact, it is worth taking a look at one of its annual reports. In
this regard some key findings highlighted in the 2001 Audit report are presented
below.
9.3.16 Auditor-General’s Report 2001
As mentioned above, the 2001 Audit Report is reviewed to demonstrate not
only the value of the audit function but to help us measure the level of transparency
and accountability in the budgetary process. In the Auditor-General’s foreword to the
2001 edition published in February 2003, she highlighted that the agency could not
present its report on time as a result of several constraints affecting the institution
ranging from “inadequate staffing to logistics”. Also, that the Audit Service Act of
1998 was still not operational, which among other things accounts for the “stalemate in
the approval of the conditions of Service without which the statutory instrument of
incorporation cannot be executed”. 590
Another mention in the report is an appeal made to the political leadership to
provide the institution with adequate office space not only in the capital, Freetown, but
589 Interview with Leslie Johnson
590 Auditor-General’s Report, Sierra Leone 2001, p1
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in the provincial capitals as well as district headquarter towns. The most notable
element in the report is that the 2001 Audit Report was not based on the Accountant-
General’s Public Accounts Report, which in accordance with procedure should form
the basis of audit review. Rather the report was based on the extracts from audit reports
and comments from parastatals.
9.3.17 Key finding of the 2001 Audit Report
A number of omissions and discrepancies were discovered in the general reporting
and accounting systems across MDAs. For example, the Auditor-General’s Certificate
reads: “I have examined the attached annual statements of public accounts for 1999
and 2000 financial years in accordance with Section 58 (1) (2) and (3) of the Public
Budgeting and Accountability Act of 1992. As the figures for several items in the
statements cannot be verified/confirmed, I am unable to certify that, in my opinion, the
statements are correct”. 591
The report also made a damning comment on the Government procurement system
that was found to be corrupt and fraught with weak disbursement and control systems.
The Central Tender Board in the Ministry of Finance (now replaced with the NPPA) -
the body responsible for all government purchase and contracts - for example, made
100 percent payment to contractors on behalf of the Ministry of Health without
submission of invoices. Similarly, advance payments of 50 percent were made before
performance. In a number of cases, payments above the normal market prices were
made to contractors by the Central Tender Board. In other instances, ministries,
departments and agencies arbitrarily flout procurement regulations with impunity
without the imposition of sanctions by the relevant authorities. For example, in the bid
to evade procurement regulation which required MDAs to submit contracts above
591 Ibid., p2
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Le12 million to the Central Tender Board for processing, they deliberately commit
fraud by splitting contracts in order to evade procedure. The problems are further
underscored by the following findings contained in the audit report:
1. Losses of cash and stores from theft, fraud or serious irregularities, Le
710,527,637 and £147,159.
2. Over-expenditure, Le8, 337,505,141 with the exception of few departments
was discovered.
3. Final accounts of 1999 and 2000 did not capture Government’s fixed assets-
government lands, buildings, vehicles, equipment and furniture.
4. Could not verify balances held at commercial banks as there were no
statements/certificates to the effect.
5. Miscellaneous debtors amounting to Le4, 868 million for the period 1999/2000
were not supported by any authentic document for the Auditor-General to
confirm their existence.
6. Proper reconciliation of the external and domestic debt figures was not carried
out.
7. Provision for outstanding claims, totalling Le470 billion as stated in the
Accounts for 1999, could not be confirmed by the Public Debt Unit of the
Ministry of Finance.
8. The Accountant-General refused to provide the Auditor-General’s department
details of accounts on the European Union Grants to the Government of Sierra
Leone-no action was taken to ensure that the report was submitted for audit.
9. Accountability measures were flouted by all diplomatic missions overseas and
their reporting systems weak and inadequate.
10. Generally, accountability and reporting systems are almost non-existent across
sectors.592
9.3.18 Summary
Significant progress seems to have been made in budget oversight provided by
the supreme audit office compared to the pre 1996 era in which oversight institutions
were subject to direct executive control. The 1998 Audit Act with imbued powers of
the auditor-general such as to levy a surcharge are transforming indicators for
improved oversight in the public sector.
592 The Auditor-General’s Report, op.cit
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From the finding in this chapter, however, there is a clear indication that the
budgetary process is still fraught with problems relating to accountability and
transparency. It depicts also that although much has been done in terms of
promulgating a new Audit Service Act (1998), there is a lot more being said on paper
than played out in action. For example, it is absurd that the annual estimates of the
audit office – supposedly an independent oversight body - is being subject to the
scrutiny of budget bureau; and with a staff strength far below the required levels to
cover a vast territory as local government units, there is little wonder that commitment
and political will are half-measured, to say the least. To institute transparent budgeting,
it must ne stated, requires that external audit functions are strengthened to meet the
task. It is in this regard that it comes as no surprise that the reform of the audit office as
in all change initiatives, came from the development partners as conditionality for
budgetary support. There is identified failing leadership to say the least.
The next section investigates the role of the anti-corruption commission (ACC)
also set up again on the recommendation of the development partners to institute
transparency and accountability in the budgetary process in part, and to curb corruption
in general.
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9.4 ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION
9.4.1 Introduction
The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was set up in 2000 as part of the
Government’s public sector reform to curb corruption in the Sierra Leone society.593
The ACC was officially established under the Anti-Corruption Act, passed in February
2000.594 Section 5 of the Act spells out the functions of the ACC, which includes to
investigate alleged fraud, to examine and propose a revision of practices and
procedures of all government ministries, departments and public agencies (MDAs), to
educate the public on the ills of corruption, and to combat corruption in the public
domain.
Section 3 of the Act provides for a Commissioner as head and a Deputy
Commissioner and both shall be appointed by the President from among persons of
“conspicuous probity and with proven knowledge and ability in accounting or other
profession or in the investigation of offences involving dishonesty”. However, the
appointments which shall last for a five-year term “may be renewed as and when
necessary” by the President. The Commissioner is charged with the responsibility “to
account to the people of Sierra Leone for the conduct of the national campaign against
corruption” (Section 5 (1)).
Section 16 imbued the Commission with powers, rights and privileges similar
to those of the High Court. And as such, the ACC can examine a witness on oath,
compel the production of evidence and can examine witnesses living overseas. It must
be mentioned however that the creation of the ACC was not a “home-grown” initiative
or internally conceived strategy by the political leadership; rather it was externally
593 Anti-Corruption Strategic Plan - Sierra Leone 2003, p14
594 Ibid.,
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prescribed by the development partners as part of donor conditionality for loans and
grants.595 It also came about as a result of high level corruption in the public sector, for
which the donor community including the UK DfID and the World Bank, urged the
Government to create a corruption curbing agency.596
9.4.2 Strategies for combating corruption
The ACC has since its inception approached its mandate through adopting
broad range activities to reduce corruption in the public sector. First, the ACC
published a mission statement: to prevent and control corruption in all forms; and its
vision: to rid the country of corruption, enhance the rule of law and contribute to the
creation of a good governance environment. 597 In 2003 the Commission crafted a five
year strategic plan 2003-2008 to achieve its mandate. The anti-corruption agency has
also established an official website (See www.anticorruptionsl.org,) and has initiated
citizen awareness campaign to reduce corruption.598
One of the strategies implemented is anonymous reporting – an interactive
system through which citizens can anonymously report corrupt activities or suspected
corrupt activities via the internet.599 Another strategy is sensitising the younger
generation by encouraging them to participate in national essay competitions on topics
such as: How corruption affects me- this strategy is meant to create a corrupt-free
future generation. The agency also publishes quarterly anti-corruption newsletters as
part of its sensitisation campaign and it also organises radio talk shows and press
briefings on its activities.600
595 Interview with Neneh Daboh, Director of Prevention and Community Relations, Anti Corruption
Commission (ACC) , June 2006
596 Ibid.,
597 See official website: www.anticorruptionsl.org
598 The Eye, quarterly magazine , December 2002
599 Anti-Corruption Commission, www.anticorruptionsl.org July 2007
600 Anti-Corruption Annual Report, 2003,
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9.4.3 Success Story
The ACC has registered some success in its war against corruption. In its 2003
Annual Report for example, the Commission reported a total of 115 offences handled
in that year alone. 37 of the reported cases relate to misappropriation of public funds
and property; and 18 of the cases relate to the misappropriation of donor funds. Tables
13 and 14 below illustrate the occurrence and category of cases dealt with. See full list
of anti-corruption cases in the high and magistrate courts in appendix F.
Table 13: Categories of case commenced in 2003
No Offence No. of Offence
1 Corruption involving a Public Officer 47
2 Corruption in the Public Sector 13
3 Misappropriation of Public Funds or Property 37
4 Misappropriation of Donor Funds 18
Table 14: Misappropriation of Public funds
No Ministries/Departments No. of Investigations
1 Education 8
2 Customs and excise -
3 City Council of Freetown 1
4 State House -
5 National Power Authority 1
6 Income Tax (NRA) 1
7 Ministry of Health -
8 Prisons -
9 NCRRR 1
10 Ministry of Education, Youths & Sports 3
11 Sierra Leone Army -
12 National Development Bank -
13 Others 10
Source: Both table adapted from ACC 2003 Report
From the above illustrations, the ACC seem to be headed in the right direction, as it is
making inroads and creating the required impact both in the public as well as the
private sectors. A case in point as reported in the media is presented below in Box 7.
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Box 7: Anti-Corruption Commission probes senior public official
The Independent, 03 May 2005, By Mohamed Kai
The Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone has continued its drive against prevalent
corruption in the country. The Director General of Sierra Leone Water Company
(SALWACO) Justin Musa is the most recent catch in the Commission's net.
The ACC has executed two search warrants at his offices in Freetown. Reports say a search
warrant was also executed at his residence on Tuesday 26 April 2005. Justin Musa was
arrested, detained but has been given bail. Justin Musa is suspected of misappropriating funds
of SALWACO.
The Public Relations Officer of the ACC Emmanuel Aiah Sennesie says the matter is under
investigation. The warrant might not be unconnected with Justin's suspected embezzlement of
over 2 million Pound Sterling meant for the provision of safe drinking water at Makeni, Bo
and Kenema in the provinces. The funds were provided by the African Development Bank and
the contract was awarded to CEEMATS, a local firm, but several problems arose that hindered
the implementation.
SALWACo was set up by government to provide water supply to urban towns in the provincial
areas of the country. Corruption has been observed to be Sierra Leone's biggest problem in
post-war era. There have been reports of fictitious contracts in many public places. (Payments
are made for services not rendered). Some public officials have also been suspected of
diverting funds to private accounts, a phenomenon that has aroused the interest of the Anti-
Corruption Commission.
Source:
http://admin.corisweb.org/index.php?fuseaction=news.view&id=117317&src=pub
While the Commission is making progress on curbing corruption, problems do exist.
There are serious limitations to the operations of the ACC that inhibit desired
outcomes. These challenges are examined below.
9.4.4 Challenges
The ACC challenges are both institutional and external. They range from
internal failings including inadequate logistics and lack of skilled professionals;
uncoordinated access to and a peripheral involvement in the budget process; and the
lack of political will - all critical to championing the war on corruption.
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9.4.5 Institutional failings
The ACC is limited by the lack of robust institutional capacity to make the
required impact. According to Neneh Daboh, Director of Prevention and Community
Relations of the ACC, “we are handicapped by the lack of experienced, professional
crime analysts and forensic experts in the field of financial fraud. Experts on financial
intelligence are most required here; however, we do not have the resources to hire one
from abroad. We have relied on local capacity which we find very limited”. 601 In
addition, the Commission partly relies on the Government’s financial assistance, the
release of which can be painfully slow thereby inhibiting performance. Also, donor
support seems to be waning in terms of providing financial and technical support.
9.4.6 Uncoordinated role in the budgetary process
That corruption mainly takes place during budget executing such as in
government procurement, cannot be overemphasised.602 It stands to reason therefore
that the Anti Corruption Act could have expanded the scope of the ACC to be directly
involved in the budgetary process. This should have been done through granting the
ACC a direct access to MDA monthly and quarterly reports, as well as creating a
working relationship with the Internal Audit Department in the MOF. In an interview
with Neneh Daboh of the ACC, during which the matter was raised, she concurred:
“As an agent of change we can request access to such materials, however, it could only
be done if we are investigating some form of allegations and not as a routine practice.
A routine working relationship in public expenditure would have made a
difference”.603
601 Interview with Neneh Dabor
602Procurement Reform, Ministry of Finance Briefing Paper, 2003
603 Interview with Neneh Daboh
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In an interview with Mariama Anthony-William, Senior Budget Analyst of the
Budget Bureau, on the oversight role of the ACC in the budgetary process, and on a
possible working relationship between the Budget Bureau and the ACC on budget
monitoring, she responded that there is no working relationship between the two
bodies, but that the need for such a working relationship has never been raised by the
ACC. “I want to believe that the ACC has got the powers to extend its influence in
this territory. But let me say that resistance is the key word, and resistance comes from
all quarters…people don’t want to change. We as a Bureau are still wondering why
MDAs are slow at compliance”. 604 Such a sentiment is shared by Chris Mahoney that
“staff resistance” to good governance reform comes from ministries, departments and
agencies.605
9.4.7 ACC mired in corruption scandals
There have been a number of media reports alleging ACC involvement in
corrupt practices. The reports not only undermine the credibility of the agency but
have created a recipe for doubts over its anti-corruption operations. For example, The
Standard Times Newspaper has run several headlines (more than 6 in number) alleging
ACC malpractices, which the ACC refuted on its official website.606 Another case in
point is a story carried by the Independent Newspaper on June 27 2005 in which the
following was alleged:
The Parliamentary committee probing Val Collier (the former
Commissioner) is reported to be receiving incriminating documents as to
how Collier has been spending the Commission's funds…. Sources say
there is likelihood for Parliament to question why Neneh Dabo one senior
official of the Commission collected 7,000 dollars as subsistence
allowance for just one trip to Vienna, Austria to attend an Anti-
604 Interview with Mariama Anthony-Williams, January 2007
605 C. Mahoney, Campaign for Good Governance, Anti-Corruption Commission,
www.anticorruptionsl.org January 2007
606 See Anti-Corruption Website, www.anticorruptionsl.org
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Corruption conference. The Commission has been discovered to spend a
whooping Le 20 billion on special operations alone and Le 118,540,000
on the Commission's generator. 607
While some of the stories carried in the media may or may not be true, they are
however a recipe for the waning of the ACC’s morale in its fight against corruption.
9.4.8 The lack of political will
The ACC leadership has changed. The Commissioner Val Collier resigned
amidst unsettled relationship with the judiciary and political leadership. The
Commissioner has not only been on the wrong side of things with the head of the
Judiciary, as alleged by the media, but that he also resigned his position as a result of
pressure from the political leadership.608 Commenting on the resignation of the
Commissioner, Saio Kamara, Editor of a local newspaper, Awareness Times, said:
We in the media business knew that Val was going to go. The SLPP [party in
government] has a way of getting their men off the hook and even rewarding
them for wrongdoing. Mohamed Daramy, a Madingo by tribe, who was
Deputy Minister of Finance and was tried in a case of fraud, is now the
Minister of Development and Economic Planning. Take another example:
Kanji Daramy, also a Midingo, the same tribe as the President, was removed
as head from SALPOST [Sierra Leone Postal Services] for committing fraud,
he was rewarded by being appointed as Presidential Spokesman. And as if
that was not enough, the same Spokesman has now been appointed Chairman
of SIERRATEL [Sierra Leone Telecommunications]…..ACC is only a front
to gain donor support; and who in this country doesn’t know that the new
Chairman of the ACC, Joko Smart, is Kabbah’s man? ACC is a big joke.609
Chris Mahoney of Campaign for Good Governance, a local non-governmental
organization (NGO), also raised similar sentiments in an article: “Addressing
corruption in Post Conflict Sierra Leone”610 that the ACC is an “intentional
infrastructure flaw” through which the insiders of Government get away with fraud.
607Independent Newspaper, “Parliament Probes Anti-Corruption Commission Head”, 27 June 2005
608 Ibid.,
609 Interview with Saio Kamara, Editor, Awareness Times Newspaper, Freetown, Sierra Leone
610 Anti-Corruption Commission, Freetown www.anticorruptionsl.org January 2007
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Mahoney stressed the fact that the whole idea of reform and good governance is meant
to “satisfy donor requirements for donor funds without implementing the anti-
corruption strategy”. 611
Concerns have been raised, also, that the role of the Attorney-General who is
also the Minister of Justice in the fight against corruption has not been a healthy one. It
has been alleged that the Attorney-General through whose courts the alleged anti-
corruption cases are heard, resorts to a delay mechanisms in order to get party insiders
off the hook. 612 This is reflected in the number of cases that have been referred to the
courts without conclusion. About 51 percent of the cases are still awaiting decisions in
the courts (See Appendix F for number of cases and the poor trend in prosecutions).613
9.4.9 Summary
Drawing on the above findings it could be said that while reforms geared
towards transparency and accountability in the public sector is required, resistance to
change is strong and commitment to reform and political will from leaders is low.
Another challenge rests with the vision of the leadership of the Commission: the way
forward, it could be said, will largely depend on the drive of the agency leader. In all,
although political will is lacking and the leadership may be acceding to the externally
prescribed policies from donor partners, it is also relevant to note that these institutions
have come to stay and that impact will take root, but it will be gradual. The ACC is
also another case of relative success in the budgetary process of Sierra Leone.
611 Ibid.,
612 Ibid.,
613 Ibid.,
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9.5 CIVIL SOCIETY
9.5.1 Introduction
Until recently, civil society and media participation in the budget process
which is core to meeting the OECD transparency and accountability benchmarks was
almost non existent. The political arrangements and power dynamics under both the
APC and NPRC regimes was such that critical voices were considered anti-
government and every attempt was made to suppress them. Critical voices from the
media and civil society organisations are now on the increase to which the Government
is tolerant to an appreciable level.614 There is a number of civil society initiatives
organised around several themes: these range from civic campaigns to poverty
reduction. It must be mentioned however, that these changes have been brought about
as a result of pressure from the development partners rather than as Government
initiatives.
An appreciable increase in the number of community based organisations now
exists both in the capital city, Freetown and in the rural areas. For example, an
umbrella organisation, the Sierra Leone Association of Non Governmental
Originations (SLANGO) was created as a rallying point for all NGOs in the country.
This is considered a bold move by civil society activists as a step towards engaging the
Government and local authorities to improve service delivery and political reforms.
614 Interview with Abu Brima, Co-ordinator, Network Movement for Justice and Development,
Freetown, Sierra Leone, February, 2006
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9.5.2 Civil Society and the budgetary process
Civil society mind set has also focused on the budget process and as a
corollary; the Government has complemented this by involving citizens in the budget
process. Three major developments that have taken place in participatory budgeting
help to analyse the role of the citizens and the media in achieving transparency and
participation in Government budget. First, there is now the District Budget Oversight
Committees designed to enhance community participation in the development of
budget, monitoring and evaluation of Government performance. This is provided for in
the GBAA to involve communities proactively in broader decision making; second, is
the involvement of civil society organisations in Budget Hearings prior to finalising
the budget document for submission to the Cabinet and Parliament; and third, is the
creation of a civil society united front - a focused umbrella organisation created by
civil society organisations to monitor the implementation of Government’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the utilisation of funds under the Heavily Indebted
Country Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) programme of the World Bank; and most
importantly, monitoring the budget process. These developments are discussed under
the following:
1. District Oversight Committees
2. Budget Hearing
3. Civil Society Alternative Process
4. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)
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9.5.3 District Budget Oversight Committees (DBOCs)
To further strengthen the budgetary process, the Government in 2003
established District Budget Oversight Committees (DBOC) in all the 12 Districts, with
the collaborative efforts of the Paramount Chiefs and Community Representatives.615
The Oversight Committees serve as intermediaries between the Government and the
communities. The DBOCs comprise of citizens of good character. The committees
discuss development plans with local political leaders, and track the budget and the
Government’s PRSP process, as it affects their communities. 616 The DBOCs prepare
and submit quarterly reports to the Director of Internal Audit in the MOF, and send a
copy to the Budget Bureau for action. Asked of what value the reports have been to the
audit department or the bureau, Mariama Anthony-Williams said: “the reports are here,
but let’s say, the reform has just started…we will along the line do something about
the reports”.617
The DBOCs also take part in the review of public expenditures and the
monitoring of budget execution. The results of the tracking survey for the 2002, for
example, were presented to Cabinet in November 2003 and its results published
thereafter.618 Consistent with the Government’s desire to enhance transparency and
accountability, the MOF has periodically published information on budgetary
provisions and expenditures in the Gazette extended to Notice Boards in all 146
Chiefdoms in the country. 619
615 Budget Bureau - Briefing Papers, op.cit.,
616 Ibid.,
617 Ibid.,
618 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Report, Ministry of Finance, 2004, p 9
619 Ibid.,p10
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9.5.4 Budget Hearings
After the line MDAs have submitted their Budget Estimates proposals based on
the Budget Call Circular, Vote Controllers and their Professional Heads and
accountants are invited to a Budget Discussion Meeting.620 The objective of the
meeting is to defend and justify the estimates submitted and to make necessary
upward/downward adjustments where possible to the resource distributions within the
agreed Budget ceiling.621 Also, policy issues, objectives and activities for which the
anticipated resources are to be used are discussed in the Budget Meeting. This meeting
for all MDAs last for about two to three weeks. 622
With the introduction of the MTEF process in 2000, the Budget Discussions
took a different turn in 2001 by involving Paramount Chiefs and Community
Community Leaders in the discussion. During the 2002 – 2004 Budget Discussions,
fifteen (15) Paramount Chiefs/Representatives and Community Leaders were invited
from several areas within the country to take part. The discussions would normally last
for three weeks and yield a high dividend to the Ministry of Finance since most of the
salient questions that could bring about improvement in budget operation at
departmental levels were asked by these paramount Chiefs/Representatives and
Community Leaders.623 A case in point is that Government now pays the West African
Basic Education Certificate Examination fees for all junior secondary candidates as a
result of budget hearings. Extreme poverty was given as a reason for the proposal.624
620 Budget Bureau-Briefing Paper, op.cit., p6
621 Ibid.,p6
622 Ibid.,p6
623 Ibid., p7
624 Interview with Mariama Anthony-William, May 2007
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9.5.5 Civil Society Alternative Process
A broad coalition of civil society organisations - Civil Society Alternative
Process - is led by a collective leadership of three groups, namely; Network Movement
for Justice and Development, National Forum for Human Rights, and Trade Union
Confederation of Sierra Leone.625 These groups steer and direct civil society
participation in the budgetary process including Government’s poverty reduction
programme.
The team has created Community Animators across the country that sensitises
communities on their role and rights relating to national resource distribution. The
group has also formed a network of Task Force across the districts to engage local
government officials and politicians to ensure that development is delivered to the
general citizenry in far-flung communities.626
Mr Abu Brima, National Co-ordinator of the Network Movement for Justice
and Development was interviewed to gauge the level of citizen participation in the
budget process, as well as to measure the effectiveness of the Civil Society Alternative
Process since its formation. Mr Brima highlighted the group is a national advocacy
NGO formed in 1988, in response to the breakdown of the national economy and the
marginalisation of citizens in decision-making. It was created as a strategy to
complement the Government’s efforts on national economic recovery, as civil society
participation is conceived a function of national development. The paramount
objective of the Movement is to address “bad governance” and to achieve “economic
justice”, as the country was brought to its knees by the decade-long rebel conflict.
625 Bulletin, Network Movement for Justice and Development, January 2005, p12
626 Ibid., p12
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9.5.6 Constraints
Civil society involvement in the budgetary process and other financial matters
is limited by its inability to influence government. The most popular case cited by civil
society activists is the World Bank’s approach to reduce poverty under its PRSP,
which required the Government to conduct nation wide consultations, surveys and
sensitisation exercises prior to documenting a national strategy on poverty reduction.
The civil society organisations took part in the exercise to help citizens to highlight
priorities on poverty alleviation.627 According to reports, priorities across the country
varied at regional and at district levels: while health and sanitation were key priorities
in some regions, education topped the list in other areas. During the exercise they
found that rehabilitation of roads to access commercial centres and agricultural
subsidies, preceded education and health. Bad roads affect agricultural communities as
they are faced with the perpetual problem of dumping rotten harvests because of the
inaccessibility to the market areas and limited local market. 628
Despite the disparity in priority needs of regions, the government did not draw
up the final strategic plans on poverty reduction in line with the recommendations of
regions. Rather it went ahead to produce a non-prioritised plan, which did not take into
consideration the views of the communities. In his overall assessment of citizens
involvement in the budgetary process, Brima said: “The government has started to
listen to the people, but it does not heed their voices”.629
627 Ibid, p14
628 Interview with Abu Brima
629 Interview with Abu Brima, January, 2006
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Box 8: Interview with Abu Brima, Co-ordinator, Network Movement for Justice and
Development
Except for the last three years, citizens’ participation in the process is almost non existent, says
Mr Brima. The participation takes two forms: Budget Hearings and PRSP sensitisation and
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS). The Ministry of Finance initiates budget
hearings by inviting civil society activists including members of Parliament to hearings on
budget estimates drawn up by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) for review. The
meetings are usually attended by donors who heavily provide budget subsidy. Mr Brima
lauded the activity as a useful out reach strategy and an inclusive instrument that takes into
account citizens’ views on national resource allocation. But he does not celebrate the move as
a productive function of achieving good governance as the activity is top-down rather than
bottom-up driven, which blunts opportunities for initiatives emanating from citizens as well as
drawing up the agenda of required areas that need to be clarified by government functionaries
at the hearings. Discussions at the hearings are “shallow, hurriedly conducted” and citizens’
inputs have never had a significant impact on the final estimates laid before Parliament by the
finance minister.
9.5.7 Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)
The public expenditure tracking survey is the point of intersection civil society
groups, community leaders, DBOCs, the finance committee and the MOF officials. As
highlighted earlier, the exercise requires local and community communities to deliver
verdict on the public service delivery system. The strategy has helped to bolster
citizens’ participation in line with the OECD Benchmarks for budget transparency.
9.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has reviewed the state of public oversight in the reform
environment of Sierra Leone under President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah since 1996. The
findings underpins that some robust measures have been taken by the development
partners backed – leadership, which promises to flourish in the medium or long term.
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The changes that have been put in place in the Parliament, the audit institution, the
introduction of the anti-corruption commission, and the limited role of the civil society
and the media – all in the budgetary process, promises a change for the better – at least
a departure from the endured under-regulation of oversight, consistent suppression of
people’s opinion and voices, and the underperformance of stagnated spirit in the
Parliament failing to perform. The chapter has helped to identify two key elements of
the study: first, that there have been some significant changes in the external oversight
functions in the budgetary process; and second, that these changes are here to stay, in
particular that civil society role will continue to evolve in the right direction to
influence government decisions.
The key question to be asked, however, is whilst reforms have been gradual
and positive although with challenges of implementation still looming, has the internal
leadership been adequate? These and many questions including the key findings are
captured and appraised in the concluding chapter.
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PART THREE
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
10.1 TESTING OF RESEARCH STATEMENT
This chapter among others tests the research statement; Sierra Leone’s ongoing
reforms in public financial management reform 1996 to 2005 have moved the country
towards improving budget transparency and participation. This is done through
examining the six selected OECD best practices for budget transparency in accordance
with the research findings. The chapter provides concluding remarks on the report and
offers recommendations for improved budgetary process in Sierra Leone. The
following key issues will be explored in testing the statement in accordance with the
OECD best practice criteria:
I. Comprehensiveness of budgets and involvement of stakeholders at the
formulation stage
II. Parliament be given sufficient time (three months) to study, debate and pass
the budget submitted by the ministry of finance
III. Effective internal control measures and internal audit to ensure the integrity of
information provided in reports
IV. The year-end timely submission of reports to the supreme audit institution
(auditor-general’s department) in accordance with generally accepted
principles
V. Parliamentary scrutiny – Parliament be adequately resourced and empowered
to carryout effective scrutiny of the report
VI. The public and media must be proactively involved in the budgetary process
and this to be made possible by the ministry of finance.
From the above outlined codes of best practice the following are reiterated that
Parliament should:
a) Be given sufficient time –no less than three months to study a budget
document before legal authorisation takes place;
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b) Be provided with adequate resources to examine all forms of reports it
deemed fit. The fiscal reports could be monthly, quarterly, half-yearly or
annual reports of the Accountant-General; and
c) Scrutinise the Auditor-General’s report to ascertain value for money.
I. Comprehensiveness of budgets and involvement of stakeholders at the
formulation stage
Comprehensiveness of the budget requires that all sources of revenue are disclosed
and incorporated in the main budget document, and involvement of stakeholders
means that all key players - most importantly, the civil society and the media play
their own part in the formulation of the budget.
a) The research findings show that the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
has significantly impacted the budgetary process in several respects, while the
Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA) on the other hand, provides a
sound basis and assurances for budget transparency. Both the MTEF and the GBAA
promises budget transparency and participation. The MTEF process, in particular,
introduced the relevant framework that aims to achieve a comprehensive budgeting
system by linking planning and budgeting, requiring MDAs to prepare strategic plans –
linking their individual sectoral goals to the national goals, redefining inputs, outputs
and key objectives.
While Government has made admirable progress on improving budget
development in terms of process and procedure, it could be said however, that there
still remains residual challenges on meeting the requirement of a comprehensive
budget. The element of preparing a comprehensive budget has not been met, as some
sources of revenue are not still captured in the main budget or appropriately reported.
These failings are clearly demonstrated in boxes 1 and 2 of the research report.
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b) On the element of stakeholder involvement at the formulation of the budget, it could
be said that this best practice has largely been met by Government. This is underscored
by the involvement of Parliament, notably the Finance Committee and civil society
groups by participating in Budget Hearings organised by the Budget Bureau in the
MOF. This is further reinforced by the survey results, which demonstrates that civil
society participation at the formulation stage of the budget is improving.
In view of the above analysis, this benchmark has partly been met. This is
because while the budget document is not comprehensive, stakeholders are however,
involved in the formulation process.
II. Parliament be given sufficient time (three months) to study, debate and pass
the budget submitted by the MOF
While this benchmark has not been strictly met, it can be said that Government is
progressively moving towards meeting the best practice criterion. This is manifested in
the fact that previously budgets were submitted to Parliament for authorisation one
month before the beginning of a new financial year. However, in recent times, the
budget documents are submitted in October, two months before the new financial year
kicks off. In view of the above findings, this benchmark has moderately been met.
III. Effective internal control measures and internal audit to ensure the integrity
of information provided in reports
Internal audit and control measures in a large measure underscore the key element of
accountability in the public sector. It can be said however, that this element has not
been met in the budgetary system of Sierra Leone.
Abundant evidence suggests in part three, chapter five, that internal audit and
controls are weak across government; for example, delays are common in the monthly
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reconciliation between the Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL), the Accountant-General’s
Department (AGD) and the National Revenue Authority (NRA), as well as in the
annual preparation of the public accounts by the AGD. Also, out of 180 non-treasury
accounts, only 47 accounts have been reconciled. In addition, and regardless of the
established rules on financial reporting, MDAs do not normally comply with monthly
financial reporting. Other weaknesses identified in the system are delays in the
monthly allocation of funds to support programmes, which in some cases, are not
disbursed at all.
Moreover, there is uncontrolled misclassification of spending that is
responsible for misuse of virement across MDAs. Vote Service Registers are not
properly kept or updated, which, according to the research findings, are due to low
professional staff calibre - there is a high number of non-accounting staff - operating
professional duties in the public service. Evidence of inefficient internal control is
further underscored by the spending review conducted for 2002 to 2003 financial
years. The report illustrates huge and rising variance between allocation and
expenditure from 4 percent expenditure increase above allocation in 2001, to 6 percent
in 2002 and to a dismal 9 percent in 2003. As there is no current data to show a reverse
in trends, it can be said therefore, that expenditure controls are very weak.
It stands to reason on the other hand that Government is not oblivious of the
continued trend, and has put in place workable structures to address lapses in
expenditure control. Among these mechanisms are the expenditure control and
payment measures set out in box three of this report: preparation of financial reports by
the Government; integrated financial management system instituted to enhance
decision making and to track financial transactions; and the introduction among several
measures, a new chart of accounts in line with international best practice.
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On the question of internal audit, it could be said that while some improvement
have taken place such as the establishment of internal audit department in the MOF
and within some MDAs, like the internal control requirements, much is still desired in
terms of attaining higher standards. For example, the unit is understaffed, there are no
annual audit plans in place, there is a lack of standard book keeping and recording, and
there is no audit manual to guide the process.
In view of the above weaknesses inherent in the control and audit systems of the
budgetary process, it could be said that Sierra Leone does not meet the best practice
criteria. However something is being done, although not as robust as would be
expected of the system.
IV. The year-end timely submission of reports to the supreme audit institution
(auditor-general’s department) in accordance with generally accepted
principles
The general accepted principle is that the public account of the financial year should be
published no more than three months after the end of the financial year. However, the
public accounts of Sierra Leone for 2001 to 2004 are yet to be completed by the AGD.
In other words, the reports of the Auditor-General for 2001-2003, have been based on
reports of transactions of MDAs.
Whilst the AGD is doing its utmost to finalise and submit the public accounts
for the said periods, it can be said that this benchmark has not been met.
V. Parliamentary scrutiny – Parliament be adequately resourced and empowered
to carryout effective scrutiny of the report
Drawing on the research report, it can be said that Parliament has over the years not
been adequately resourced to carry out budget oversight. While Parliament by law is
fully empowered to scrutinise reports, this function has not been effectively translated
into practice. Parliament is beset with multiple problems ranging from human,
financial and logistical weaknesses to be able to deliver on its mandate. Regardless of
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these missing links, however, Parliament in recent times has revamped itself in terms
of restructuring its committee systems and, as well as holding some institutions to
account.
In view of the above analysis and findings, it could be said that this benchmark
has been partially met, however, surmounting challenges remain that could only be
met through the exercise of political will and long-term commitment.
VI. The public and media must be proactively involved in the budgetary process
and this to be made possible by the ministry of finance.
A lot has been done to enhance citizen and media participation in the budgetary
process. According to Section 2 of the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act
(GBAA) of 2005, the minister must ensure that all interested groups participate in the
decision making, implementation and evaluation processes of the national budgets.
Evidence on the actualisation of these requirements has been reviewed in the report
and they include holding budget hearings, conducting public expenditure tracking
surveys, the establishment of district budget oversight committees (DBOCs), and the
institutionalisation of civil society efforts in influencing the budgetary process.
Whilst these suggest a positive achievement, there is also the missing link of
total involvement of the citizenry in the process as well as providing the district budget
oversight committees the required logistics and an enabling environment to perform
their functions. In view of the overall analysis, it can be said that this benchmark has
moderately been met.
From the above analysis, it is discovered that while the Government of Sierra
Leone is making progress in the area of participation in the budgetary process, the
elements of transparency, which comes with accountability are lacking. Participation
of all stakeholders at the formulation, implementation and evaluation stages is on the
increase. However, there is gross underperformance in the area of transparency: the
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budget documents are not comprehensive; poor and untimely reporting on monthly,
quarterly and annual public accounts pervades the system, and monitoring and control
mechanisms are mostly dysfunctional.
A table capturing the performance of various Governments reviewed in this
study is provided below.
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Table 32
OECD Best Practice Benchmarks for Budget Transparency
Key:
 = poor performance (benchmark not met)
 = very poor performance (benchmark not met)
 = mixed performance, but improving trend (benchmark met)
Administration
1.
Comprehensive
budget &
stakeholder
participation
2.
Three months
given to
Parliament to
pass budget
3
effective
internal
control/audit
prevails
3.
Timely
publication of
public
accounts
5.
Adequate
resource to
enable
Parliamentary
scrutiny
6
Civil society
and media
participation
Comments
Siaka Stevens
1968 - 1985
      Championed
single-party
M-Gen Joseph
Momoh
1985 - 1992
      Introduced
1991
Constitution
and a new
financial law
Cpt. Valentine
Strasser/Madaa
Bio
1992 - 1996
      Reversed the
gains made by
Momoh
Tejan Kabbah
1996 – 2005
      Moving in the
right direction
but with donor
pressure
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10.2 CONCLUSION
The research report has traced the historical development of the Sierra Leone
Parliament since 1787 to the present with emphasis on capacity of Parliament to hold
the executive to account, and the management of financial resources. The piece of
work has also explored the political development of the country with a focus on the
party system overridden by personality and tribal affiliations. The work has also
explored the management of financial resources under the various governments of
Siaka Stevens (1968 – 1985), Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh (1985-1992),
Captain Valentine Strasser and Brigadier Julius Maada Bio (1992-1996), and that of
President, Alhaji Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (1996-2007). The key findings reveal that
with the exception of the Kabbah administration (1996 to 2007), which introduced
standard measures to improve budget transparency, all preceding governments did
little to improve budgeting and/or largely perpetuated corruption.
Drawing on the research findings, a key lesson identified must be highlighted,
which is that the success of reform (among several variables not discussed here) is
contingent on putting the appropriate institutions in place, providing enabling legal
frameworks to define the process as well as to guide implementation; putting in place a
robust people process – building the capacity of the workforce from senior officials
down to the bottom of the ladder, and the flexibility to enable them perform their
duties without interference and hindrance; a robust strategy defined and guided by
systems review and reaching out to stakeholders – allowing for a multiplicity of
opinions to enrich the process – developing a culture to be challenged by stakeholders;
and a leadership that is defined by commitment, will power, and what would be
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referred to as a “phoenix mentality”.630 Of the variables identified, it could be said that
the research findings demonstrate that for nearly a decade 1996-2005, the government
of President Kabbah has registered some successes and they manifest a marked
improvement in budget participation with some achievements in transparency. On the
basis of this premise of the research findings, it could be said that reforms in Sierra
Leone are moving towards improved budget transparency and participation, thus
confirming the research question of the study that, Sierra Leone’s on-going reforms in
public financial management from 1996 to 2005 have moved the country towards
improving budget transparency and participation. This is demonstrated in Table 31
above, which presents a summary indication of the performance of the various
leaderships between 1968 and 2005.
In drawing this conclusion, one is not oblivious of the fact that the measures
introduced by the Kabbah administration were in a large measure influenced or
directed by donors or development partners, principally the World Bank, IMF,
European Union (EU) and DFID. The research report further demonstrates that whilst
the reforms that were being introduced might have been useful and proactive, they
were not robust enough to meet the OECD transparency benchmarks. This brings Lord
Norton’s concerns to the fore about the sustainability of reforms in countries that
heavily depend on donor budgetary support, such as Sierra Leone. One of the concerns
is whether change could be achieved in the medium term before donor support
diminishes or disappears; and secondly, noting that governments are not usually keen
630 As a public sector adviser in the area of public finance, one of the key elements of institutional
success I share with senior officials in government across the Commonwealth is the legend of the
phoenix (the bird that burns itself on the pyre after 500 years of living in the desert only to achieve self-
renewal). The phoenix mentality requires the humility to identify personal and institutional limitations
and to make difficult and realistic decisions to deal with them.
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to be heavily scrutinised, where would political will come from when donor pressure
diminishes?631
On the first question above, it could be said that regardless of donor
involvement in the financial reforms of Sierra Leone for about a decade, a lot more is
desired in order to meet the OECD benchmarks. In other words, whilst much has been
accomplished in terms of adopting principles introduced by the donors, the willingness
to translate principles into practice as related in the analysis of this study remains a
daunting challenge. Furthermore, the need for meeting the challenge of change is
directly related to the question of political will, which is the lynchpin of national
reform. Common sense demonstrates that it is easier to implement internally conceived
ideas and policies than externally prescribed ones. In other words, it could be easier to
carry out one’s own plan of action than those prescribed by external players.
Reform measures introduced by the World Bank, bilateral and multilateral
agencies come with the following challenges: the leadership must first of all
understand the policy, adopt and implement it in good faith, as well as make follow-
throughs. It stands to reason, therefore, that whilst these challenges may be addressed
by a determined government to achieve results, on the contrary, leaderships that are not
keen to be heavily scrutinised, would almost always adhere to externally prescribed
policies only to access extra resources that come with the benchmarks and, not because
they believe in the measures introduced. This is underscored by Chris Mahoney’s
comment in chapter eight, for example, that the Government of Sierra Leone
established the anti-corruption commission to satisfy donor requirements in order to
receive donor funds without implementing the anti-corruption strategy. It could be
631 The comment was raised by Lord Norton whilst reviewing this research. It however turns out to be a
very significant component of a future follow up research: The interplay and impact of political will and
external development partners on reforms
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deduced from this analysis that until the leadership of Sierra Leone commits itself to a
genuine reform strategy, the role and influence of the development partners would not
deliver robust impact.
This brings the role of the civil society and media to the fore. Throughout the
study, it is observed that civil society and the media have not been given the legitimate
space to engage both with government and the development partners nor have they
been able to meaningfully influence decision making around the budget. This is not to
suggest that their collective role has not received due attention at these quarters – it
certainly has – nonetheless, there is room for improvement. Having said that, capacity
enhancement of the media and civil society to be able to hold government to account
also comes as a crucial measure that limits participation. It must be said that both the
government and development partners require a shift that allows for a holistic
integration of these closely related communities in the overall outreach programme.
Furthermore, a key issue that must be addressed is the critical question of a
continued commitment on the part of the Government and succeeding administrations
to consolidate recent gains when donor resources or presence would have declined. On
the face of things it appears from evidence in this research that the Government is
committed to consolidate gains, however, how substantial and sustainable will the
commitment turn out to be given the unmistakable and conspicuous chequered history
of political and economic corruption? May be reforms will continue in the right
direction, or drain into the quagmire of political complacency.
In regard of the above scenario, where will the drive for change and
development emanate if it had never been demonstrated by the political leadership
except when prompted by key external players to do what is right? It appears from
evidence in this research that major changes and reforms were brought to the fore on
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account of external influence such as the introduction of the Medium Term
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for effective budgeting, the National Public
Procurement Authority (NPPA) to achieve fair and corrupt-free procurement
environment, and the introduction of sectoral budgeting, to name a few. Does the lack
of initiative to get things done rest on complacency, or is it a lapse demonstrated by the
lack of political will? It appears that external players have got lot more roles to play in
terms of providing positive direction for economic development than local political
leaders. However, external players only deliver some segments of the process, leaving
the critical task to be carried out by the Government: they are to change the mindset of
public servants, community leaders and that of the people; instil drive and a sense of
purpose in the public service and the people. It is in regard of what ought to be done as
a national strategy that the following approach is recommended to inform decision-
making as a way forward for national development.
10.3 MAIN REFORM CONCLUSIONS
I. That the success of reform will largely benefit from political will and long term
commitment to change, rather than from externally driven ideas that may not
directly reflect the internal social-economic and political dynamics of the
country. Evidence from the research depicts that this is unlikely to happen
given the unimpressive trail of leadership performance over the years.
However, a robust adherence to the provisions of Paris Declaration on donor
alignment backed by the strict application of international best practice on
budget transparency and participation will provide focus and deliver results.
II. That empowerment of key institutions such as the Parliament, the Auditor-
General backed by adequate resources to support their functionality will make
positive difference to reform. The independence of the Audit institution is also
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paramount to the process. The achievement of these international best practices
must be set as a stringent condition for accessing donor funds.
III. There is still a room for the enhancement of civil society and, stakeholder
participation in the budgetary process is urgently recommended.
IV. A review of budget preparation system to capture all sources or revenues and
expenditure (comprehensive budgets) will remove inconsistencies and combat
corruption.
V. A strengthened control environment is required to enforce internal control,
financial reporting and internal audit across the MDAs.
VI. There is the general need to strengthen budget oversight by empowering all
oversight institutions.
VII. That Government should continue to empower its citizens in the quest of
achieving a mature level of responsive governance; and
VIII. That to achieve the above, it is highly recommended that Government hold a
national economic forum to “brainstorm” or discuss and search for a way
forward on improving financial governance.
The question also of how to take forward the recommendations emanating from
such a forum would squarely depend on political will and long term commitment to the
new agenda of change, including the desire to consolidate the gains made in the recent
past. Alternatively, the donor community may have to adopt a sunset policy on
budgetary support leading to a gradual withdrawal of all forms of support relating to
budgetary resources. It could be argued that a gradual recession in aid and loan may
influence and trigger change in the development psyche of the people and leaders of
Sierra Leone. The view taken is based on the evidence in this study that the availability
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of budgetary support over the years have permeated the development agenda with little
internal contribution from the leaders and technocrats in terns of initiatives and
commitment. In this regard, the endless stream of budgetary support has become part
of the problem rather than a solution. The resultant effect is a reinforcement of the age-
old social problem of complacency, which is structured on the foundation of
dependency; a state of dependency nurtured by a non-forward looking culture of
underperformance, reinforced and spirited by corruption, maladministration, and a
failure to reinvent and give meaning to itself. It is also about time for the leaders to
note that poverty and war are a failure of politics and policy.
The demeaning state of affairs raises more questions than provide answers. A key
question to be grappled with is how could a country blessed with so much natural
deposits such as diamonds, gold and bauxite, fail to propel itself into affluence for
nearly half a century of independence even though it was armed with the first
institution of higher learning - Fourah Bay College – in the sub region as far back as
1872. Ideally, Mr Macloed’s contribution to the debate on the Sierra Leone
Independence Bill in March 1961 must be carefully considered by every Sierra
Leonean:
The Population and area of Sierra Leone will make it one of the smaller members
of the Commonwealth, but that in itself is no bar to a country holding its
independence with dignity and ability and playing a substantial part on the stage
of the world. Nor is it a particularly rich country, although, as the Report I have
quoted shows, we have been able to make substantial provision for financial
assistance in the early stages. As those hon. Members who have been there will
know, its economy is mainly agricultural, but it has, in addition, rich deposits of
diamonds and iron ore, and bauxite has recently been discovered in substantial
quantities. I think that there is a sufficient economic basis for an independent
future. Certainly, Sierra Leone is much better off than many other countries
which have recently come to their independence. 632
632 Hansard Report: Sierra Leone Independence Bill – Order for Second Reading – 22 March 1961
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Drawing on the above, it could be said that Sierra Leone requires a strong
leadership with vision and commitment to turn around not only the economy but the
development culture and mindset of its people. Certainly, it requires a leadership with
the ability to look beyond the horizon of personal aggrandisement with a conviction
that the pleasures of life could be derived from giving oneself to the good course of a
nation. After nearly half a century of independence, the country deserves a leadership
that prides itself on giving rather than taking, on sowing rather than reaping, and on
respecting the needs of posterity rather than those of a selected few. It is about time
leaders recognise that the key role of leadership is to carry a succeeding generation
shoulder-high to give them the opportunity to see beyond what the current generation
could ever experience.
In conclusion, it must be said that the journey of change is characterised by the
making of tough and difficult decisions in a changing international environment.
Therefore, the leaders of Sierra Leone must note that the test of change and
development lies in the strength and vision of leadership, in the poise of policies, in a
robust people process and in the flexibility to review and adopt new ideas. That while
the country might have inherited the past, the present is the only opportunity it has to
shape the future, and it must do so by drawing lessons but not being afraid to introduce
new thinking with commitment.
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APPENDIX A
Interview, Olayinka Phillips, Ag Dept Director, Internal Audit 14 June 16 2006
1. When was the concept of Internal Audit (IA) brought to the fore in Sierra
Leone’s Public Financial Management (PFM) reform?
Answer: April 2005 when the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act was
created.
2. Was the idea internally conceived, I mean, who thought of the idea within
Government? Or was it externally prescribed such as by donors?
Answer: The idea was prescribed by the donors and is part of the benchmark criteria to
be met for donor support.
3. So, no one thought since independence that internal audit, or a kind of self-
assessment is integral or significant to financial management?
Answer: I will be in trouble. OK, you said this is for academic credit only. Yes, it
wasn’t important to the powers that be. But those who are contributing to our
development … our donors thought it is important. And you know what; they are
driving us crazy on this.
4. Can you tell me in passing, the evolution of internal audit in Sierra Leone?
Answer: At the moment 13 MDAs have internal audit which have recently been
created but only six could be said to meet the donors’ criteria as effective Internal
Audit. The required calibre of staff in terms of qualification and experience is yet to
be provided to properly staff these units. With the exception of the Sierra Leone
Police, the issue of producing regular reports to the vote controller of these MDAs with
copies sent to the Ministry of Finance is still a challenge.
5. Is their a special Act or Regulation on Internal Auditor driving your activities?
Answer: Yes the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005) gave legal
backing to Internal Audit and how this act is to be implemented would be contained in
the new Financial Management Regulations to be finalised in April 2007.
6. What is the Internal Audit structure? Is it centralised in the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), or is it decentralised? I mean, staff arrangements.
Answer: The structure of Internal Audit is still evolving, at the moment a combination
of both centralised and decentralised system is being used. Decentralised in that each
MDA should provide its own staff, do their independent plan of activity, report to their
vote controllers or ministers where the issue of the report concerns the vote controller.
It is centralised because the Internal Audit in all MDAs receive technical support from
the Internal Audit in the Ministry of Finance. However we are looking at a situation
where all Internal Audit Staff within all MDAs will be under the full supervision and
control of the Director of Internal Audit in the Ministry of Finance, he would be
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transferring these staff within the MDAs to foster and maintain their independence.
This would be included in the new Financial Management Regulations.
7. Could you please throw some comment on reporting systems?
Answer: Each MDA reports to its vote controller and the minister is copied. Where
the subject of the report is that of the vote controller himself, then the report is
addressed to the minister. This is stipulated in the GBBA 2005.
8. So, what about sanctions?
Answer: None at the moment. Maybe when the Internal Audit Committee is formed
they will look into this.
9. In the absence of sanctions, what about follow-up systems, how effective are
they?
Answer: Not effective. The formation of the Internal Audit Committee is still a
challenge
10. Any Strategic partnerships?
Answer: None at the moment
11. Is the Internal Audit a division of the Auditor-General’s Office?
Answer: No it is not a division of the Auditor-General’s Office, it is a separate division
within government.
12. Is it a division then, of the Accountant-General’s Office?
Answer: No it has nothing to do with the Accountant-General’s office. Although what
used to be an internal audit unit within the Accountant-General’s office, it was
transferred to the Department under the control of the Director of Internal Audit in the
Ministry of Finance.
13. What are the initiatives, any thing new in terms of practice or management?
Answer: We are moving away from pre-audits and developing an internal audit that
will look at business process and add value to management.
14. Any comments on internal control procedures?
Answer: Each Internal Audit Unit is expected to review the internal controls within
their respective division and report on its adequacy and adherence to management.
Where such controls are lacking, the Internal Audit Unit should make suggestions to
management.
15. Any comments on budget monitoring and evaluation?
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Answer: honestly we have not been able to do much on this as yet. During 2006 the
Internal Audit within the Ministry of Finance looked at how the imprest given to Sierra
Leone Police was spent and a comprehensive report was issued to the Inspector
General of Police. Other Charges of Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Internal Affairs
were also audited with reports sent to their vote controllers and each minister copied.
This was done in a bid to have first hand evidence as to how budget in these ministries
are implemented.
16. Can you tell me a success story?
Answer: Apart from the Sierra Leone Police that have implemented most of the
recommendations none of the other MDAs have complied.
17. What about the challenges you face: Institutional, capacity, funding, wages,
equipping, MOF, external, etc
Answer: From my own perspective as a government, we have not made Internal Audit
a priority therefore, the required attention from the powers that be have not been given
to it.
On Capacity, there is generally an apparent lack of capacity within the entire
government machinery from which Internal Audit is no exempt. The ministry of
finance is talking about employing 8 new internal audit staff as clerks and audit
assistant - these would be deployed in the various MDAs. The joke about this is that
they are claiming to target graduates and accounting technicians but they are offering
to pay the mainstream Civil Service pay of less than Le200,000 to [approximately,
£40.00 Great British Pounds] these staff.
18. Per month?
Answer: Yes, per month.
About funding, the Department needs more attention in terms of funds to make its
existence felt. Now about wages – As I speak to you my contract will end on the 30th
June 2007 although the European Commission is saying they will provide funding up
to 31st December 2007. No sustainability plans have been set by the Ministry of
Finance as to the way forward and all three qualified staff within the Internal Audit…
in the entire government machinery are contract staff: two are paid by the European
Commission and the Director is paid by DFID.
19. What about equipment?
Answer: I must confess it is getting better but the process is very slow and a lot more
needs to be done if the department should be effective. I stand to be corrected but
personally, I am not sure whether as a ministry we want Internal Audit to be effective
and efficient. I believe donors should pay attention to Internal Audit in terms of project
support and not make it an EC something.
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20. Can you offer any recommendations?
Answer: The donors needed to come down hard on the ministry to own Internal Audit
as their project and make it a budgetary priority. I think this is the only language that
our government can understand.
21. Any other issues not captured here, today?
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APPENDIX B
MTEF Forms
Answer: No, not at all.
Application for Quarterly Release of Funds - Other Charges
To be used for GOSL Funds
MTEF/PETS FORM 1 No…………
Quarter: ________________
MDA Code____________________ Division Code: ________________ Programme Code:
_______________
Accounts Details: __________________________________________ Accounts Code: _________________
Annual Provision _________________ Releases to Date ____________________ Balance
_______________________
Programme Objective(s) as per Strategic Plan: / Ref. No……..
Ref No. Activities/Details of Expenditure Amount (Leones)
Total for
Quarter
Complete details as per Procurement Plan
1. Procurement Method: 2. Ref
No……………………..
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EXPENDITURE AND ACTIVITY INITIATION FORM Form:
MTEF/PETS 2
Activity and Expenditure Initiation
To be used for both GOSL and Donor Funds
This Form is to be completed by the Programme Manager when an activity is to be implemented for which funds will
be required. The purpose of the Form is for the Programme Manager to state the activity, to which Objectives it relates
(as shown in the 2003 MTEF Estimates) and the types and costs of the inputs (or items and sub-items) required.
The Form is to be authorized by the Vote Controller and Professional Head and to be attached to the LPO and Payment
Voucher for the expenditures.
PART ONE: ORGANISATION
MDA:
Division:
Code:
Code:
Programme: Code:
Region:
District:
Code:
PART TWO: OBJECTIVE AND ACTIVITY
Indicate whether expenditure is:
Item 2: Other Recurrent Expenditure
Item 3: Capital Expenditure
Item 4: Development Expenditure
Code:
Code:
Code:
Name Signature
Date
Initiated by: (The Programme Manager) ___________________________ _________________________
________________
Certified by: (The Professional Head) ___________________________ _________________________
________________
Authorised by: (The Vote Controller) ___________________________ _________________________
________________
Approved by: (The Minister) ___________________________ _________________________
________________
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Indicate Objective of Expenditure:
Description of Activity: (Write brief description of Activity as described in Strategic Plan and Estimates)
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Form: MTEF/PETS 2
(Continued)
Activity and Expenditure initiation
This part of the Form is to be used in identifying and coding the Items required and their costs. For each Item identify
whether it is to be funded by GOSL or a donor and code the source of funds. The bottom part of the Form is for
authorisation of the expenditure and completion of the full account code for the expenditures
PART THREE: TYPES OF EXPENDITURE REQUIRED
Items and sub-Items (use standard Items and Sub-items)
Funding Institution
(Indicate the amount to be
funded by the GOSL or
donor
Local Purchase Order No: Date:
Payment Voucher No: Date:
Sub-Code Accounts
Details
Description Qty
Cost
Le
GOSL Donor
Le Le
PART FOUR: AUTHORISATION OF EXPENDITURES
Programme Manager:
Name:_______________________ Signature:__________________ Date:_________________
Professional Head:
Name:_______________________ Signature:__________________ Date:_________________
Vote Controller:
Name:________________________ Signature:___________________ Date:_________________
Minister:
Name:________________________ Signature:___________________ Date:_________________
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APPENDIX C
Recommendations of Stakeholders on Public Procurement Reform
Recommendation 1
It is recommended that the Vice President’s Directive of 22nd April 2003 be
implemented fully in order to avoid any possible confusion. The National Steering
Committee shall have the authority to amend procurement procedures including setting
thresholds for ministries and other procuring entities. The National Steering
Committee shall also have the authority to waiver competitive bidding upon request
from procuring entities.
Recommendation 2
It is recommended that the Executive Secretariat of the Steering Committee is
appointed the focal point for all public procurement cases in the interim period. The
staff of the Central Tender Board is transferred to the Executive Secretariat to support
this function. All ministries and other procuring entities shall submit all procurement
cases above Le 12 millions to the Executive Secretariat.
Recommendation 3
It is recommended that a Chief Procurement Officer be appointed in each Ministry and
supported by a procurement staff whose size is determined by each agency’s
procurement volume.
Recommendation 4
It is recommended that for all procurement cases the Executive Secretariat appoint an
evaluation committee consisting of a user agency representative, a technical expert(s),
a representative of the ministry and other stakeholders as necessary, including a
representative of the Executive Secretariat.
Recommendation 5
Although each country should have its own distinctive procurement process, there are
still common procurement practices among countries: specifications, solicitation,
evaluation, negotiations, contract award, etc. Thus:
It is recommended that the National Steering Committee releases a procurement
manual instead of the suggested non-binding procurement guidelines as a contingent
model that is used for the Government’s procurements from now to the time a new
system is established and implemented as the result of the reform process.
This manual should be used by all ministries/agencies within the Government.
Ministries/agencies should not be prohibited from modifying it in order to meet their
special procurement needs, however only if approved by the National Steering
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Committee. A sound procurement systems share common features, and this interim
procurement experience will not be wasted as it will be transferred to the procurement
reform system introduced later.
Recommendation 6
Dishonesty and mismanagement are commonly found in the contract administration
phase. It is recommended that the Executive Secretariat in cooperation with the
Auditor-General’s office and the Stock Controller department is appointed to monitor
contract implementation, particularly for major projects.
316
APPENDIX D
Interview, Mr Farrel Elliott, Executive Assistant NPPA 10 January 2007
1.
When was decentralised public procurement (PP) system conceptualised in the
Public Financial Management (PFM) reform of Sierra Leone?
Answer: Public Procurement as a PFM tool was mainstreamed by the Public
Procurement Act of 2004 and largely by the integration of procurement
planning as part of the PFM reform supported by the IRCBP. The preparation
of procurement plans became conditionality for the release of tranches of
budgetary support by the World Bank
2. Was the idea internally conceived; I mean, who thought of the idea within
Government? Or was it externally prescribed such as by donors?
Answer: The idea was almost accidental. The president was on a visit to the
Sea Ports and he was informed of the procurement of a faulty forklift. He then
disbanded the Central Tender Board and the Cabinet released a document
transferring procurement to the Office of the Vice-President. The UNDP and
the World Bank were soon after approached for technical and financial
assistance for the design and implementation of a procurement reform
programme.
3. Tell me more about the evolution of Public Procurement in Sierra Leone
Answer: The First phase was from September 2003 to December 2004, during
which Public Procurement was regulated by the Interim Rules and Regulations
which was drawn up by the Procurement Reform Secretariat and IAPSO with
feedback from the World Bank and the UNDP. The second stage was after the
passing of the law in 2004 which brought the National Public Procurement
Authority into force. Currently, major entities are required to plan according to
the Public Procurement Act and a lot of capacity building exercises are being
conducted by the NPPA in connection with other service providers such as the
Institute of Public Administration and management and the University of Sierra
Leone.
4. What are the strong points of the NPPA Law, and what about the weak areas?
Answer: One of the strong areas is that it ensures the independence of the
NPPA in principle as an agency of assurance. Another positive aspect is the
requirement for procurement planning and the emphasis on capacity building.
Two noted weaknesses are the low fines/sentencing guidelines for people who
contradict the law and lack of protection for whistle blowers.
5. What is the NPPA structure, how decentralised is the agency?
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Answer: the NPPA has an 8-member Board of which the CEO is a member; the
agency has independent review panel of 3 members appointed by the Minister
of Finance. Currently the NPPA has no decentralised structures
6. What is the working relationship between entity procurement officials and the
NPPA? How cohesive is it?
Answer: The NPPA provides oversight, monitoring and capacity building
functions in relation to the agencies. Agencies/entities are required by law to
submit and publish procurement plans. To the best of my knowledge the
emphasis has been on the 7/8 big spending ministries and agencies, the most
important of which are health, education, finance and agriculture.
7. How effective is the NPPA in carrying out its mandate?
Answer: Relatively well. The prime constraint has been funding to be able to
fully operationalise a lot of its planned activities. The donors are dragging their
feet in providing pledged funds to enable the agency to perform. If you want to
ask for reasons, let me say that donors are good at making promises and
pledges, but it is something else to make good on promises.
8. Has the feet dragging got anything to do with poor performance on the part of
the agency?
Answer: not exactly. We may have been initially branded to be slow at
implementing, but those were only teething problems. Now we are into full
operations but the donors like the UNDP have not been honouring their
promises to provide funds for our operations.
9. How transparent is the procurement process across MDAs?
Answer: Hard to tell. The possibilities for information leakage and insider
trading are enormous. Infact, there is suspicion in some quarters that some
public officials are linked to some companies. I cannot provide you with cases
as these are only rumours. But my guess is that they can be true.
10. Are ministries adhering to the prescribed process?
Answer: Yes, largely, in terms of getting plans done. In terms of
implementation, it has been a mixed story as is it not only the responsibility of
the NPPA but the ministry of finance to ensure that there is a no cash flow
problem with procurements. However, some inputs are seasonal and Sierra
Leone budget is still heavily donor-reliant so at time there is very little
correlation between the plans and the implementation. Like I mentioned just
now, the donors are partly to be blamed for the delays in funding.
11. Please comment on Procurement reporting
Answer: MDAs are expected to submit returns on a quarterly basis. However,
this has not been adhered to very strictly.
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Any sanctions being imposed for failing to adhere to regulations?
Answer: I do not know of any sanctions that have been applied to any
offending party.
12. In other words there is a weak Follow-up system
Answer: Currently not very effective as there are serious constraints on staff
strength.
13. How effective is the Independent Review Panel?
Answer: In my opinion not very effective as they have yet to fully assess
complaints brought by suppliers. Infact, there has been a noted reluctance on
the part of suppliers especially to bring cases to the IPRP. Maybe, this is
because they are afraid of losing business.
14. Please cite a case heard by the panel and its outcome
Answer: There was a complaint once heard by the IPRP on the supply of rice
threshers and haulers for the Ministry of Agriculture, but I am not sure of the
outcome. The problem was that the contract was cancelled by the Office of the
President and there are concerns of political interference in the process.
15. Is political interference or the inability of the independent review panel partly
the reason why donors are slowing down support?
Answer: you keep coming to this same issue. I will say no! Let us look it this
way: the donors are more or less in control of reform in Sierra Leone, therefore,
if they observe that political interference or poor performance are becoming the
big issue, they could have easily drawn the attention of the Government and
create further conditionalities. Let me say, therefore that delays in the
disbursement of funds have become the norm.
16. What are the initiatives, any thing new in terms of practice or management
within the NPPA?
Answer: Yes, new thinking has been introduced. The website will be an
excellent platform for the dissemination of information both on procurement
opportunities and awarded contracts. The information on contract awards will
clear or confirm suspicions of collusion on the part of suppliers and MDAs.
17. Any comment on Procurement monitoring and evaluation?
Answer: Currently very weak and needs to be scaled up very much.
18. Can you share with me an NPPA success story?
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Answer: Yes, of course; the passing of the law was a milestone. However,
much needs to be done to operationalise public procurement by getting the
regulations done and improving the capacity of staff.
19. Can you offer any recommendations?
Answer: I think that more should be done in terms of capacity building
especially mid-level officers in the MDAs.
20. Any other issue not captured in this interview?
Answer: No
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APPENDIX E
Interview, Mohamed Jusu, Snr Clerk of Committees 26 June 2006
1. Let us begin by hearing your experiences as a staff of Parliament
Answer: The Sierra Leone Parliament which has more than 31 committees with only 4
persons serving as committee clerks. For example, I serve 7 committees including the
Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Finance Committee, the legislative Committee
and four other committees. I will discuss the PAC which is a statutory committee
established by the constitution of Sierra Leone to examine the reports of the Auditor-
General on the accounts of the country. Regardless of the capacity constraints facing
Parliament, some energy has been pumped into the undertakings of the committee. For
example, the PAC is at the moment concurrently examining three reports: the 2000,
2001 and 2002 reports. It is important that the committee has almost concluded its
report and will submit it soon to Parliament.
The PAC has registered some success in its post war activities, for example, the 1996
and 1999 reports were well received by the donor community, and as a result, the
reports have now been used as benchmark for budgetary support. That is to say, all
reports must meet the standard in terms of substance and quality. Similar sentiments
were emphasised at our last review meeting with the donor partners.
Membership of the committee cuts across party lines on proportional basis. However, a
very thorny issue on the chairmanship has brewed for too long. The opposition All
Peoples’ Party (APC) has been insistent that Sierra Leone must catch up with sister
countries in the Commonwealth on the good practice of a member of the opposition
party chairing the PAC. Regardless of this concerns, I can say with a clear mind that
the committee is up to the job regardless of the chair being the Deputy Speaker of
Parliament as well as a member of the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples’ party (SLPP). A
member of the opposition party sometimes chairs the committee meetings in the
absence of the chair. Members sometimes approach issues on non-partisan basis
because they think serving the interests of the country take precedent over party
interests. Committee members work towards establishing value for money on the
premise that more than sixty percent of the country’s budget is drawn from donor
funds. Upon reflection, the committee’s approach to work convinces me that
institutions can be different regardless of similarities in structures. For example,
although the chair of the committee is Deputy Speaker and member of the ruling party,
the activities of the committee is very impressive. The fact that donors found the 1999
report very useful and went as far as using it as a benchmark for additional funding,
demonstrates the value of the work of the committee This is not to say that all is
perfect about the committee.
2. So what imperfections have you identified and what are the constraints?
Answer: Firstly, capacity is low in terms of members’ ability to scrutinise the report of
the Auditor-Generals in a clear sense of the word. Also, there are only 4 committee
clerks in the whole House and there isn’t sufficient manpower and time to study the
report and to advise the committee on the direction it should take. For example, advice
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on why some issues are important more than others, and how the report content should
be prioritised rests on me alone, and come to look at it, I am serving six other
committees. The report content is usually full of discrepancies within ministries and
agencies MDAs and our diplomatic missions abroad, which require the summoning of
a very high number of officials to appear before the committee. There are several
follow ups to be through reading and digesting the report to be able to guide the
committee. Secondly, the PAC meetings do not normally form a quorum, although this
is infrequent. MPs also complain about their personal welfare relating to the lack of
transport facility for the committee to carryout its job. Other constrains are the lack of
adequate computers, research materials and support staff to facilitate the work of
committee clerks.
On the part of the committee members they say that this like a fulltime job. Sometimes
we spend almost a whole night here looking at reports. So members think they require
motivation to carryon with the job…to perform their duties. Not even the chair of the
committee has got an official vehicle to facilitate on the spot checks both in the capital
and in remote towns and villages of the country.
3. Who appears before the PAC a witness?
Vote controllers, that is to say permanent secretaries and chief accountants of
ministries are summoned to appear before the committee. In certain circumstance,
heads of contracting firms who default in meeting their contractual obligations are
summoned before the committee. Moreover, because of the high incidence of
impropriety in public enterprises, the committee resolved at its last meeting that in
future hearings, chairmen and board members of public enterprises should be
summoned to listen to proceedings relating to the performance of their institutions.
This is considered by the committee an effective method of bringing the conduct of
senior officials to the attention of their chairmen and board members; and it is also an
incentive for board members to take corrective measure at the implementation stage of
budgets.
4. What about sanctions and how effective are they?
Sanctions are normally imposed by the Auditor-General through surcharge measures.
Some progress has been made in recovering lost moneys from senior officials in
government as in the 1996 and 1997 reports. I cannot say that the compliance level is
high. I can say however, that the ultimate responsibility of ensuring that sanctions are
imposed and are effective is the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice. I don’t think
that has been the case.
5. Has there been an increase in meeting hours?
Yes, there has been a tremendous increase in the meeting hours of not only this
committee but other committees as well. Like I mentioned earlier, we meet for the
better part of the night looking at the reports of three years: 2000, 2001 and 2002.
6. Given your vast knowledge in budget oversight, how would you measure the
capacity of MDAs in implementing budget allocations?
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I will not say that MDAs lack the capacity to deliver services or to generate revenue as
the case may be. My candid view is that MDAs are faced with serious constraints that
need an immediate attention of Government. Untimely access to allocations is a big
issue affecting agencies at all levels of Government. For this reason, I personally will
not totally blame an agency for failing to perform if the financial resource is not
accessed to do a job on time. Also, the fluctuation of our national currency, the Leone
against the United States Dollar, affects market prices and contracts.
There is also a human resource problem: there are few trained and qualified accounting
officials in the civil service to support vote controllers in the implementation of their
allocations. A situation exists in which we have a very large number of low calibre
officials such as non financial officials handling money matters. This problem is highly
related to the low level of wages paid in the public service. I will say that some of the
problems considered by the Finance Committee and the PAC are capacity related
rather than fraud related. For example, the recording of financial transactions is a
common problem in some of theses agencies. We have discovered that it is largely
capacity related. Some institutions also underspend their allocation because
management capacity and leadership are absent at the highest level in the civil service.
We are in serious situation.
7. Can you comment on the working relationship between the PAC and the Audit
Service?
A very good working relationship exists between the PAC and the Audit Service.
These institutions are interrelated and as you know, the latter is an arm of the former in
some countries. In Sierra Leone, the PAC highly relies on the technical expertise of the
Audit Service to carryout its work.
8. What about the PAC’s relationship with the public?
PAC hearings are not open to the public, although most Parliamentary businesses are
now open to the general public and the media.
9. Can you comment on the wider Parliament – public relations?
Yes, as I mentioned, the business of Parliament is open to the public except for a few
restricted deliberations. For the budgetary process, Parliament usually assists
constituents to articulate their concerns regarding allocations for projects. For example,
if constituents are aggrieved about the non implementation of a facility, or a certain
project is not implemented as spelled out in the budget document, they have the
opportunity during budget hearings organised by the ministry of finance, to seek
redress by taking advantage of the presence of members of the finance committee. Let
me provide you with an example, the civil society representatives have influenced the
budget document on more than two situations. A memorable case is the increase in
education budget after the 1999 rebel invasion of Freetown, which affected the daily
livelihood of citizens.
10. As a Clerk also serving the Finance Committee, can you throw some light on the
activities of the committees?
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The Finance Committee has been doing extremely well in terms of monitoring the
implementation of the budget. The committee looks at budget estimates of line
ministries and asks for quarterly returns. Some comply with this demand and some
don’t. However, there are sanctions put in place for non compliance, for example, the
allocation of defaulting institutions are withheld until the report is submitted to the
committee. I cannot say, however, that absolute compliance prevails. There are some
lapses.
When the budget is presented before Parliament by the minister of finance, the
committee prepares questionnaires and dispatch them to line ministries in accordance
with their unique situations and would integrate feedbacks into its final
recommendation to the Committee of Supply. This committee comprises the whole
House reconfigured into 9 appropriation sub-committees to study the budget document
prior to the budget debate. Some of the general questions raised by the Finance
Committee are: what was your original proposed budget submitted to the ministry of
finance; What was the final allocation made by the finance ministry; How did you
implement the previous allocation; What were your constraints; do you envisage
similar constraints, and what could Parliament do to address those constraints; and
what have you done about your constraints? In the case of a revenue generating
institution, the following typical questions are asked: what is your target for the next
year? Did you meet your target in the previous year, if not, what were your
constraints?
11. Is Parliament normally given sufficient time to debate and pass the budget?
Not really, Parliament always struggles with passing the budget on time. But this year
was different as the budget was presented in October ahead of the new financial year
which begins in January. In cases of delay to authorise the budget, the President of
Sierra Leone has the constitutional mandate to expend moneys from the consolidated
fund through the signing of a warrant that lasts for a period of three months: January to
March. If Parliament fails to authorise the budget during this period, then and another
warrant is issued by the President for the continuity of Government business. MPs
consider presidential warrant an erosion of the authority of the Parliament.
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APPENDIX F
Anti-Corruption Cases in High and Magistrate Courts
NO. FILE
REFERENCE
NAME OF
ACCUSED
OFFENCE DATE
IN
COURT
COURT CURRENT POSITION
1. 2000-1 Justice Taju Deen
(Judiciary)
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
- High
Court,
Appeal
Court
Convicted, 12 months
imprisonment. Appealed
against decision, awaiting
result of appeal
2. 2001-35 Cummings
(Commissioner of
Income Tax
Department
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
- High
Court
Acquitted January 2003
3. 2001-001 Prince Harry David
Morlu (Principal
School of Hygiene
Bo) and Alusine
Christian Kamara
(Finance Officer,
School of Hygiene
Bo)
Misappropriation
of Public Funds
16/9/03
26/903
High
Court
On 22/4/04 both accused
persons were found guilty on
8 counts out of 9 counts. On
6/5/04 they were sentenced as
follows: 1) Prince David
Harry Morlu 6 months on
each count to run concurrently
and to pay fine of
Le20,000.00 on each count. 2)
Alusine Christian Kamara to
pay a fine of 45,000.00 on
each count. Both to jointly
refund Le17,511,000.00; the
money misappropriated to the
state of Sierra Leone
4. 2001-030 Alhaji M.S.
Kargbo (Public
Heath Aid,
Freetown City
Council)
Misappropriation
of Public Funds
26/9/03 High
Court
Convicted on 12/1/04 on
count 3, misappropriation of
public fund of Freetown City
Council & sentenced to 6
months imprisonment & to
pay Le19,000 compensation
to FCC. Acquitted &
discharged on counts 1 & 2
misappropriation of public
fund of FCC.
5. 2001-017 Abdul Mark
Saccoh (Director
Christian Child
Charity and
Community
Development
Project)
Misappropriation
of Donor Funds
8/10/03 High
Court
On 2/04/04 the trial judge
Justice Schuster found him
guilty on both counts: count
1-Le44522,560/- count 2 –
Le20,188,800.00. On 20/4/04
he was sentenced as follows:
Count 1, 2 yrs. Imprisonment,
Count 2, 4 years
imprisonment. Sentence to
run concurrently. He was
ordered to pay the entire
amount involved to the state.
6. 2001-3 Lovetta Adams and
Abie Bockarie
(National
Registration)
Soliciting
Accepting an
Advantage
20/3/02 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Lovetta Adams convicted on
both counts on 30/12/03, each
counts Le1,000,000 or 12
months to run concurrently,
fine paid. Abie Bockarie
acquitted and discharged.
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NO. FILE
REFERENCE
NAME OF
ACCUSED
OFFENCE DATE
IN
COURT
COURT CURRENT POSITION
7. 2001-50 Mohamed
Lamrana Sowe
(Businessman)
Offering an Ad-
vantage
5/10/02 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress, no
witness taken since October
2003.
8. 2001-113 Momoh Pujeh and
Mary Pujeh
(Member of
Parliament and
House Wife
(Transfer to Sierra
Leone Police)
Possession of
Dia-mond
8/8/02 Magistrate
Court No.
1
Momoh Pujeh convicted in
October 2003, 12 months
imprisonment, appealed
against conviction in the High
Court. Won appeal, acquitted
& discharged. Prosecution in
progress in respect of the wife
CID dealings
9. 2000-9 Sulaiman
Massaquoi and
Saidu Kamara
(Police)
Soliciting and
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
9/10/01 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Police Inspector Massaquoi
convicted on both counts and
sentenced to 1 year
imprisonment on each count
to run concurrently or pay a
fine of Le1,000,000.00 on
each counts. DSP Saidu
Kamara acquitted and
discharged 30/12/03
10. 2001-4 Joseph Bangura
(Director General,
Ministry of
Defence)
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
15/3/02 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in Progress
11
.
2001-20 Samuel Kamara Fraudulent
conversion
15/0/02 Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
(police dealing)
12. 2000-4 Alfred Jonathan
Blango
Perjury 15/4/03 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
13. 2001-56 Jonathan Nicol
(Court Clerk)
Soliciting and
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
19/8/02 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
14. 2001-71 Kemmoh
Mustapha Sankoh
(Police)
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
14/11/02 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
15. - Moses Banya
Kapuwa
Unlawful
Possession of
Canabis Sativa
3/6/03 Magistrate
Court No.
3
CPS dealing, arrested by
A.C.C. officers, acquitted and
discharged
16. 2001-128 Michael Carew
(Judiciary)
Bailiff of the High
Court
Soliciting an Ad-
vantage
11/9/03 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
17. 2003-202 Joseph Johnson
Gberie
Misappropriation
of Public funds
13/8/03 Magistrate
No. 3
Convicted on 7/11/03,
sentenced 3 years or
Le2,000,000.00, paid the
Le2,000,000.00
18. 2002-95 Osman Bangura
(Cadet
Administrative
Officer – Lands)
Soliciting and
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
13/8/03 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
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NO. FILE
REFERENCE
NAME OF
ACCUSED
OFFENCE DATE
IN
COURT
COURT CURRENT POSITION
19. 2001-49 Major Abdul
Sorie Conteh
(Military)
Accepting an
Ad-vantage
29/7/03 Magistrate
Court No.
3
Prosecution in progress
20 DOC/IF/01/097 Arthur
Matthew
Belden
Principal
Tomlison
High School
Songo
Misappropriation
of public funds
3/2/04 High Court
Freetown
On 12/2/04 he pleaded guilty
to all 10 counts of
misappropriation of public
funds. On 16/2/04 sentenced
to one day imprisonment and
to refund Le1,783,593.00 to
the Government of Sierra
Leone within 8 weeks period.
21 DOC/IF/02/015 Albert
Joseph
Gombo
Coordinator
ADDO, Bo
Misappropriation
of public funds
9/2/04 High Court
Freetown
On 24/2/04, the surety Paul
Makavora gave evidence of
the death of the accused and
tendered relevant documents
to the effect. The matter was
then withdrawn from the court
in view of the death of late
Albert Joseph Ghombo.
22 DOC/IF/00/012 Joseph
Aruna
Regional
Electoral
Commission
(East)
Misappropriation
of Public Funds
5/4/02 High Court Prosecution in progress
23. DOC/IF/00/012 Francis
Lissa
Hindowa
Regional
Electoral
Commission
(South)
Misappropriation
of Public Funds
5/4/02 High Court Prosecution in progress
24 DOC/IF/01/057 Mohamed
Alie Kargbo
Surveyor,
Geological
Dept.
Misappropriation
of Public Funds
16/04/04 Magistrate
Court No.3
Prosecution in progress
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APPENDIX G
Field Questionnaire Civil Society June 2006
A) Socio-economic characteristics of respondents:
1) In which age group do you belong?
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
55 +
2) What is your sex?
Male
Female
3) Your highest level of education attained
Secondary
Tertiary:
a) Technical and vocational institute
b) Teacher Training College
c) Professional Diploma
c) University:
First Degree
Masters
PhD
Other………………………….
4) What is the level of your current position in your organisation?
Leader
Member of the Executive Committee
Board member
Field Activist
Professional
Support Staff
Other (please specify):
5) How long have you worked as a civil society activist?
3 years or less
3 – 5 years
5 – 9 years
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9 years or above
B) Budget Participation
6) Have you or your organisation participated through consultations in the budget
preparation exercise?
Yes
No
7) In general do civil society groups influence the budget draft developed by the
Budget Bureau in the Ministry of Finance?
Yes
No
Don’t know
If yes, please provide an example
8) What is the level of civil society participation in the budgetary process?
Very high
Appreciably improving
Not improving
Don’t know
9) What is the level of collaboration between civil society groups on the budget?
Very high
Appreciably improving
Not improving
Don’t know
10) Is the level of budget awareness and participation of civil society in the capital,
Freetown the same as in the rural areas of Sierra Leone?
Yes
No
If no, please explain
C) Monitoring Expenditure
11) How would you consider the role of civil society in monitoring Government
expenditure?
Very active
Appreciably improving
Not active
Don’t know
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12) Has the exercise Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) been a useful
monitoring and evaluation tool?
Yes
No
Don’t know
13) Do you consider the District Oversight Committees (DOCs) a useful grass roots
institution that could positively impact the budget process?
Yes
No
Don’t know
14) How effective are the DOCs in carrying out their functions?
Highly effective
Appreciably improving
Not effective
Don’t know
D) Interaction with Government and other Stakeholders
15) What is the level of civil society interaction with International Financial
Institutions such as the World Bank on civil society participation?
Very high
Interaction appreciably improving
Less interaction
Don’t know
16) How would you consider the Government’s strategy on improving civil society
participation in the budgetary process?
Highly effective
Appreciably improving
Less effective
Don’t know
17) What is the level of resource provided by Government to enhance civil society
participation in the budgetary process?
Adequate
Appreciably increasing support
Not adequate
Don’t know
18) How would you consider civil society interaction with MPs?
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Very high
Appreciably improving
Less interaction
Don’t know
19) Does the civil society influence Parliament’s deliberations and decisions on budget
matters?
Yes
No
Don’t know
20) How often do civil society groups attend hearings/meetings such as the Public
Accounts Committee hearings?
Very often
Less often
Don’t know
E) General Oversight
21) How would you consider the oversight role of the Audit Service in the budgetary
process?
Highly effective
Appreciably improving
Less effective
Don’t know
22) Do you consider account reports published by the Accountant-General timely,
complete and informative?
Yes
No
Don’t know
23) Do you find the Auditor-General’s report a deterrent as well as a learning tool for
budget officials and budget implementers in Sierra Leone?
Yes
No
Don’t know
24) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the last report (you saw) of the Auditor-
General (for example, were defaulters brought to book)?
Highly satisfied
Satisfied
Not satisfied
Don’t know
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25) Do you have confidence in the overall budgetary process of Sierra Leone?
Yes
No
Don’t know
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APPENDIX H
Field Questionnaire MDA Officials June 2006
B) Socio-economic characteristics of respondents:
6) In which age group do you belong?
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
55 +
7) What is your sex?
Male
Female
8) Your highest level of education attained
Secondary
Tertiary:
a) Technical and vocational institute
b) Teacher Training College
c) Professional Diploma
c) University:
First Degree
Masters
PhD
Other………………………….
9) What is the level of your current position?
Executive
Senior Management
Middle Management
Junior Management
Professional
Support Staff
Other (please specify):
10) In which department have you/ do you work within government?
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Please state: ……………………………
11) How long have you worked in the public sector?
3 years or less
3 – 5 years
5 – 9 years
9 years or above
B) Budget Transparency
7) Have you participated in drawing up estimates for your MDA?
Yes
No
a) If no, do you think you should have been involved, and why?
8) Does the Budget Bureau provide you adequate window to defend your estimates?
Yes
No
Don’t know
9) How often does your MDA prepare a supplementary budget?
Every year
Once in the past three years
Once in the last five years
Not at all
10) Does your MDA experience delay in the release of funds to implement
programmes set out in the estimates?
Delay is common
Some delay
Less delay
No delays
(For any of the above, please explain)
11) Does your MDA prepare timely expenditure report?
Yes
No
Don’t know
12) Do internal auditors monitor and report on your MDA activities?
Yes
No
Don’t know
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If yes, when did Internal Auditors start operating in your MDA?
a) If no, what plans are under way to address the problem
b) Are recommendations of internal auditors taken into account by your MDA?
13) Have new monitoring mechanisms been introduced in your MDA since the
introduction of the new Public Budgeting and Accountability Act?
Yes
No
Don’t know
14) Does your MDA over spend?
Yes
No
Don’t know
If yes, please explain
15) Does your MDA under spend?
Yes
No
Don’t know
If yes, please explain
a. Do you perceive the Audit Service an adversary institution?
Yes
No
Don’t know
17) How would you rate the Audit Service in exercising its oversight functions?
Effective
Making appreciable improvement
Not effective
Don’t know
18) Do you consider providing adequate resources for the Audit Service a
necessary ingredient for achieving transparent budgeting?
Yes
No
Don’t know
19) Would you consider the Public Accounts Committee an effective oversight
institution?
Yes
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No
Don’t know
20) Do you consider providing adequate resource for Parliament and its Oversight
Committees a plausible strategy to achieving transparency?
Yes
No
Don’t know
21) Would you consider civil society participation robust and has had some
influence on behaviour around the budgetary process?
Yes
No
Don’t know
22) How would you rate the Sierra Leone budgetary process?
Highly transparent
Achieving appreciable level of transparency
Not transparent
Don’t know
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APPENDIX I
Socio-economic data of respondents
Socio-economic characteristics of respondents
The section presents the profile of respondents drawn from both the Civil
Society and Government. Personal characteristics include age, sex, academic status,
present occupation in organisation and length of service in present occupation.
Age distribution
The age distribution of respondents was investigated and results revealed the
following data on Table 14 below.
Table 15
Age distribution of respondents
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56+ Total%
Civil
Society
Total 0 6 21 16 3
% 0 14.28 50.0 38.1 7.14 42
MDAs Total 7 12 11 2
% 32.5 32
Source: Field Survey 2006
The age distribution of respondents revealed that the youngest fell within the age group
of 26-35, whilst the oldest are in the age group of 56 and above. These give a wide
range of considerable variable in the sample respondents’ age in the country. The
insert age value was between 36-45 years and the mean age of sample respondent was
40 years. This indicates that there were more young activists and agency workers (36-
45) than older workers (56 and above). This is in correlation with the life expectancy
in Sierra Leone within which range the working population falls. 633
Gender distribution
633 The World Health Organization country data on Sierra Leone puts life expectancy as 37 for males
and 40 for females, see http://www.who.int/countries/sle/en/
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The gender composition of respondents was investigated and the results are presented
in the Table below.
Table 16
Gender distribution of respondents
Sex
Civil Society MDA.s
No Percentage No Percentage
Male 30 66.7 25 78.125
Female 15 33.3 7 21.875
Total 45 100 32 100
Source: Field Survey
The Table reveals that over two-thirds of the sample respondents were male
66.7 percent. This means that there are more men in the civil society movements and
in the MDAs than there are females. The females represent 33.3 percent of the working
population, which is less than half of their male folks. This underscores the ongoing
campaign for more female representation in the public domain. These include the
formation of several women’s groups including the popular 50/50 gender groups which
advocate high quotas for women in the Parliament and the civil service. It also has led to the
enactment of three key gender bills by the Parliament on Thursday 14th June, 2007: The
Domestic Violence Act; The Devolution of Estates Act; and The Registration of Customary
Marriage and Divorce Act. The three aim to domesticate the convention for the elimination of
all forms of discrimination against women.
Education distribution
The education status of respondents was investigated and the results are
presented in Table 17 below. More than 65 percent of respondents have attained
professional certificates, a diploma, a bachelors or a masters degree. It reveals that
more than half of the respondents surveyed were well informed of the relevance of the
research. However, the absence of doctorates among the sample reflects that country
338
experience in social policy research – a vital component of civil society intervention or
participation in national development process - is low.
Table 17
Distribution of respondents by educational status
Educational Level
Civil Society MDAs
No. Percentage No. Percentage
Technical / Vocational 2 43.5 1 3.1
Teacher Training 9 19.5 0 0
Professional / Diploma 12 26.1 7 21.9
First Degree 21 45.7 13 40.6
Masters 1 2.1 7 21.9
PhD 0 0 0 0
Others 1 2.1 4 12.5
Total 46 100 34 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
Occupation of respondents
The current positions filled by respondents in their various institutions of work were
investigated and the results are provided in the Table below.
Table 18
Distribution of official positions held by respondents
MDAs Civil Society
Occupation /
Current Position
No. Percentage Occupation /
Current Position
No. Percentage
Executive 1 3.1 Leadership 9 19.5
Senior Management 15 46.9 Member of Executive
Committee
12 26
Middle Management 9 28.1 Board Member 0 0
Junior Management 3 9.4 Field Activists 13 28.3
Professional 3 9.4 Professional 5 10.9
Support Staff 1 3.1 Support Staff 5 10.9
Others 0 0 Others 2 4.3
Total 32 100 46 100
Source: Field Survey 2006
The data indicate that a good number of the sample respondents are occupying senior
management or leadership positions in the MDAs and in the civil society groups.
About 50 percent of respondents in the MDAs hold executive or senior management
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positions, while about 46 percent are leaders or executive committee members in the
civil society groups. The proportion of respondents in middle management in the
MDAs is 28 percent and a similar percentage correlates with field activists in the civil
society. This demonstrates that civil society activities are focused mostly in the field.
